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The United States Court for China: A
Triumph of Local Law
TAHIRIH V. LEEt
I. INTRODUCTION
THE LOCAL NATURE OF LAW AND THE RESISTANCE TO IT BY
AMERICAN EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
In 1920, a Belgian trading company contracted in
China to sell a hundred tons of "spray hen's egg yolk" and
seventy-five tons of "hen's egg albumen" to a Mr. W.P.
Hough for U.S. $336,000. Mr. Hough worked for Neuss,
Hesslein & Co., an American corporation with its main
office in New York. While half of the hundred tons of egg
yolk and seventy-five tons of egg albumen were sitting in
Shanghai awaiting shipment, and the other half was in
transit to the place of shipment in Shanghai, the New York
office of Neuss, Hesslein, & Co. cabled the Belgian trading
company with the news that it had been unable to procure a
line of credit to cover the purchase.
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The Belgian trading company sued Neuss, Hesslein in
the United States Court for China, whose judge presided in
the compound of the United States Consulate in Shanghai,
for breach of contract and delivered the summons to Mr.
Hough. Neuss, Hesslein made a special appearance to argue
that the court had no jurisdiction over it and the case
should be dismissed. It gave four reasons to support its ar-
gument. First, it was subject to the jurisdiction only of New
York courts because it was a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the state of New York. Second, it
had not authorized any agent present within the court's ju-
risdiction to accept service of process, thereby consenting to
the court's jurisdiction. Third, it had not registered with the
American Consulate in Shanghai as an American corpora-
tion engaged in business within the jurisdiction of the court.
Fourth, it had not engaged in business within the jurisdic-
tion of the court.
The United States Court for China found that Neuss,
Hesslein did maintain a branch office in Shanghai and
ruled that its prayer for dismissal made the special appear-
ance into a general one, both of which subjected Neuss,
Hesslein to the jurisdiction of the court. During the series of
pleadings that followed the rejection of Neuss, Hesslein's
jurisdictional argument, Neuss, Hesslein held fast to its
denial that it maintained any branch office in Shanghai,
admitting only that "its salesmen, from time to time, had
maintained an office in the city of Shanghai... for the pur-
pose of displaying samples and receiving and forwarding
mail and samples." The court held in favor of the plaintiff
and awarded it half of the damages it prayed for; plus in-
terest and costs.'
The defendant appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed on the
ground that the United States Court for China lacked juris-
diction over Neuss, Hesslein. The United States Supreme
Court had well established the rule, stated the court, that
"[a] foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a
personal liability, in the absence of consent, only if it is
doing business within the state in such manner and to such
1. Neuss, Hesslein & Co. v. Van Der Stegen, 10 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir.
1926).
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extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there."2
The appeals court added that the Supreme Court also
placed the burden of proof on the plaintiff, because United
States federal courts were creatures of United States stat-
ute and of limited jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that
the Belgian trading company had not brought sufficient
proof that Mr. Hough was Neuss, Hesslein's agent, or that
the office he operated in Shanghai was a branch of that
company or that Neuss, Hesslein was in any other way do-
ing business in Shanghai.
The case of Neuss, Hesslein v. Van Der Stegen throws
into sharp relief the tension between local needs and sover-
eign prerogatives that plagued the exercise of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction by the United States in China. Here, the
priority for the people of Shanghai was to reduce the cost of
needlessly producing and then of efficiently disposing one
hundred and seventy-five tons of raw egg that were rotting
in their midst. From the district court judge's point of view,
informed as it was by the stench of the vats of broken eggs
just down the street, it made some sense to order the person
who contracted to buy them to share in the cost of their
production and disposal. By contrast, the prerogatives of
the United States government put a premium on reigning
in the discretion of the district court judge who was ten
thousand miles from Washington, D.C. where it was diffi-
cult to supervise him. Supervision from the other end of the
globe is expensive, particularly without the air travel or
electronic telecommunications of today. A cheaper way than
direct and daily supervision to limit judicial discretion is to
enforce on appeal a narrow reading of the federal statutes
granting the local court jurisdiction, a reading which relies
on interpretive rules developed by the sovereign in its capi-
tol.
This approach to limiting judicial discretion from afar
may be less expensive than daily monitoring, but it may
require resort to legal fictions to make the sovereign's rules
2. Id. at 776. This was about twenty years before the United States
Supreme Court unveiled its Minimum Contacts doctrine to extend the personal
jurisdiction of forum courts over out-of-state corporations. Nonetheless, the
germ of this doctrine is visible here in the Ninth Circuit's opinion.
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fit the local circumstances. In Neuss, Hesslein v. Van Der
Stegen, for example, the court of appeals without pause ap-
plied the Supreme Court's jurisdictional rules for "foreign
corporations" to a New York corporation employing a
salesman in China. "Foreign corporation" was a term devel-
oped in the United States to refer to businesses incorpo-
rated or headquartered in one state of the union which were
sued in another. "Foreign" meant from out-of-state, not
from out-of-the United States. In one sense the analogy
works: if "foreign corporation" covers even those that are
from a neighboring state, even just a few miles across the
state border, then it must include those that are from a
state ten thousand miles away from the forum. But in
another sense, the analogy does not work, because it makes
China into a state of the United States and puts a New
York corporation employing a salesman in China in the
same position as a New York corporation employing a
salesman in Michigan.
This story is interesting not just for its peculiar viscos-
ity, but also for the way it illustrates a central feature of
law, that local law exerts an inexorable force upon trial
courts. As they are faced daily with issues that confront the
people in their geographical vicinity, courts address imme-
diate problems with solutions tailored to them. Solutions
are tailored to problems by creating rules for them or by
citing to laws made by those who are familiar with those
problems. Geographic distance from the problems lessens
familiarity. Even where law takes on imported elements,'
as it does in the case of a wholly foreign court which is
intended in every way possible to function as an extension
of the foreign sovereign's court system, it can retain an
intensely local character.' At least part of the reason for
3. Alan Watson has amply demonstrated that transplants of laws from one
geographical location to another commonly stimulate legal change. See
generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (2d ed. 1993); ALAN WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE, AND
AMBIGUITY (1998); ALAN WATSON, LAW OUT OF CONTEXT (2000).
4. A wealth of superb scholarship supports the idea that law orients itself to
its locality. Sally Engle Merry concludes in her landmark study of the
introduction of United States law into the Hawai'ian islands that "The local
context-the identity of judges, attorneys, and police officers-mediates
critically between the law as authoritative text and the imposition of its power,
thus defining the way law acts as a site of power." SALLY ENGLE MERRY,
[Vol. 52926
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this is that even where rules made far away are applied by
a court, they can be applied in such a way as to stretch the
rules to immediate needs.
This is the case in spite of the sovereign's efforts to
maintain control over the court. When a court is operating
on behalf of a government that is many miles removed, the
exigencies of local circumstances are drawn into conflict
with the sovereign's need to control. If that control aims be-
yond the court's operations to the very character of the
court, the sovereign's rules, to trump local ones, have to be
stretched beyond recognition in an attempt to cover the
situation at hand. This process leads to absurd processes
and justifications for them, without eviscerating the superi-
ority of, or the need for, local rules.
A pantheon of highly respected legal scholars have ar-
gued in various ways about the superiority of local law.
Robert Gordon observes that law is fundamentally diverse
at the local level, in a way that should be celebrated rather
than rued or countered. Robert Ellickson concludes that
disputes between neighbors are resolved without reference
to, or even influence by, laws enacted by lawmakers outside
their communities, even where those laws are intended to
apply to those disputes.6 Richard Epstein argues that com-
mon law courts create better law for local needs than do
legislatures and national administrative agencies, and hisjustification, that self-interest, as opposed to regulatory
law, is the only proper means for handling "primarily local"
matters_-comes very close to suggesting that it is because
COLONIZING HAWAI'I: THE CULTURAL POWER OF LAW 265 (2000). Robert Gordon,
in his definitive examination of the functional approach to law, emphasizes that
local diversity is one of the enduring and most important features of law. See
generally Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
Rebecca French finds in her exhaustive examination of Tibetan law that it was
unique because it bore features known nowhere else at no other time. See
generally REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL
COSMOLOGY OF BUDDHIST TIBET (1995).
5. See generally Gordon, supra note 4.
6. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 4-6 (1991).
7. See Richard Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapters of Oregon: The
Law and Economics of Habitat Preservation, 5 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 29-30
2004] 927
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the courts, of first-instance at least, are geographically
closer to the issues.8 Oliver Wendell Holmes's classic on the
inherent wisdom of the common law is at its core an argu-
ment in favor of local law. Even though he uses the word
"nation" to refer to the territorial unit that is most relevant
to his discussion, he emphasizes history and experience
over logic as the keys to understanding law. In doing so he
comes down on the side of the law's immediate social and
geographical context more than on its abstract qualities.9
None of these scholars analyzes the spacial relations
between legal problem and law maker, however, and only
Epstein uses the word "local" (and only once) to describe the
ideal for such relations.1" Indeed, the term "local" is not self-
defining nor is there a consensus definition of it. Jurists use
it, in various contexts, to refer to virtually all levels of gov-
ernment, village, city, county, state, and even national. His-
torians working within the region of Asia are just now
beginning to analyze the term. If any germ of widely-
accepted meaning for "local" in the legal literature could be
identified, it would be something akin to "parochial" or
"low-level." Roscoe Pound used the word this way in his in-
fluential address to the American Bar entitled What May
We Expect From Comparative Law?11 He chided those who
respected local law by describing them as members of a
"cult"1 and implying that their point of view could only be
arrived after one had suffered a kind of mental illness." He
consigned all local law to irrelevancy by calling it anoma-
lous and insignificant. 4
(1996-1997) (citing Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315
(1993)).
8. See id.
9. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1963) (1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience...
[T]he prevalent moral and political theories.. .have a good deal more to do than
the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.").
10. Epstein, supra note 7, at 30.
11. Roscoe Pound, What May We Expect From Comparative Law?, 22 A.B.A.
J. 56, 58 (1936).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
[Vol. 52928
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My aim in this study is to suggest the opposite, namely
that, as a general matter, law is at its best and most indeli-
ble when it is local in origin. I use the word local to collapse
as much as possible the identities of the makers and the
subjects of the law. In other words, communities that are
bound by the laws constitute the best makers of these laws
because their members understand better than outsiders
the activities that will be regulated by the laws. These
communities also make the most indelible laws in the sense
that these laws will take root more easily and will be easier
to enforce than those imposed from the outside.
This is a broad argument that does not mean to pre-
clude any exceptions. The Civil Rights movement in the
south of the United States may stand as an example of the
superiority of law imposed from the outside. But exceptions
do not necessarily disprove the rule, and the Civil Rights
movement probably does not show that outside law is easier
to impose than inside law.
The great strength of local law in Shanghai during the
first half of the twentieth century was partly a function of
the great degree of autonomy the city enjoyed from national
law in China.15 Historians of China have stressed, almost
unanimously, that local freedom from oversight from the
capital brought with it the risk that power would be mis-
used. The national authorities have been depicted in scores
of accounts as a source of checks that kept local bullies in
line." This portayal of national versus local mirrors almost
15. See Tahirih V. Lee, Risky Business: Courts, Culture, and the
Marketplace, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1335, 1337 (1992-1993) [hereinafter Lee,
Risky Business].
16. See, e.g., Timothy Brook, Family Continuity and Cultural Hegemony:
The Gentry of Ningbo, 1368-1911, in CHINESE LOCAL ELITES AND PATTERNS OF
DOMINANCE 28 (Joseph W. Esherick & Mary Backus Rankin eds., 1990) ("The
imperial political system... denied them a legitimate voice in the decision-
making processes in their native places by empowering them politically only
after they had passed the higher state examinations and left for a bureaucratic
career elsewhere. This nonenfranchisement allowed the gentry to occupy the
pinnacle of the social order at home only extrapolitically."). For a summary of
this portrayal of the relationship between national authorities in China and
"local bullies," see Lenore Barkan, Patterns of Power: Forty Years of Elite
Politics in a Chinese County, in CHINESE LOCAL ELITES, supra at 191-92.
Barkan's own revision of this portrayal is more complex, but relies just as much
2004] 929
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exactly the portrayal of federal courts in the United States
found in a broad spectrum of literature on American law.
Here, federal courts routinely look superior, not just techni-
cally, but ethically, to state courts.17
My aim in this article is not to bring down either of
these scholarly edifices, both of which are rich with valu-
able data and insights. What I hope, instead, to accomplish
is a careful rethinking of the position they take on the rela-
tionship between national and local law. Their position on
this relationship looms so large in both the fields of Chinese
history and American law, that it has given rise to an
almost knee-jerk assumption that national law is superior
to local law. This assumption is not only wrong as a default
position, in either field, it is wrong most of the time as a
conclusion to be drawn after careful consideration of exam-
ples of the relationship between national law and local law.
The founding statute suggests that the U.S. Court for China
was established to cure the problem of corruption in the
American consular courts in Asia.18 If so, and particularly if
it diminished corruption in those cities, the court might il-
lustrate the moral and functional superiority of sovereign
law to local law, even when extraterritorially applied. 9 But
there are alternative explanations, such a concern for the
appearance of corruption, or the use of corruption as a mask
for more pressing motivations for establishing the court
on the terms "national" and "local." See id. at 193-94. For more on the tension
between national and local elites, see Joseph W. Esherick & Mary Backus
Rankin, Concluding Remarks, in CHINESE LOCAL ELITES, supra at 305, 334, 339,
343.
17. See generally GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER: THE
STORY OF THE SURVIVORS' UNPRECEDENTED LAWSUIT (1976).
18. A consular report to Congress in 1904 stated that the great deal of
discretion afforded American consular judges under U.S. law "in more than one
instance led to grave abuses." MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, A REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE CONCERNING THE IMPORTANCE OF
REFORM IN OUR EXTRATERRITORIAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN CHINA AND KOREA,
INCLUDING A DRAFT OF AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DISTRICT
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR CHINA AND KOREA, S. DOC. No. 58-95, at 4 (3d
Sess. 1905) (including an extract from report upon tour of consular inspection in
Asia made by Herbert H.D. Peirce, Third Assistant Secretary of State, 1904)
[hereinafter EXTRATERRITORIAL REFORM].
19. See Tariff of Fees of Officers of United States Court for China, Exec.
Order No. 8062, 4 Fed. Reg. 1181 (Mar. 10, 1939).
[Vol. 52930
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that could not be publicized because of their political sensi-
tivity or because those establishing the court did not admit
these stronger motivations to themselves.
Beware of national portrayals of local law as corrupt.
These portrayals are naturally self-serving, and they supply
a handy justification for national law to intrude into the
local arena. Such a concern, articulated in the form of a
national statute, then, is just as likely evidence that local
law is superior in strength, if not quality, to national law. If
it were not superior it would not be difficult to dislodge, and
therefore would pose no threat to national authorities,
which in turn would make local law unworthy of the great
effort it takes to marshal such focused attention from so far
away.
If law is stronger when it is local than national, or per-
haps even essentially local in character, then the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and the exportation of law will
be fraught with difficulties. Difficulties arise because law
administered far from its origin will fail to take hold in its
original form and in an efficient manner reasonably free of
absurd outcomes. This is likely to be true whether or not
the law is administered by locals, and therefore this conclu-
sion raises questions about arguments in the field of
Comparative Law and Legal History that portray legal
transplants as universally workable. 20
The local nature of law also has crucial implications for
the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The rich literature on
federalism in the United States includes debates about the
proper locus of authority over a wide variety of activities.
Such authority includes the power to tax,21 to regulate tele-
communications 22 and elections, to bestow patents and
20. See generally LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, supra note 3.
21. See, e.g., Matthew M. Craft, LOST and Found: The Unequal
Distribution of Local Option Sales Tax Revenue Among Iowa Schools, 88 IOwA
L. REV. 199 (2002-2003).
22. See, e.g., Matthew N. McClure, Working Through the Static: Is There
Anything Left to Local Control in the Siting of Cellular and PCS Towers After
the Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 44 VILL. L. REV. 781 (1999); Kevin M.
O'Neill, Wireless Facilities are a Towering Problem: How Can Local Zoning
20041 931
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trademarks, 21 to restrict the use of land24 and other envi-
ronmental resources,2 to police,26 and to define and prose-
cute crimes.27 When these discussions turn to places outside
the United States, as they seldom do, they focus on a
broader range of activity and treat the problem in less
detail. 8 Discussions about which level of government is ap-
Boards Make the Call Without Violating Section 704 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 975 (1998-1999).
23. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Regulating Trademarks on Exterior
Signs: Should Local Law Trump the Lanham Act and the Constitution?, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1105 (1997-1998); Ellisen S. Turner, Swallowing the Apple Whole:
Improper Patent Use by Local Rule, 100 MICH. L. REV. 640 (2001-2002).
24. See, e.g., Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings
Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464 (2000); Peter W.
Salsich, Jr., Federal Influence on Local Land Use Regulations: The Fair
Housing Act Amendments, 9 J. AFFORD. Hous. & COMTY. DEV. L. 228 (2000).
25. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National? The Increasing
Federalization of Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 179 (2000); Mailaika M. Eaton, Of Salmon, Salamander, and Lizards:
Can State and Local Conservation Plans "Preempt" the Endangered Species
Act?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (2001-2002); Christy Noel, Preemption Hogwash:
North Carolina's Judicial Repeal of Local Authority to Regulate Hog Farms in
Craig v. County of Chatham, 80 N.C. L. REV. 2121 (2001-2002).
26. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.
J. 2137 (2002).
27. See, e.g., Steven D. Dillingham, Prosecution and Federalism: Most
Justice is Local, 36 PROSECUTOR 20 (2002); Cheryl Crumpton Herring, 18 U.S.C.
§ 666: Is It a Blank Check to Federal Authorities Prosecuting State and Local
Corruption?, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1317 (2000-2001); Simon Stern, Between Local
Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales for Jury Nullification
After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L. J. 1815 (2002).
28. See, e.g., Megan J. Ballard, The Clash Between Local Courts and Global
Economics: The Politics of Judicial Reform in Brazil, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
230 (1999); Dr. Thomas J. Barfield, On Local Justice and Culture in Post-
Taliban Afghanistan, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 437 (2001-2002); John Clark,
Restraints by Regional and Local Governments on Competition: Lessons From
Transition Countries, 25 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 363 (1999); Xiaoqing Feng & Frank
Xianfeng Huang, International Standards and Local Elements: New
Developments of Copyright Law in China, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 917
(2002); Stephen R. King, Getting a Seat at the Table: Giving the Indigenous
Peoples of the Russian Far East Control Over Local Government, 7 PAC. RIM L.
& POL'Y J. 803 (1998).
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propriate for certain kinds of authority appears also in
hundreds of published decisions by United States courts.29
This study contributes to the scholarship on federalism,
comparative law and legal history by connecting the broad
themes about the origins of law and loci of legal authority
with details about an extended experiment in administering
law half a world away from its origin. This experiment drew
into conflict a sovereign and a locality and presented an
extreme version of such conflict because the sovereign and
the locality were separated by great territorial distance.
The United States Court for China,.a United States federal
court tried hundreds of civil and criminal lawsuits in China
from 1906 to 1943. It was a veritable incubator of tensions
between local needs and distant, sovereign agendas. As
such, it holds a goldmine of examples of the contradiction at
the root of both extraterritorial jurisdiction and federalism,
that between the local nature of most activities, on the one
hand, and efforts to superimpose the distant sovereign's law
upon those activities. The tension produced a myriad of dif-
ficulties in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction. Notable
among them were ambiguities in the court's status, proce-
dural questions, choice of law questions, and jurisdictional
questions.
Of course all courts face obstacles to the exercise of
their jurisdiction. Opportunistic attorneys inevitably try to
find legal or procedural loopholes through which their cli-
ents can escape the applicable law or the jurisdiction of the
court. But many of the difficulties for the U.S. Court for
China in addition stemmed from the fact that the Court
was outside the United States and at some geographical
distance from its sovereign and its lawmaker and that its
sovereign largely ignored this fact. This distance created an
inattention by the sovereign to ironing out ambiguities in
the status of the court, ambiguities created by discrepancies
in the law that it authorized the court to apply and in the
formal delineation of the court's jurisdiction. Far from
resolving these discrepancies, Congress and the United
29. The leading case is Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266 (1998), in
which the United States Supreme Court affirmed the supremacy of federal
authority over state authority to regulate elections.
2004] 933
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States Supreme Court exacerbated them as the years of the
U.S. Court for China's operation went on. These discrepan-
cies created room within which the United States Court for
China could exercise discretion, but the boundaries of this
discretion were unclear and therefore subject to challenge
by litigants. Inadequate funding from Washington exacer-
bated the precariousness of the court's position.
This distance also raised the specter of uncontrolled in-
dependence by the court. Unlimited discretion of the judge
was always an issue for Congress during the life of the U.S.
Court for China, and most of the relatively few measures it
took with respect to the court involved some reigning in of
the court's authority. During certain periods, judges there
did act as mavericks and thus bolstered the justification of
Congress's moves. Closely related to, but different than,
such independence was the tendency of the court to operate
like other courts in Shanghai. This tendency also posed a
threat to authorities in Washington, a threat that led to an-
other policy, that of covering the court with an American
veneer.
The U.S. Court for China resembled other courts in
Shanghai. It relied on the Shanghai Municipal Police, the
principal local force not run by the United States govern-
ment, to gather evidence and enforce orders. It applied law
from dozens of countries, as did the other courts nearby. It
followed the jurisdictional rule followed by all courts in the
city, which was to sue or prosecute in the court of the de-
fendant's nationality. This was the primary rule of personal
jurisdiction at the U.S. court in the sense that the
territorial notions of personal jurisdiction which held sway
in federal district courts back in the United States rarely af-
fected cases at the U.S. court. The territorial boundaries of
its jurisdiction were too vast, and included too many other
courts run by sovereigns other than the United States, for
the notion of territoriality to have much effect.
In addition to a lack of attention on the part of authori-
ties in Washington, D.C. to funding and to formal coherence
in the structure of the court, the geographical distance be-
tween court and sovereign also encouraged a lack of under-
standing by the U.S. sovereign of the issues that faced the
court on a daily basis. As a result of this ignorance, absurdi-
ties plagued the application of U.S. procedure and law at
[Vol. 52934
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the China court. The law had to be distorted to make it
cover the instant facts and issues. Legislators and judges in
Washington, D.C. and San Francisco acted as if they willed
to be blind to the fact that this court was situated in China
and in a world-class financial and commercial center with
one of the world's most heterogeneous populations.
In these ways, local law possessed a functionality that
was superior to that of sovereign law, a functionality that,
though challenged from afar by the sovereign, proved in
many ways to be ineluctable. This study aims to learn from
this court something, about courts and law in other times
and places, and concludes that the conflict between sover-
eign and locality at this court highlights the greater effi-
ciency and wisdom of local law more generally. To make
this case, a general description of the United States Court
for China is followed by separate examinations of the legal
issues at the heart of the tension between the locality and
the sovereign. Chapter II of this article provides a portrait
of the United States Court for China which shows that an
American veneer covered an operation which resembled
other courts in Shanghai at the time at least as much as it
did courts in the United States. Chapter III shows how the
procedure of the court was a battleground between local
influences and circumstances on the one hand, and sover-
eign prerogatives on the other. Chapter IV turns to the law
that was applied at the court and to choice of law issues
there and shows how they reflected the tension between
locality and distant sovereign. Chapter V sets out how the
jurisdiction of the court illustrated this tension. The final
chapter, Chapter VI, concludes this study by delving into
the complexities of the concept of "local law." Illustrations
for this will be drawn from the details supplied in the body
of this article. After acknowledging these complexities, I
will set out that the concept is nonetheless important,
because it encapsulates a type of law that is generally supe-
rior to law imposed from a long distance away. After sum-
marizing the evidence supplied in this paper, I will end by
offering possible explanations for the inattention to local
law in the United States' approach to extraterritorial juris-
diction in China, and explanations for why those in the
United States responsible for creating this court and
2004] 935
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allowing it to operate for 35 years refused to acknowledge
the local nature of the court.
CHAPTER II
THE AMERICAN TRAPPINGS AND THE SHANGHAI SOUL OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA
Throughout the United States Court for China's exis-
tence, members of the United States Congress attempted to
layer onto the United States Court for China the veneer of a
United States district court. These efforts failed, however,
to create a court that was- more a cousin of its Article I
counterparts in the United States than it was a cousin of
the other courts run by various local governments at the
time in Shanghai. Even the impetus for creating the court
stemmed from developments in China, rather than from a
change in United States policy; and this, too, Congress
papered over, by substituting a rationale which located the
impetus for the court within the United States government.
In 1905, the Emperor of China issued an edict which
forbade the use of the light and the heavy bamboo as an
instrument of punishment in any Chinese court in China
and required the substitution of fines and imprisonment."
The officers of the Shanghai Municipal Council, a body
comprised of Americans and British which governed a sec-
tion of Shanghai called the International Settlement, and
officers of the foreign consulates in China at the time
believed that the edict was directed against the Interna-
tional Mixed Court of Shanghai, in which judicial panels of
one Chinese and one foreigner convicted Chinese to lashes
with a bamboo pole. In carrying out this edict, the Chinese
judges at the International Mixed Court found themselves
accused by Americans and British of serving "a general
30. Translated report from the Prefect of Jiangsu Province, Yuan, to United
States Consul-General Rodgers, "in re Abolition of 'Bambooing' in Mixed Court,"
(Nov. 2, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1,
Frame 523 (National Archives). Readers should note that any archival sources
cited hereafter from F167, Roll No. 1, are from a group of materials entitled
"U.S. Consulate, Shanghai, Tokyo," Boxes 0124, 860, 796, 535, 536, 905, and
591, which contain 1821 pages of correspondence dating back to 1876.
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policy directed against foreign influence not only at this
place but throughout the country."'" The Shanghai Munici-
pal Council tried to persuade the American judge at the
International Mixed Court to defy the edict, but the Ameri-
can judge refused. In December of that year, the Council
reported this to the American Consul-General in Shang-
hai,"2described to him the American judge as harboring
"pro-Chinese sympathies,"3 and asked whether the United
States Minister in Beijing had ever issued any instructions
which the American judge might interpret to prevent him
from obeying the Council. 4
The Emperor's edict was at least in part a response to
the growing control over the International Mixed Court by
the Shanghai Municipal Council. Just a year earlier, the
Council secured the cooperation of the foreign consuls
stationed in Shanghai in the plan by the Council's police
force, the Shanghai Municipal Police, to wrest control of the
Mixed Court's prison from the Chinese judge's staff. The
consul approved changes that the Council made in the
prison, and worked with the Council in transferring female
prisoners to the prison run by the French Municipal Coun-
cil in a part of Shanghai known as the French Concession."
While the Emperor of China created consternation
among the foreign courts in Shanghai, the American
Consul-General in Shanghai faced charges of corruption in
31. Letter from the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council to
American Consul-General in Shanghai, James L. Rodgers (Dec. 12, 1905),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frames 456-58
(National Archives).
32. Report of Interview with Mr. Arnold, microformed on Microcopy F167,
Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frames 459-60 (National Archives).
33. Letter from the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council to
American Consul-General in Shanghai, James L. Rodgers (Dec. 12, 1905),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 457
(National Archives).
34. Letter from the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Council to
American Consul-General in Shanghai, James L. Rodgers (Dec. 12, 1905),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 458
(National Archives).
35. See A. M. KOTENEV, SHANGHAI: ITS MIXED COURT AND COUNCIL 103-105
(Ch'eng-wen Publ'g Co. 1968) (1925).
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the exercise of his judicial duties, charges leveled against
him in Washington, D.C. by George F. Curtis, an American
lawyer in Shanghai,36 and others.37 Curtis may have been
spurred by the failure of the American Consular Court in
Shanghai to enforce a sizeable judgment he had won there
for one of his clients,38 but this fact did not deter the
congressmen who spearheaded the campaign to strengthen
the presence of the United States federal government in
Shanghai. In response to the charges, Congressmen Hughes
and Williams authorized an investigation into the American
Consular Court in Shanghai and arranged a meeting
between Curtis and President Theodore Roosevelt on the
matter. With the knowledge and approval of President
Theodore Roosevelt, the American Consul-General in
Shanghai was ordered to appear in Washington to answer
the charges, and the Third Assistant Secretary of State,
Herbert H.D. Peirce, inspected the United States' consu-
lates in the Pacific. After reading a report by the Secretary
of State on the inspection, President Roosevelt ordered
Congress to establish "a district court of the United States
for China and Korea."39 The Secretary of State drew up an
ambitious blueprint for the court. Not only was it to be
named a "district court," but it also should regularly hold
trials in four cities, Shanghai, Tianjin, Canton, and Seoul,
Korea. As with other United States district courts, appeals
would go directly to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, and from there to the United States
Supreme Court.4 ° Peirce, whose report was also transmitted
to Roosevelt, was even more ambitious. He called it a
36. Charges Against Rufus H. Thayer: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Expenditures in the Department of Justice on Charges of High Crimes and
Misdemeanors Made Against Rufus H. Thayer, Judge of the United States Court
for China at Shanghai, China, 63d Cong. 43 (1913) [hereinafter Hearings].
37. Herbert H.D. Peirce, the Third Assistant Secretary of State who
personally investigated the American Consular Court in Shanghai, reported
somewhat vaguely to the Secretary of State that the situation there had "in
more than one instance led to grave abuses," and that "there have been many
complaints" about the quality of justice meted out by the consular officials at
that Court. EXTRATERRITORIAL REFORM, supra note 18, at 4, 6.
38. See Hearings, supra note 36.
39. EXTRATERRITORIAL REFORM, supra note 18.
40. Id. at 1-2.
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"United States circuit court" and recommended that its
judge be appointed "for not less than fifteen years...."'
This high-level sturm und drang led the Consul-General in
Shanghai to resign and the two Congressmen to initiate an
overhaul of the entire United States consular service, which
included raising salaries by a third in March of 1906.42
Once Roosevelt ordered the creation of the court,
Congress moved at lightning speed to carry out the order.
On May 25, 1906, Congressman Edwin Denby submitted a
report to the House from its Committee on Foreign Affairs,
in which the committee unanimously recommended passing
a bill that created a "United States District Court for
China."43 The haste with which the statute was enacted that
established the court left important questions about the
court's status unaddressed. Neither this committee, nor any
of the congressional bodies that subsequently dealt with the
subject identified any constitutional authority under which
Congress was acting. When Congressman Perkins submit-
ted a report on the bill to the House from the Conference
Committee on June 28, the name of the court was still the
"United States District Court for China." It was only two
days later, when both houses of Congress passed the bill,
that the name changed from the Article-I-sounding "District
Court" to a more Article-III-sounding "Court," but without
explanation." Unbelievably, neither Article I nor III were
mentioned in the founding statute, nor in any laws or
hearings relating to the court. The published documents
relied merely on the authority established by "treaties
between the United States and China.4 5 Perhaps the
omission was due to a failure to consult with the Justice
Department or obtain its support in the rush to create the
court.46
41. Id. at 5.
42. Hearings, supra note 36, at 4, 43, 50, 73-74.
43. H.R. REP. No. 59-4432 (1st Sess. 1906).
44. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, 34. Stat. 814 (creating a United Stated
Court for China and prescribing the jurisdiction thereof).
45. Id.; see also EXTRATERRITORIAL REFORM, supra note 18, at 1.
46. For a discussion of the authority in Article III to create courts in the
territories on the mainland of the United States, before they became states, see
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As reflected in the legislative history and the statute,
the primary goal of the Congressmen who took the lead in
establishing the court was to curb corruption among Ameri-
can consular officers in China. As judges in the American
consular courts in China from 1864 to 1943, whose author-
ity rested on a series of treaties between China and the
United States and a host of federal statutes and State
Department regulations, American consular officers pur-
portedly had been looting the estates of Americans who died
in China, many of them quite sizeable after years of in-
volvement in the booming financial, real estate, industrial,
and commercial markets of Shanghai.47 Congress's cure for
this theft was not just to create a federal court next door to
the consul and spell out in detail how to closely monitor the
consuls' administration of American estates in China.
Despite the jurisdictional conflicts which this spawned,
Congress devoted relatively little statutory language to dis-
tinguishing the jurisdiction of the United States Court for
China from that of the American Consular Court in Shang-
hai. It provided merely that the new court would serve as
an appeals court for the consular court and that it would
supervise the consular court's adjudication of inheritance
cases. The bulk of the attention was paid to how the new
court would supervise the consular court, descending into
such nitty-gritty as:
Within sixty days after the death in China of any citizen of the
United States, or any citizen of any territory belonging to the
United States, the consul or vice-consul whose duty it becomes to
take possession of the effects of such deceased person under the
laws of the United States shall file with the clerk of said court a
sworn inventory of such effects, and shall as additional effects
come from time to time into his possession immediately file a
supplemental inventory or inventories of the same. He shall also
file with the clerk of said court within said sixty days a schedule,
under oath, of the debts of said decedent, so far as known, and a
schedule or statement of all additional debts thereafter discovered.
Such consul or vice-consul shall pay no claims against the estate
without the written approval of the judge of said court, nor shall
he make sale of any of the assets of said estate without first
Peter Nicolas, American-Style Justice in No Man's Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895,
993-97 nn.657-92 (2001-2002).
47. Hearings, supra note 36, at 4, 11, 34-35, 43, 51, 64, 73-74.
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reporting the same to said judge and obtaining a written approval
of said sale, and he shall likewise within ten days after any such
sale report the fact of such sale to said court, and the amount
derived therefrom. The said judge shall have power to require at
any time reports from consuls or vice-consuls in respect of all their
acts and doings relating to the estate of any such deceased person.
The said court shall have power to require where it may be
necessary a special bond for the faithful performance of his duty to
be given by any consul or vice-consul into whose possession the
estate of any such deceased citizen shall have come in such
amount and with such sureties as may be deemed necessary, and
for failure to give such bond when: required, or for failure to
properly perform his duties in the premises, the court may appoint
some other person to take charge of said estate, such person
having first given bond as aforesaid. A record shall be kept by the
clerk of said court of all proceedings in respect of any such estate
under the provisions hereof.
48
As is obvious from the statutory language, the Congress
was more concerned about micromanaging the way that
estates were administered in Shanghai than it was about
preventing confusion about the demarcation of jurisdiction
in criminal and civil cases between the court it was creating
and the consular court. Nor did Congress address the
administrative difficulties that might arise from the
employment of consular officers at the new court. The stat-
ute did not specify whether the Dockery Act applied to the
United States Court for China, an act which regulated the
salaries and other disbursements to federal courts other
than the consular courts. 49 The statute did not specify
whether the regulations of the Justice Department or State
Department as to absences of judges from the jurisdiction of
the court applied. In fact, the statute never explicitly
named the State Department as the administrator of the
court, although the State Department assumed those duties
for the first two-thirds of the court's life. Instead, Congress
merely alluded to the State Department's authority over
procedure at the court by providing that "the procedure of
the said court shall be in accordance, so far as practicable,
48. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, 34 Stat. 814, 815 (creating a United
States Court for China and prescribing the jurisdiction thereof).
49. Dockery Act, ch. 174, § 13, 28 Stat. 210 (1895).
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with the existing procedure prescribed for consular courts
in China, in accordance with the Revised Statutes of the
United States. . .. "50
Congress also expressly authorized the court to apply
"the laws of the United States," both in the "exercise[ ]" of
its "jurisdiction" and in the inheritance cases that the court
was supposed to supervise.5 In other words, Congress found
a solution to corruption in Shanghai not just in measures
taken to regularize the particular procedures in Shanghai
which lay at the root of the corruption, but also in -
substantive law. By explicitly- authorizing the U.S. Court to
apply federal law to these cases, and by failing to authorize
the application of any other law, Congress was attempting
to control how U.S. judges parcelled out American estates
in China. United States judges would then have no leeway
to select among the various state laws on the subject nor
could they refer to Chinese or other non-U.S. laws.
And, as if Congress feared that its cure for corruption
would become infected with the very disease it was com-
bating, Congress set the salaries of each of the five officers
of the court and required the marshal and the clerk of the
court to "furnish bond for the faithful performance of their
duties, in sums and with sureties to be fixed and approved
by the judge of the court."" According to the news that
filtered back to Washington, there had been some clouding
of the distinction between "fees" that went to the court
coffers, and compensation owed the officers, either in the
form of a flat fee per day or per case, or a percentage of the
amount involved in a dispute, particularly probate cases. As
evidence that such a fear plagued the U.S. government
throughout the four decades of the court's operation,
Congress reset the salaries and fees of the court's judge and
other officers on no less than five additional occasions, in no
less than five additional occasions, 3 directing that all fees
50. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 3, 34 Stat. 814, 815 (creating a United
States Court for China and prescribing the jurisdiction thereof).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See H.R. 27523, 60th Cong. ch. 235 (1909); H.R. 21201, 63d Cong. ch.
145 (3d Sess. 1915); H.R. 11960, 66th Cong. ch. 223 (1920); H.R. 11463, 70th
Cong. ch. 904 (1928); H.R. 7909, 74th Cong. ch. 452 (1935).
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be funneled into the U.S. Treasury, and President Franklin
D. Roosevelt issued an executive order in 1939 fixing any
and all of the fees that the Clerk of Court there could col-
lect.54
United States congressmen also projected onto the
United States Court for China a concern about American
commercial interests. In the view of the federal body that
established this court, the commercial viability of
Americans across the Pacific Ocean depended on the
unswerving implementation of its own law. In the words of
a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations a
few years later, "The court is of extreme importance to the
commercial wellbeing [sic] of our citizens doing business in
China and administers justice to our citizens in accordance
with our own principles of jurisprudence."55
Congress apparently tried to give the court a jurisdic-
tion as close as possible to those of Article I federal district
courts without running afoul of United States treaties with
China and without defeating its purpose for creating the
court, both of which substantially modified this jurisdiction.
The court's subject matter jurisdiction was larger than
Article I federal district courts, extending to most types of
civil and criminal cases, and expressly to probate cases. Its
personal jurisdiction was more restricted, covering only de-
fendants who were citizens of the United States or the
Philippines. Its appellate jurisdiction spanned all of China
and Korea, where the United States operated several con-
sular courts whose decisions could be appealed to the U.S.
Court for China. 6 This made its territorial jurisdiction
larger than that of any U.S. district court, and indeed any
U.S. court of appeals.
Although this court could not be an Article I federal dis-
trict court because its judge did not have a lifetime
appointment, some pains were taken to make this court ap-
54. Tariff of Fees of Officers of United States Court for China, Exec. Order
No. 8062, 4 Fed. Reg. 1181 (Mar. 10, 1939).
55. UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA, S. REP. No. 64-101 (1916).
56. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, 34 Stat. 814, 815 (creating a United
Stated Court for China and prescribing the jurisdiction thereof).
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pear to be so. As if handed down by a U.S. district court, the
decisions of the U.S. Court for China could be and were
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
seated in San Francisco, and finally to the United States
Supreme Court. 7 This track, to California, and then to
Washington, D.C., provided the only appellate recourse for
the variety of non-American nationals who sued Americans
in China for matters which fell within the jurisdiction of the
U.S. Court for China. To confirm this, the State Depart-
ment instructed the court that there was no appeal from the
court to the American Minister in Peking.58
Other efforts were made to create the appearance of an
Article III federal court. As mentioned above, in the
President's, Congress's, and Secretary of State's reports on
the court, up until two days before its establishment they
called the court "the U.S. District Court for China." The
U.S. court of appeals referred to the jurisdiction of the U.S.
Court for China as "the District of China."59 It had an offi-
cial abbreviation in the Federal Reporter, "C.C.A. China."
At an address to the American Bar Association, Judge
Lobingier stressed that the court was "a part of the federal
judicial system corresponding in grade mainly to the dis-
trict courts .... [and] considered as located in the ninth
judicial circuit ... "'0
Much of the trappings laid upon the personnel of the
court was designed to create the appearance of a federal
district court. It was presided over by a "judge" rather than
a magistrate and staffed by a United States District
Attorney, a U.S. marshal, a clerk, and a stenographer. All
but the stenographer were appointed by the President.
Although the judge's term was limited to ten years, and the
57. Id.
58. Letter from U.S. Consul General to His Excellency Ts'ai Nai Hung,
Customs Taotai of Shanghai (Apr. 24, 1909), U.S. Court for China 1909; Vol.
0651, pg.41; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State,
Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National Archives at College Park,
College Park, MD.
59. See, e.g., Nat'l City Bank of New York v. Harbin Elec. Joint-Stock Co., 28
F.2d 468, 472 (9th Cir. 1928).
60. Judge Lobingier's Address at the Decennial Anniversary for China of the
United States Court, in 3 A.B.A. J. 273, 275 (1917) [hereinafter Lobingier].
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others' were at the pleasure of the President, the President
nominated and the Senate confirmed each of the succession
of judges who presided at the court.6' Each took the oath of
office in the United States before setting sail for Shanghai
to take up his post. 2 Congress intended that the authority
of the judges at the U.S. Court for China match the
"authority possessed by the corresponding officers of the
district courts in the United States as far as may be consis-
tent with the conditions of the laws of the United States
and said treaties." 3 The U.S. Attorney at the court was
considered to be a "law-officer of the government [of the
United States] in China," and to hold "an office corre-
sponding to that of a United States District Attorney in the
United States." 4 The judge for the U.S. Court for China
forwarded to the President the names of his nominees, and
the President selected his choice for the post.65 In 1908,
when Mr. Arthur Bassett occupied the position, his mainjob was to prosecute Americans at the U.S. Court for China,
a job he had performed in the American Consular Court
before the creation of the U.S. Court for China.
In practice, however, the authority of the court's staff
did not rise to the level of that of their counterparts in the
United States. For one thing, the Court for China's person-
nel overlapped with that of the American consular court in
Shanghai. For example, the two courts shared a Chinese
61. Hearings, supra note 36, at 10.
62. The second judge, Rufus H. Thayer, took the oath of office on Dec. 23,
1908 and was on the bench of the U.S. Court for China by March of 1909. The
State Department announced his appointment to the Clerk of the U.S. Court for
China. U.S. Court for China 1909; Vol. 0651, pg. 16; Records of Foreign Service
Posts of the Department of State, Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84;
National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
63. 34 Stat. 814, 816, ch. 3934, § 6 (1906) (quoted in United States v.
Chapman, 14 F.2d 312 (1926)); United States Court for China: Hearings Before
the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the United States Court for China, 65th
Cong. 55 (1917) [hereinafter Hearings 2].
64. Letter from F.E. Hinckley to Roderick Dorsey (Sept. 10, 1908), U.S.
Court 1908; Vol. 3218, pg. 40; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the
Department of State, Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
65. Hearings, supra note 36, at 58.
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interpreter.66 Where the personnel themselves were not
shared, the equivalent positions in the two courts per-
formed the same functions, held the same status, and were
curbed by the same limitations. As an example of such a
limitation, officers of the U.S. Court could earn no more
than the nominal fees allowed to consular officials for legal
assistance to American citizens. In another such limitation,
all officers of the U.S. Court got the two and a half months
paid vacation enjoyed by consular officials, which posed a
problem to litigants at the Court for China because there
were no official alternates to fill in during their holidays. In
addition to his holidays, the duties of the U.S. Marshal
required him to be absent from the U.S. Court for China for
weeks and even months at a time. Not only was he charged
with serving the summonses of the U.S. Court, he also had
to transport its prisoners to and from its prison, at times to
a destination as far away as San Quentin in San Francisco.
One such trip took him almost three months.67 Suffering
from the same problem of long-absent officers, the
American Consular Court came up with curious solutions to
it over the years. In one instance, the equivalent of the U.S.
Attorney there appointed convicts in the American prison
on the premises to fill in for him while he was away.
Perhaps it should have been no surprise that, while on
duty, one of these substitutes removed the page on which
his sentence was recorded from the criminal docket of the
American Consular Court.68
Another practice that undermined a similarity of status
to that of Article II courts was the obligation to perform the
tasks of more than a single court officer. The Clerk of the
Court, whose job in the United States would have required
the receiving, processing, and issuing of court documents,
66. See U.S. Court 1908; Vol. 3218, pg. 191; Records of Foreign Service Posts
of the Department of State, Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
67. For a record of one such trip, see U.S. Court 1908; Vol. 3218, pg. 209;
Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Consular Posts,
Shanghai, China; RG 84; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
68. U.S. Court 1908; Vol. 0651, pg. 73-74; Records of Foreign Service Posts
of the Department of State, Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD; Letter (Sept. 27, 1909), id. at 75;
Letter from Dorsey to Bassett (Nov. 29, 1909), id. at 77-78.
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also served as the financial officer of the United States
Court for China.69 This required him to forward documents
called vouchers to the State Department in Washington to
obtain the salaries for the court's personnel and the rent for
the court's facilities. 7' The U.S. Marshal, the person in
United States federal courts in charge of serving the proc-
esses of the court, did double duty also as the United States
Court for China's "Disbursing Officer," which meant that he
paid the court's rent to the U.S. Consul-General in
Shanghai and, after 1911, assumed most of the responsibili-
ties related to the court's finances. 71 This doubling up was
long a practice at the consular court, where, for example,
T.C. White served for a time as both the U.S. Marshal and
Clerk of Court and where Roderick Dorsey served as both
Marshal and warden of the prison until 1908.2
There was always pressure for personnel at the United
States Court for China to perform the same duties for the
American Consular Court. The interpretation of the statute
that created the United States Court for China by the
United States Court for China73 and by American Consuls
in Shanghai and Tianjin in 1935, was that it abolished the
position of Marshal at the American Consular Court of
Shanghai. Nonetheless, the Consul General of Shanghai
conceded that the position continued to be filled for some
years after 1906.7' Between July of 1917 and January of
1920, the American consular court of Shanghai had no
Marshal, owing to the omission of any provision for his sal-
69. Hearings, supra note 36, at 57.
70. Id. at 10, 57.
71. Id. at 10, 61.
72. U.S. Court 1908; Vol. 3218, pg.1; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the
Department of State, Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
73. See In re Hannigs, 2 EXTRATERR. CASES 257, 259-60 (1922).
74. Letter from Samuel Sokobin, American Consul, Tsingtao, China, to the
Honorable Secretary of State, Washington (Apr. 24, 1935), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frames 12-15 (National
Archives); Letter from Samuel Sokobin to Edwin S. Cunningham, Esq.,
American Consul-General, Shanghai, China (Apr. 5, 1935), id.; Letter from
Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul-General, to Samuel Sokobin, Esq.,
American Consul, Tsingtao, China (Apr. 10, 1935), id.
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ary-or for the salaries of the marshals of any American
consular court-in the Congressional Appropriations Act for
the diplomatic and consular service for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1918. The U.S. Marshal at the United
States Court for China refused to assume the other
Marshal's responsibility for serving processes of the consu-
lar court in Shanghai, even while Congress was considering
legislation which would formerly transfer this responsibility
to him.75
The financial overlap and the close proximity of the
United States Court for China and the American Consular
Court were daily reminders that the United States Court
was not a typical federal district court. The two courts
shared a compound and part of the same building, and the
State Department provided the funds, through the U.S.
Consul-General, for some of the operations of the U.S.
Court, such as supplies ,7 the U.S. Marshal's expenses while
transporting prsoners, and general operating expenses.
The two courts shared a prison to house the Americans
awaiting trial or convicted in the two courts and in the
other American consular courts in China.79 Congress appro-
75. Memorandum to Mr. Cunningham (Apr. 13, 1935), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 3, Frame 139 (National Archives).
Readers should note that any archival sources cited hereafter from F167, Roll
No. 3, are from a group of materials entitled "Correspondence of American
Consul, Shanghai, 1935-1940," Boxes 2569 and 2717 (further known as
"Correspondence 1940," Vol. 101, class 8, 805).
76. See letter from Vice Consul-General to O'Brien (Sept. 17, 1908), U.S.
Court 1908; Vol. 3218, pg.196; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the
Department of State, Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
77. See U.S. Court 1908; Vol. 3218, pg.209; Records of Foreign Service Posts
of the Department of State, Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
78. When Judge Wilfley arrived at the court, he cabled the Secretary of
State directly for $800 to cover court expenses. Cable from Judge Wifley to the
Secretary of State (Dec. 27, 1906), U.S. Court for China 1906; Vol. 3215, ch. 8.9,
Vol. 3596, pg. 109; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State,
Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National Archives at College Park,
College Park, MD.
79. See Consular Court and U.S. Court for China 1906; Vol. 3215, ch. 8.9,
Vol. 3596, pg. 117; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State,
Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National Archives at College Park,
College Park, MD; see also U.S. Court 1908; Vol. 3218, pg. 155; Records of
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priated funds for the prison in a bill in 1891 and again on
May 21, 1908, but the U.S. Consul-General in Shanghai,
and ultimately the State Department, had the final say over
the major decisions about its operation, such as its loca-
tion.80 The American Consul-General in Shanghai received
the funds appropriated for the prison and disbursed them to
rent the entire facility for the Consulate, at whose rear the
prison was situated, and to keep and feed its prisoners. The
U.S. Court for China was bound by an interpretation of the
U.S. Attorney General of the 1891 Congressional act to
share the prison with the consular court."s
The prestige of the judge of the U.S. Court for China
was not as great as that of a regular appointment to the
federal bench. Not only was his term limited to ten years
rather than life, as enjoyed by Article III district courtjudges, the judge at the U.S. Court for China ranked even
below the American Consul-General in Shanghai and his
Vice-Consul when he was put in temporary charge of the
consulate in the Consul-General's absence. Nor was he
Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Consular Posts, Shanghai,
China; RG 84; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
80. The U.S. Marshal at the U.S. Court for China in 1909, Hubert J.
O'Brien, sent to the Department of State his recommendation that the jail be
relocated to a building separate from the American Consulate. He tried to make
the case that the move and the additional rent would not be expensive. See
Report by O'Brien to the State Department and letter telegrammed from the
State Department to O'Brien (Mar. 26, 1909), U.S. Court for China 1909; Vol.
0651, pgs. 81-88; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State,
Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National Archives at College Park,
College Park, MD. For evidence that the prison was run by the U.S. Consul-
General in Shanghai and subject to the authority of the State Department, see
the letter to Judge L.R. Wilfley, United States Court for China, from Vice
Consul-General in Charge (Sept. 8, 1908), U.S. Court 1908; Vol. 3218, pg. 1;
Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Consular Posts,
Shanghai, China; RG 84; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
81. The interpretation read: "At the present time but one prison is provided
for prisoners convicted in our consular courts in China, which must be located
at Shanghai and may cost $750.00, not being limited to $600.00 as provided by
section 4121 [of the Act]." He specified that the U.S. Court for China was
included in this group of courts which was to share the use of the single prison.
Letter from Bassett to Denby (Oct. 5, 1908), U.S. Court 1908; Vol. 3218, pgs.
172-73; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Consular
Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National Archives at College Park, College
Park, MD.
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listed in the Federal Reporter's list of federal district court
judges.82 His annual salary began at $8,000, which in 1906
was $2,000 more than federal district court judges received,
but by 1928, it was $2,000 less, a gap exacerbated by the
discontinuance four years earlier of a $1,500 slush fund for
expenses and a 1221 percent rise in the cost of living in
Shanghai during the prior fourteen years. 3
A scandal surrounding the first judge of the U.S. Court
for China, Lebbeus Redman W*ilfley from St. Louis,
Missouri, did not help augment the stature of the post. In
1908, an attorney named Mr. Andrews either sued him or
brought impeachment proceedings against him, possibly in
retaliation for wiping out the American prostitution indus-
try in Shanghai by prosecuting all prostitutes who claimed
United States citizenship. Judge Wilfley also made enemies
of the American bar in Shanghai by requiring attorneys
who appeared before his court to pass a bar examination.
Wilfley had undergone training of sorts for the position by
assisting Solicitor General Hoyt in defending two appeals
from the Supreme Court of the Philippines to the United
States Supreme Court in 1904.84 Although President
Theodore Roosevelt cleared Wilfley of wrongdoing and
praised his work at the U.S. Court for China, Wilfley
resigned, and by December 23 of 1908, only two years into
Wilfley's ten-year term, Rufus H. Thayer, a long-time bu-
reaucrat in the Treasury department who had practiced law
in Washington, D.C. after studying in Columbia Law
School's night program, was sworn in as Wilfley's replace-
ment. 5
82. See, e.g., 186 FEDERAL REPORTER iii-vi (1911); 192 FEDERAL REPORTER v-
viii (1912). Both of these Federal Reporters list by Circuit all the federal judges
in the United States in 1911 and 1912. However, the United States Court for
China judge is not included in either volume. These volumes are just two
examples of lists published while the United States Court for China was in
operation.
83. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT FROM THE
SECRETARY OF STATE RECOMMENDING SALARY INCREASES FOR CERTAIN OFFICERS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA, S. Doc. No. 70-83, at 1-2 (1928).
84. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195
U.S. 100 (1904).
85. Hearings, supra note 36, at 4; U.S. Court for China 1909; Vol. 0651, pg.
16; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Consular
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The Court's second judge also came under attack and
left before his term expired. After only four years on the
bench of the U.S. Court for China, Thayer returned to the
United States, citing ill health. The following year, the
House Committee on State Department Expenditures heard
charges against him of irregular expense accounts and
indulging in long absences from the court while defendants
languished in jail awaiting trial.86 No findings or punish-
ment or other action against Thayer resulted," but the
reputation of the U.S. Court was tarnished by public airing
of the unflattering accusations.
Even the most learned and hard-working of the fivejudges at the U.S. Court for China, Charles Sumner
Lobingier, had to defend himself against charges of impro-
priety in office which were aired in a very public way.
William S. Fleming instigated an investigation of Lobingier
by the State Department in Washington, D.C. after Fleming
lost his petition for certiori to the United States Supreme
Court in a case in which Lobingier convicted Fleming of
contempt of court in 1921. This conviction came after
Fleming asked for a change of venue in one of the cases he
was trying before the court, giving the reason that
Lobingier had abused his office. Fleming served eleven days
in the jail on the American Consular compound before a
thousand dollar bond and his appeal to the Ninth Circuit
won him his release from a six-month sentence. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the U.S. Court, and the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling, and yet these
must have felt like hollow victories for Lobingier, who spent
much of 1922 in Washington, D.C. defending himself during
the State Department's investigation, while cases piled up
at the U.S. Court for China. Although Fleming and
Lobingier reconciled,88 the damage done to the operations
and the reputation of the U.S. Court for China must not
have been easily repaired.
Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National Archives at College Park, College
Park, MD; NORWOOD F. ALLMAN, SHANGHAI LAWYER 101-105 (1943).
86. See Hearings, supra note 36.
87. ALLMAN, supra note 85, at 105.
88. Id. at 81-82.
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The United States Court for China differed in other
respects from U.S. district courts. Its decisions were re-
ported not in the Federal Supplement, as were decisions of
the U.S. district courts, but in Shanghai in the China Law
Journal and the China Law Review (1922-1940), published
by professors and students of the Soochow University
School of Comparative Law, a night school extension pro-
gram on the outskirts of Shanghai, taught Anglo-American
law using the case method devised by Dean Bloom, a
graduate of Michigan Law School. The judges in the U.S.
Court for China and the American consular court comprised
a large portion of the faculty at Soochow."9
Physically and financially, the U.S. Court for China was
a close cousin of the American Consular Court in Shanghai.
The U.S. Court rented facilities from the U.S. Consulate in
Shanghai, at 12, 15, and 35 Huangpu Road, and conducted
most of its business there, as well as housed the judge and
the marshal there free of charge. Congress and the State
Department each appropriated funds for its maintenance
and that of the prison run on the grounds to house U.S. citi-
zens who were awaiting trial at either court or were serving
sentences imposed by the Court.9"
89. THE WOOLSACK, 18-22 (1924) (The Woolsack was the yearbook for the
Soochow University Law School in Shanghai during the 1920s and 30s. It is full
of photos, essays, and memorabilia from each graduating class).
90. Hearings, supra note 36, at 25, 38, 40-41, 49, 57.
When the first judge of the U.S. Court for China, Lefius R. Wilfley, arrived
at his post from St. Louis, Missouri, he cabled the Secretary of State directly for
800 dollars to cover court expenses. See Consular Court and U.S. Court for
China 1906; Vol. 3215, ch. 8.9, Vol. 3596, pg. 109; Records of Foreign Service
Posts of the Department of State, Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84;
National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. For a record of his
appointment and origin, see the letter from Vice Consul-General in Charge to
Jonas & Naumburd, 7 Washington Place, New York (unsigned copy) (Sept. 5,
1906), Consular Court and U.S. Court for China 1906; Vol. 3215, ch. 8.9; Vol.
3596-97, pg. 10; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State,
Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National Archives at College Park,
College Park, MD.
Congress appropriated $2,400 for the rent of premises for the use of the U.S.
Court for China for 1909. The U.S. Consul General had started in 1908 to
charge rent of the U.S. Court for China for using part of the U.S. Consulate.
The rent was $300 per quarter. Letter from Denby to Hubert J. O'Brien (Aug.
25, 1908), U.S. Court 1908; Vol. 3218, pg. 196; Records of Foreign Service Posts
of the Department of State, Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84; National
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Procedurally also, the United States Court for China
resembled other courts in Shanghai more than it did the
United States federal courts. The United States Court for
China resembled local courts in its reliance on local police
to supply it with evidence and to carry out its orders, and in
its adherence to the local jurisdictional rule that plaintiffs
sued defendants in Shanghai only in courts operated by the
defendants' home country. These aspects of the court
touched every case from beginning to end and determined
the important questions of whether the court could hear the
case and whether the court could gather evidence and
enforce its orders.
The procedural side of the United States Court for
China differed from that of its counterparts at home in fun-
damental ways. It lacked the jury that its counterparts at
home used. No "state"-level body made the law for it to
apply or the procedures for it to follow. It lacked a code of
procedure such as the New York Field Code and others
modeled on it. Career diplomats, with their orientation
toward promoting American interests abroad, substituted
for judicial officers in performing some of its work.
The status of the court was problematic. Was it a crea-
ture of the Justice Department or the State Department?
Did the Justice Department exercise authority over itsjudges, or did the State Department? Was it more like a
United States district court or the American Consular
Courts in operation around the world at that time? Was it,
at least in certain respects, equivalent to the Insular Courts
Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. The U.S. Marshal, in his capacity
as "Special Disbursing Officer, Department of State, United States Court for
China," paid the rent by check in the equivalent amount of Mexican dollars.
Letter from O'Brien to Denby (Aug. 26, 1908), supra at 198. The Consul General
returned the check, asking for U.S. $125.00 per quarter instead, until the
Consulate's enlargement was finished. Id. at 201. The Consul General and
O'Brien then settled on $60.00 per month for half of the building adjoining the
Consulate on the north, a house belonging to a Mrs. Sys. Id. at 203-04. They
then changed this to $125.00 per quarter until December 1, 1908, when newly
rented adjacent premises were to be acquired and the rent would then be raised
to $250.00. Id. at 208.
The State Department shipped by boat "official supplies" to the U.S. Court
for China. Letter from Vice Consul-General to O'Brien (Sept. 17, 1908), supra at
199.
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in operation in the territories acquired from Spain, which
fell under the authority of the United States War Depart-
ment? Was it akin to the territorial courts that operated in
Alaska, where the judge had to notify the Auditor of the
Department of Justice whenever he left the jurisdiction of
the court?91 The State Department officially administered
the Court with ad hoc appropriations from Congress until
1933, when the Justice Department officially took it over.92
In 1939, Congress transferred the court's judges and clerk
of court and their staffs to the administrative office of the
U.S. Courts, while the court's U.S. Attorney and U.S.
Marshal and their staffs remained under the jurisdiction of
the Justice Department.93
As further evidence of the hybrid nature of the court
and the carelessness of its creators, Congress declared after
twenty-seven years that the Justice Department would as-
sume responsibility for administering the court. Although
the switch was formal, it barely registered on Congress's
radar screen and left unanswered these fundamental ques-
tions about this court. If Congress, the United States
Supreme Court, and the President of the United States had
taken the trouble required to insert the court seamlessly
into the apparatus of the United States legal system, then
such questions easily could have been answered.
Despite the lack of clarification of the court's status in
its organic statute, the United States Attorney General did
not fill the void by clarifying its status with rulings. The
State Department assumed the task of verifying the ex-
penses and disbursements of the United States Court for
China and paying the salaries of the judge and other per-
sonnel there only after the Justice Department failed to do
so after a period of time. It was more a result of accident or
91. See Hearings, supra note 36, at 26-27, 29, 37, 52-53, 60-61, 71-75.
92. See H.R. Doc. No. 77-124 (1941) (citing Exec. Order No. 6166 (June 10,
1933)).
93. Id.
94. See Exec. Order No. 6166 (June 10, 1933), which organized the executive
agencies; COMMUNICATION FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
PROPOSED PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE JUDICIAL
ESTABLISHMENT, ASIAN AMENDMENT TO THE BUDGET FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1942,
H.R. DOc. 77-124, at 2 (1942).
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neglect than design. As the Auditor of the State
Department described in response to the question "Is there
any law that places this judge [of the United States Court
for China] under the jurisdiction of the State Department?":
I do not know that there is. There was a little trouble at first to
know just where the jurisdiction was that had charge of this court.
Some question came up in regard to this-I believe some
remittance was made of fees or a remittance from some estate, or
something of that kind, and the Department of Justice would not
receive it. It was submitted to the officer in the Treasury who
decides these points, and he would not take any action in it, and it
was sent to the Auditor for the State Department, and I gave the
directions as to how the money was to be deposited, and took the
responsibility of settling the accounts without any authority from
any place. The Department of Justice would not receive the
accounts, and disclaimed any jurisdiction over them, and the State
Department, of course, had to take them.... They have been
running that way ever since, and nobody has questioned it.
95
The courts of the United States did not rule on the
question.96 Despite the fact that the State Department over-
saw the finances of the United States Court for China, and
the Auditor of the State Department testified that the court
belonged to the State Department,97 the State Department
in some of its rulings referred to the United States Court for
China as a United States court and in doing so treated it
like United States district courts.98
The confused and hybrid status of the United States
Court for China, along with the periodic attempts by
Congress and the President to control its procedures and
personnel, suggest that people in the United States gov-
ernment feared losing control over American judicial opera-
tions in Shanghai at the same time that they saw the court
as operating in an unimportant backwater. This paradoxi-
95. Hearings, supra note 36, at 72.
96. Id. at 70-75.
97. "This court comes under the State Department, and the State
Department is supposed to regulate this court. The Department of Justice does
not have anything to do with it." Id. at 72.
98. Id. at 37.
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cal view of the court motivated federal government
regulation of it at least as much as the fear that the percep-
tion of corruption tainted the reputation of the United
States abroad. Just the fact that this court was in China, in
a place poorly understood by legislators and the executive
in Washington, and far from their observation, would have
made these lawmakers suspicious of the court's activities.
Such a suspicion would have aroused the desire to exercise
any kind of control.
Detailed probing of the procedures, jurisdiction, and
substantive law of the U.S. Court for China reveals a mix-
ture of elements from both Shanghai and the United States.
What is most striking about this mixture is that it consis-
tently highlights how local in character the court was. The
procedural, jurisdictional, and substantive law elements
from the United States remained largely divorced from any
context in which they could operate in a useful or meaning-
ful way. Thus, these elements rarely rose above the level of
the trivial or superficial. By contrast, the procedural, juris-
dictional, and substantive law elements from Shanghai lay
at the heart of the court.
CHAPTER III
IMPOSING A MASK OF UNITED STATES PROCEDURE
The veneer of a United States district court masked an
institution whose procedures differed in fundamental ways
from those of the United States district courts. These differ-
ences stemmed from the U.S. Court for China's lack of two
important features of a United States district court: a
procedural code and a jury. These features of federal courts
in the United States were so intrinsic to their character
that it is not much of an exaggeration to say that federal
procedure in the United States during the nineteenth and
the first half of the twentieth century evolved out of and
around these features. Rules of evidence in federal court
emphasized the oral presentation of evidence in order to ac-
commodate the jury as the trier of fact. Rules of pleading in
federal court were found, until 1938 when the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by federal courts, in
the codes promulgated by the state in which the federal
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court sat. Congress was responsible for the lack of both an
official procedural code and a jury at the U.S. Court and re-
sisted adding them even when Congress's attention was
drawn to the difficulties in the court's administration when
all the rest of federal procedure was imposed upon a court
which lacked these features.
Compounding these fundamental differences between
the U.S. Court and federal trial courts in the United States
were pressures from the State Department to make the
court serve American interests and from the environment
in which the U.S. Court operated that molded it into an in-
stitution bearing local characteristics. As a result of these
pressures, the judge at the U.S. Court functioned in some
respects like a mediator, personally and informally advising
the parties and funneling their communications between
them. The judge also negotiated with Chinese courts and
with the local police to help the court carry out its orders.
The judge also disposed of the majority of cases in summary
fashion. In all three respects, the U.S. Court resembled
courts in Shanghai more than federal courts in the United
States.
A. Lack of a Procedural Code
The statute that created the court made no mention of
which procedures should be followed-apart from the
bureaucratic-style process outlined for inheritance cases in
one section of the statute. This left the court in a tricky
situation because federal trial courts in the United States
in 1906 followed the procedures of the states in which they
sat. The U.S. Court for China sat in Shanghai, a place with
dozens of courts, but no single authority or procedural code
governing them. Congress also left undetermined which
rules should guide the court for quasi procedural issues,
such as statutes of limitations, evidentiary questions, and
capacity to sue. Although this question was not settled for
the federal district courts, particularly after the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934 and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,99
99. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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at least the district courts had some recognized options to
choose among. The U.S. court did not.
Congress's refusal to reconcile the procedural mask of
the U.S. court with its fundamental character left to others
the task of dealing with the difficulties in the administra-
tion of the U.S. Court for China which resulted from an
imposition upon it of all United States procedure when it
lacked a jury and a procedural code. Although Congress
established the U.S. court in order to impose some regular-
ity on the administration of law by American consular offi-
cials in China, it nonetheless left the court's procedural
rules in the hands of the State Department, which, with the
cooperation of the United States Consul General in China,
had for forty years exercised the authority to devise the
rules of procedure and remedies for the consular courts in
China."°0 Congress authorized the judge of the United
States Court for China merely "from time to time to modify
and supplement said rules of procedure."10 '
The officers of the State Department were by no means
experts in the complex patchwork of rules of procedure that
then held sway in federal courts. 02 Until 1938, and there-
fore throughout most of the life of the U.S. Court for China,
federal courts did not have their own codes of procedure,
but instead followed the Supreme Court's equity rules and
the rules of the states in which each court sat. The rules of
the states varied considerably, and not all of them had
codes. Rules even varied by city, and from city to country-
side within the same state.
The first judge of the U.S. Court for China, Judge
Wilfley, established at best an ad-hoc and partial code of
procedural rules for use in the court, rules whose
100. U.S. Rev. Stats., § 4117 (1916); See Hearings 2, supra note 63, at 16, 46.
101. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 5, 34 Stat. 814, 816 (creating a United
States Court for China and prescribing the jurisdiction thereof).
102. For mention of the lack of legal training of consular officials at that
time, see Note, The United States Court for China, 49 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1936).
103. See GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 1-8, 98-101, 104-09
(1932).
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incompleteness disappointed at least some lawyers who
practiced there.
1 4
The judge who suffered most from his lack of rule-
making authority was Charles Sumner Lobingier, the third
judge of the court. He was a man who chafed under what he
perceived to be undue constraints on his authority and un-
stable working conditions at the U.S. Court for China. The
chaos that World War I visited upon the multinational
community of Shanghai only served to intensify his frustra-
tion. That war brought political changes that made
Lobingier feel so besieged by pressures from several sides
that he began to worry about the future of the court. He had
to contend with the recent pronouncement of the new
Chinese Supreme Court that it refused to recognize the
judgments of the U.S. Court for China. He had to compete
with the United States Consul General in Shanghai and his
underlings for the administration of lucrative probate pro-
ceedings. He felt compelled to challenge the State
Department over, its decision to exempt from the jurisdic-
tion of the U.S. court Germans, Russians, and Austro-
Hungarians because they were enemy subjects. To make
matters worse, from his perspective, Europe drew
Congress's attentions away from the Far East during World
War I and dimmed the future of Congressional appropria-
tions for the court. It got to the point where Lobingier
feared that Congress would cut off funds and appointments
of his subordinates altogether.0 5
Lobingier attempted to boost his rule-making authority
in order to cope with the absence of both a local law-making
body and a procedural code for the court. After some pres-
sure from Lobingier, the State Department transferred the
power to make procedural rules for the U.S. Court for China
from the U.S. Consul General to the judge of that court.
Emboldened perhaps by this augmentation of his authority,
Lobingier asked Congress to give its approval of the power
transferred to him, and he balked at Congress's suggestion
104. Hearings, supra note 36, at 50.
105. See Hearings 2, supra note 63, at 24.
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that this power be expressly made subject to the approval of
the Supreme Court.'
Lobingier had already taken the liberty of drafting a
code of evidentiary rules and new rules of procedure and
having them both printed in an American newspaper in
Shanghai. The rules of evidence were a detailed synthesis of
evidentiary rules from all over the world, but mainly from
California and the Philippines."°7 From a vague reference in
his introduction, it appears that the French propensity for
codification inspired him--"It has been decided, therefore,
to frame first a tentative draft (or as our French colleagues
would say a projet) of said rules."' 8 He drew in one place
from the French Civil Code, for his rule on "Presumptions
as to Life, Death and Survivorship.""°9 His principal motive,
however, was far from trying to move the United States
Court for China toward the model provided by its French
contemporaries. On the contrary, the spirit behind his draft
appears to have been to shore up the notion that the U.S.
court was American in character. This effort provides evi-
dence of a perception that the U.S. court was not American
in character.
At the same time, this draft code reveals that the ab-
sence of a jury exerted a profound effect on the character
and the operations of the court. Lobingier attempted with
this proposal to instruct all the men who sat as judges in
the various American courts in China how to weigh evi-
dence, a task about which judges in the United States did
not have to concern themselves, as well as screen evidence,
a task which judges in the United States did have to con-
cern themselves, because of the presence of the unprofes-
106. See id. at 46. One of the lawyers who represented clients before the
U.S. Court for China recounted in his memoirs a different account of the judge's
power to make rules. Norwood Allman wrote that the fifth and final judge of the
court, "Judge Helmick took advantage of a rule-making power, formerly
exercised by American Ministers and inherited by the United States judge on
establishment of the court." ALLMAN, supra note 85, at 108.
107. U.S. Court for China Administrative Jurisdiction Circular No. 4:
Proposed Rules of Evidence, MILLARD'S REVIEW OF THE FAR EAST, July 14, 1917,
at 164-168, July 21, 1917 at 192-196 [hereinafter MILLARD'S REVIEW].
108. Id. at 164.
109. Id. at 165.
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sional juries. In the absence of juries in American courts in
China, judges there had more work to do with the evidence
collected, and because there was no school for them, and no
tradition behind them, Lobingier's code tried to fill the void.
He asked Congress to approve those rules." To make his
case, he attempted to portray his bid for rulemaking
authority as in sync with that of prominent jurists in the
United States at that time:
Conferring upon courts the power to make rules instead of having
rules made by the legislature is one of the important planks in the
platform of the law reformers at the present time.
1 1
Lobingier also wanted Congress to remove the court
from being bound by the State Department's rules for
consulates that specified court fees. This would have had
the effect of multiplying almost 1,000 times the fees in pro-
bate cases and vastly augmenting the financial resources of
the court."
2
Congress granted none of these requests, including the
request to give its stamp of approval to the State
Department's transfer of authority over procedure to the
judge of the U.S. Court for China. This decision by Congress
foreshadowed its bolder move two decades later, the pas-
sage of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934."' With it, Congress
both won and lost its war over procedure with all of the
federal district courts. While the Act delegated to the
federal courts the power to make procedural rules,114 it did
110. Hearings, supra note 36, at 46.
111. Id. at 49. The most likely reform which Lobingier refers to here is the
American Bar Association's adoption of a resolution in 1911 in favor of federal
courts making their own rules of civil procedure. The ABA lobbied Congress for
the next twenty years to pass a statute allowing federal courts to make their
own procedural rules. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTs 426-27
(5th ed. 1994).
112. Hearings 2, supra note 63, at 17-18.
113. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified more recently at
28 U.S.C. 2072 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)).
114. This is a description of the Act from Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-
Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375, 379, 426-28 (1992-
1993).
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so in a way which precluded the district courts from each
making their own procedural rules and instead centralized
the authority to make procedural rules in the United States
Supreme Court. Pursuant to this statute, the U.S. Supreme
Court drafted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
with the input of a committee of lawyers and adopted the
FRCP on December 20, 1937. After submitting the rules to
Congress, they became effective on September 16, 1938
when the deadline for Congressional disapproval passed.
This move curtailed the rule-making authority of not just
the federal district courts, but also the U.S. Court for
China, which adopted the FRCP virtually unchanged in De-
cember of 1938, within months of its adoption by all the
other federal courts. By this time, Judge Lobingier had left
the court and Judge Milton J. Helmick the fifth and final
judge of the U.S. court, presided there.11
B. Lack of a Jury
The litigants and judges at the United States Court for
China were further justified in their confusion over the fed-
eral waiver rules of pleading-and the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit further unjustified in chastising them for
their confusion-by the fact that some of those rules, par-
ticularly those related to preserving questions of law for
review on appeal, applied to civil suits in which either ju-
ries were to be empaneled, or where the right to a jury trial
was waived.116 Since neither ever characterized any lawsuit
at the United States Court for China, the application of
these rules undoubtedly left room for disagreement."7
Despite the Ninth Circuit's insistence that the U.S.
Court for China was bound by the procedural rules of other
district courts, criminal procedure at the U.S. Court for
China deviated quite substantially from that in federal dis-
trict courts in the United States. This fact was reflected
little in written procedural rules. One difference not clearly
articulated in a written rule was that, despite the fact that
115. ALLMAN, supra note 85, at 107.
116. See FEDERAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 67, 76-77, 80, 82-
83 (Roy B. Marker ed., 1935) [hereinafter Marker].
117. See id.
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the court was a creature of the U.S. Constitution, it was un-
clear whether the U.S. Constitution could be invoked as
authority in the U.S. Court for China. The 1906 Act did not
extend nor deny the extension of constitutional protections
to those subject to the U.S. Court for China. None of the
United States Supreme Court's "Insular Cases," which dealt
with the extension of the United States' sovereignty over
territories acquired by treaty from another sovereign which
suffered defeat at the hands of the United States military,
mentioned China.
118
In practice, criminal defendants at the U.S. Court for
China were not indicted by a grand jury or tried by a jury.
The court never empaneled a jury, for either criminal or
civil trials, despite the fact that Congress modeled it on the
British Supreme Court for China, 9 which did empanel
them for both criminal and civil trials.12° The court's refusal
to empanel juries came even though parties demanded jury
trials, even in civil cases."'
In operating without a jury, the U.S. Court for China
resembled all the other courts in Shanghai with the excep-
tion of the British Supreme Court for China. The Privy
Council in London issued the procedural rules for this
court, which provided that juries could be empaneled upon
either the request of either party or the order of the court.
To qualify for the list from which juries were drawn, a
potential juror had to satisfy a minimum income require-
ment.'22 Because only one court out of the several dozen in
operation in Shanghai used a jury, the absence of a jury
was a local trait.
118. See, e.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U.S. 244 (1901).
119. See, e.g., Hearings 2, supra note 63, at 7-12, 16.
120. See The China Rules of Court, 1905, Rules 26-30, in BRITISH
JURISDICTION IN CHINA: RULES OF COURT, 1905-1916, 17-18 (W. B. Kennett ed.,
1918) [hereinafter Kennett].
121. See, e.g., Barkovitch v. Katz, 1909-1911; Records of the Foreign Service
Posts of the Department of State, Consular Posts, Shanghai, China, Civil Court
Case Files; B361-380, file B363; RG 84; National Archives at College Park,
College Park, MD.
122. Kennett, supra note 120, at 17.
2004] 963
964 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
Judge Lobingier justified doing away with the jury in
two ways, one of which, a lack of local demand for it,
123
emphasized its connection to the court's local context. His
other justification looked to sovereign law, specifically a
U.S. Supreme Court holding in an appeal from the U.S.
consular court in Kanagawa, Japan. In 1890, the American
Consul-General in Japan convicted a British seaman
employed on a U.S. ship of the murder of a U.S. seaman. In
a broad holding, the Supreme Court construed the grant of
judicial powers to U.S. consuls, in two treaties between
Japan and the U.S. and federal legislation enacting the
treaties into law, to mean that the due process require-
ments of indictment by a grand jury and trial by jury did
not apply to U.S. citizens abroad."2'
The first of Lobingier's justifications is stronger than
the second. His assertion that there was insufficient
demand for U.S. constitutional protections in Shanghai
depends, of course, upon who he was envisioning to be eligi-
ble for demanding a jury. If he was thinking of criminal
defendants, it is difficult to imagine that they would not
123. See Hearings 2, supra note 63, at 12.
124. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891):
In none of the laws which have been passed by Congress to give effect
to treaties of the kind has there been any attempt to require
indictment by a grand jury before one can be called upon to answer for
a public offense of that grade committed in those countries, nor to
secure a jury on the trial of the offence. Yet the laws on that subject
have been passed without objection to their constitutionality .... By
the Constitution a government is ordained and established "for the
United States of America," and not for countries outside of their
limits.... The Constitution can have no operation in another country.
Id. at 464.
The Court reasoned with an original intent argument:
The framers of the Constitution, who were fully aware of the necessity
of having judicial authority exercised by our consuls in non-Christian
countries, if commercial intercourse was to be had with their people,
never could have supposed that all the guarantees in the
administration of the law upon criminals at home were to be
transferred to such consular establishments, and applied before an
American who had committed felony there could be accused and tried.
They must have known that such a requirement would defeat the main
purpose of investing the consul with judicial authority.
Id. at 464-65.
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demand a jury if they had a chance to, unless it was obvious
from the outset that the jury would be biased against the
defendant. If the only relevant demand was from the
District Attorney who prosecuted the court's criminal cases,
then it is easier to see a lack of it, as empaneling juries re-
quires more work than not empaneling them. The conven-
ience of the District Attorney, however, is not a strong
justification for dispensing with the U.S. Constitution. As
for his second justification, one of the problems with citing
the U.S. Supreme Court precedent he cited was that the de-
fendant in the case was not American, whereas all of the
defendants at the U.S. Court for China were. It is easier to
make the case for exempting an alien from the protections
afforded by the U.S. Constitution, than it is for exempting a
citizen of the United States.
Neither the justifications for dispensing with the jury at
the U.S. Court for China, nor their weaknesses, stirred
members of Congress or the President or any other federal
officials from questioning the practice or moving to stop.
Most members of Congress probably were not aware about
the court in the first place. When Congressman Bailey in
1913 questioned American attorney George Curtis about
the practice of the court, he showed that he knew nothing
about it. What is more, Mr. Curtis' response suggests that
he either did not know about Supreme Court jurisprudence
denying jury trials to litigants in territorial and extraterri-
torial courts of the United States, or he simply steadfastly
refused to acknowledge that these decisions bound the U.S.
Court for China.'25 Despite Curtis' insistence that Judge
Thayer improperly denied litigants their trial by jury,
neither Congressman Bailey, nor any of his fellow
Congressmen, took any further measures to inquire into or
change this practice.
The decision by the judges at the U.S. Court for China
not to apply the U.S. Constitution in the U.S. Court for
China may have been an attempt to cope with the great
distance between Washington and Shanghai, in the sense
that they perceived the court to be beyond the federal gov-
ernment's means to ensure that constitutional guarantees
125. See Hearings, supra note 36, at 52-53.
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were enforced there. Even the pro-jury Mr. Curtis seemed
to acknowledge the impotence of a government half a world
away to protect him from the wiles of a judge in Shanghai
who repeatedly held him in contempt: "[iif you consider that
you are 7,000 miles from the appellate court, with no jury
and a hostile judge;" he also stated "there we are 10,000
miles from home and 7,000 miles from the apellate [sic]
court. Do I make myself understood?""6
The decision by judges at the U.S. court not to empanel
juries might have represented a bow to the particular needs
of Shanghai and the American community there. Apologists
for the lack of a jury argued that it was more difficult to
empanel juries of Americans where Americans made up a
tiny minority of a city's inhabitants than where they made
virtually all of the population. Still, the opposite argument
could be made, namely that the smaller the pool of potential
jurors, the easier it is to identify them and assemble them.
The decision not to empanel a jury at the U.S. court was
ironic, however, given one of the primary reasons for the
court's existence. The court's raison-d'etre was to imple-
ment on Chinese soil the legal privileges gained by the
United States in the Sino-American treaties of the
nineteenth century. These privileges centered on the right
of Americans to be free of the harsh criminal procedure
believed to hold sway in the Chinese courts of the time. In
1907, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit linked
the right to be free of Chinese criminal procedure to the
right to be subject to the relatively pro-defendant proce-
dures of United States criminal law when it stated that
Congress established the U.S. Court for China to extend
U.S. criminal procedural protections to U.S. citizens in
China.'27 In light of the practice of not following United
126. Id. at 54-55.
127. In Biddle v. United States, 156 F. 759 (9th Cir. 1907), the court stated:
The object of the treaty and the intention of Congress, in creating the
United States Court for China, in so far as that court is given criminal
jurisdiction, was to throw around American citizens residing or
sojourning in China, and there charged with crime, the beneficent
principles of the laws of the United States relating to the trial of
persons charged with crime-the rules of evidence, the presumption of
innocence, the degree of proof necessary to convict, the right of the
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States criminal procedure at the court in China, the appeals
court statement suggests that Congress's purpose for the
U.S. Court for China was, at best, only partially realized.
No doubt the United States' experience with adminis-
tering justice in the Philippines shaped the perceptions of
federal officials about the need for juries in Shanghai. The
Supreme Court denied any right to a jury trial or indict-
ment by a grand jury in the courts established and operated
by the United States in the Philippines, notwithstanding
the explicit importation of American constitutional rights
into the Philippines by the United States President and
Congress. The Court reasoned that not only had Congress
omitted the right to a jury and the right to a grand jury
indictment in its 1902 statute which provided the
Philippines with a host of other American constitutional
rights,"28 but furthermore that the right to a jury trial was
"merely a method of procedure" rather than "fundamen-
tal, "129 and that "requirement of an indictment by grand jury
is not included within the guaranty of 'due process of
law.""3 A final reason was that the Spanish legal system
which was thereby supplanted by the American one recog-
nized no juries.' In other words, American courts would
refrain from empaneling juries out of deference to local
practice under their immediate predecessors. This series of
rationales is based more on administrative expediency than
on information about local needs in the Philippines. From
the absence of details about either in these opinions one can
infer that the effort required to assemble juries abroad,
from populations that were perhaps more transient or less
accused to be confronted with witnesses against him, exemption from
being compelled to incriminate himself, etc.
Id. at 761.
128. Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 691, 692 (providing for the
administration of the civil affairs government in the Phillipine Islands); see also
Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914); Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138, 144-45 (1904).
129. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 144-45.
130. Ocampo, 234 U.S. at 98.
131. See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 144-45.
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American than those in the fifty states, outweighed any
concern about native preferences or sensibilities.
In the context of American courts in the Philippines,
the Supreme Court based its attempt to surgically remove
the jury from the constitutional underpinnings of American
criminal justice abroad also on nonsensical legal abstrac-
tions. These abstractions not only were intrinsically
confusing, but also conflicted with many of the Court's ra-
tionales for exercising American jurisdiction in the
Philippines. The Supreme Court's assertion that the right
to a jury trial was not fundamental clashed with its asser-
tion elsewhere that United States criminal procedure
applied to the Philippines. It treated habeas corpus peti-
tions from the Philippines the same as those from the
states.'32 As the Court stated in seemingly unequivocal
terms:
[W]e must test the correctness of the action of the court below by
substantially the same criteria which we would apply to a case
arising in the United States and controlled by the bill of rights
expressed in the amendments to the Constitution of the United
States. 133
This passage clashed with some oft-quoted language of
the U.S. Supreme Court, which it trotted out frequently tojustify limits on rights afforded to territories outside the
states. With this language, the Court tried to suggest a
category of constitutional protections with lesser strength
than those in force in the states by using words without le-
gal meaning, words such as "inference" and "general spirit":
Doubtless Congress, in legislating for the territories, would be
subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights
which are formulated in the Constitution and its amendments; but
these limitations would exist rather by inference and the general
spirit of the Constitution from which Congress derives all its
132. Fisher ex. rel. v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 181-82 (1906).
133. Serra v. Mortiga, 204 U.S. 470, 474 (1907).
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powers, than by any express and direct application of its
provisions.134
These dicta reveal the confusion in Washington about
how to operate courts in areas outside the states over which
it had assumed control. These competing visions demon-
strate, also, that it was not an assessment of conditions in
Shanghai or China that determined the policies in
Washington about how U.S. law should be administered
there.
Regardless of the reasons for operating the U.S. court
without a jury, the effects on the court of doing so were pro-
found from a procedural point of view. With no lay persons
trying the facts, there was no need to screen evidence for
bias or improper foundation. Objections to evidence as it
was submitted at trial were ludicrous, of no purpose,
because the judge was the only person apart from the
parties and their attorneys who heard the evidence. There
was even little need for a single trial at which all the evi-
dence would be submitted at once as part of a grand show.
An episodic approach to submitting evidence and ruling on
issues would have been easier on both judge and litigant,
because they discover evidence episodically. There was no
need for separating procedural rules of equity from those of
law, because a principal difference between those two types
of courts was the presence or not of a jury. There was no
need for directed verdicts.
Finally in 1938 the court adopted rules which made it
clear that some procedures flowing from the existence of a
jury, such as the right to empanel a jury and the directed
verdict, were not available. 3 Yet, despite so many other
procedural ramifications of the lack of a jury, the U.S. court
retained the practice of screening evidence for bias and
134. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, 136 U.S. 1, 44 (1890), quoted in Dorr 195 U.S. at 146, and Downes, 182
U.S. at 268.
135. See FED. R. Civ. P., version adopted at the United States Court for
China (1939), R. 38, 39, 47-51.
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improper foundation, including objections,"' retained the
single, showy trial where the parties' attorneys did most of
the work by way of presentations of pleadings and then evi-
dence, largely in the form of direct and cross examinations
of expert and eye witnesses, while the judge remained
largely silent,3 7 and recognized some distinction between
equity and law.13" In all three ways, needless procedures
were followed. One reason for this was the need to maintain
as much as possible the look of a federal district court,
because the Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court
were standing ready to overturn its decisions on procedural
grounds. Neither of those appellate courts recognized any
major procedural differences-apart from the bare fact of
the absence of a jury-between the U.S. Court for China
and federal district courts inside the United States.
C. Procedural Confusion as a Means to Control and Belittle
the Court
One of the striking conundrums facing judges and liti-
gants at the U.S. Court for China was that, while Congress
prevented the promulgation of a procedural code for the
court and denied that procedural adjustments needed to be
made at the court to accommodate the lack of a jury, the
136. See, e.g., testimony taken in Spies v. Peiping Univ. Med. Coll. (1935),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 147
(National Archives).
137. See, e.g., hearing in Spies v. Peiping Univ. Med. Coll. (1935), as
recorded in Case of Dr. Spies v. P.U.M.C. Opens in U.S. Court Here, in THE
PEIPING CHRONICLE, May 24, 1935, May 26, 1935, and other articles of similar
title in May 22, 1935, May 30, 1935 microformed on Microcopy F167, Record
Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frames 133-91 (National Archives).
138. See, e.g., statement "[tihese are three actions at law" by Judge Helmick
in his opinion in Spies v. Peiping Univ. Med. Coll. (1935), published in its
entirety in PEKING & TIENTSIN TIMES, July 1, 1935, microformed on Microcopy
F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frames 192-96 (National Archives). Judge
Helmick had guided the plaintiffs to bring the action in law instead of in equity,
as one of them had originally done, when the judge denied his motion for a
preliminary injunction. As reported by the United Press in Shanghai, "The
Judge also indicated that Dr. Spies' remedy was probably in a suit for damages
against the P.U.M.C., instead of an injunction against wrongful dismissal."
NORTH CHINA STAR, Apr. 26, 1935, microformed on Microcopy F167, Record
Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 124 (National Archives).
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U.S. court of appeals chastised the court and its litigants for
failing to follow particular types of procedures. The war
waged by judges of the U.S. Court for China with Congress,
as described above, was not just for control over the court's
procedure, but also over whether the understanding in
Shanghai of just what its procedures were could be
expanded and clarified. Yet, not only did Congress manage
to keep the court from clarifying procedure in this way, but
the U.S. court of appeals consistently ruled on appeals from
the U.S. Court for China as if the procedural rules there
were clear, widely known, and the same as those in U.S.
district courts in the Ninth Circuit. The only procedural dif-
ference between the U.S. Court for China and U.S. district
courts that the Ninth Circuit ever recognized was that the
U.S. Court for China did not empanel juries, but it
restricted the magnitude of this difference by consistently
refusing to recognize its broad ramifications. For example,
when the defendant in a banking case challenged the U.S.
Court for China's factual findings, the Ninth Circuit refused
to broaden the scope of its authority to review that court's
factual findings because that court did not empanel a jury.
The Ninth Circuit explicitly underlined the similarity of its
appellate jurisdiction over the U.S. court to its appellate
jurisdiction over other federal district courts and to the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the other federal circuits over the
federal district courts within them: "Writs of error to the
United States Court for China form no exception to the
rule. , 1
39
In these rulings, the Ninth Circuit was acting well
within the statute which established the United States
Court for China and gave the Ninth Circuit appellate re-
view over it. Although the statute did not provide for the
court's procedure to be as close as possible to that of federal
district courts, neither did it accommodate the lack of a jury
at the U.S. Court for China by expanding the fact finding
powers of the United States court of appeals when it heard
appeals from the U.S. Court for China. The statutory lan-
guage is explicit that the appellate review exercised by the
139. Gillespie v. H.K. & Shanghai Banking Corp., 23 F.2d 670, 671 (9th Cir.
1928).
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Ninth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court over
the U.S. Court for China is the same type of appellate
review as that exercised by any United States appeals court
and the United States Supreme Court over any United
States district court. The statute provides in relevant part:
That appeals shall lie from all final judgments or decrees of said
court to the United States circuit court of appeals of the ninth
judicial circuit, and thence appeals and writs of error may be
taken from the judgments or decrees of the said circuit court of
appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States in the same
class of cases as those in which appeals and writs of error are
permitted to judgments of said court of appeals in cases coming
from district and circuit courts of the United States.
140
The Ninth Circuit was authorized, then, to enforce any
similarity in appellate review without touching the larger
question of the similarity of all procedure at the U.S. Court
for China to all procedure in the Article III federal trial
courts.
The appeals court invoked section five of the statute
establishing the U.S. Court for China to justify imposing
the same waiver rules on the U.S. court as were imposed on
all federal courts. 4 ' But the Ninth Circuit's blanket imposi-
tion of the waiver rules for objections and defenses and
grounds for appeal ignored the fundamental problem that,
in the United States, these rules were applied only in cases
where trial by jury was available to the parties.142 A leap
had to be made, then, from the federal courts which
imposed no waiver rules in cases where there was no right
to a jury, to the U.S. court which was supposed to impose
the waiver rules in such cases. This leap remained unex-
140. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 3, 34 Stat. 814, 815 (creating a United
States Court for China and prescribing the jurisdiction thereof).
141. China Press, Inc. v. Webb, 7 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1925).
142. See, e.g., Crowell Bros. v. Panhandle Grain & Elevator Co., 271 F. 129
(8th Cir. 1921), cited in Marker, supra note 116, at 82; Paxson Co. v. Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 201 F. 656 (3d. Cir. 1912), cited in Marker, supra note 116,
at 83; Patterson v. Robinson Bros. & Co., 180 F. 668 (3d. Cir. 1910), cited in
Marker, supra note 116, at 67; see also China Press, Inc. v. Webb, 7 F.2d 581
(1925), cited in Marker, supra note 116, at 81, 89, 90.
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amined by the Ninth Circuit or the United States Supreme
Court.
Despite the lack of a jury at the U.S. Court for China,
the Ninth Circuit before 1938 expected the U.S. Court for
China to divide law and equity just as did the other federal
district courts. The provision in the organic statute of the
U.S. court that it apply "the laws of the United States" and
"the common law" could be construed to include the distinc-
tion between law and equity, but this language did not
explicitly mandate this. Despite the lack of clarity about
which authority extended the jurisprudence on the law-
equity distinction to the U.S. Court for China, the Ninth
Circuit did not visit the question. It simply imposed a dis-
tinction on the court when questions arose about which
issues had been preserved for appeal. When such questions
arose, it was unclear from the appellate opinion whether
the U.S. court permitted parties to dispense with the dis-
tinction, or whether the parties ignored the distinction at
their peril, or, indeed, whether the parties simply disagreed
with the appeals court's application of that distinction-as
in the argument that the appeals court could not consider
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings or
judgment of the U.S. court below in a proceeding against a
trustee or assignee for the equitable distribution of a fund
in his hands.1" Although the Ninth Circuit treated these
questions as if they had obvious answers, they did not
because the very extension of the law-equity distinction to
the U.S. Court for China made no sense since no jury was
ever empaneled there.
The distinction came up not just on appeal, but also at
trial at the U.S. Court for China and before a House
subcommittee hearing. George F. Curtis, an American
attorney who had been practicing law in Shanghai for a
decade, in 1913 tried to get the U.S. government to remove
.Judge Thayer from the bench of the U.S. Court for China.
One of the accusations he leveled against Judge Thayer was
that he did not understand "the equity practice of the
United States" and the U.S. Supreme Court's rules of
equity, which, Curtis explained, were supposed to be in
143. See McDonnell v. Bank of China, 33 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1929).
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force at the U.S. Court in Shanghai. Curtis attributed his
inability to secure the enforcement of a monetary judgment
in favor of his client on Thayer's ignorance of equity proce-
dure.
I found Mr. Andrews [a defendant] was in Shanghai, passing
through from the south, going to Yokohama, and I immediately
drew up a bill in equity, asking for a writ of ne exeat, asking for an
accounting of the money-the money still in his possession-
asking for a discovery, but the court would not issue the writ,
although the bill was drawn up according to law and verified, and
the judgment against them was produced, sealed under the
consular seal of the court that issued it [the American Consular
Court] .... Mr. Thayer would not issue that writ, and therefore
Mr. Andrews could do just as he wished about it. They answered
and admitted the judgment, but denied that we were entitled to-
Mr. Fergusson (interposing). What did they answer? I thought you
said that the judge would not allow you to file it?
Mr. Curtis. I filed the case. Then I filed an amended bill, attaching
interrogatories to my bill. By the way, the judge only gave me 24
hours in which to file an amended bill, when, under the equity
practice of the United States, you can amend a bill as a matter of
course. Then they demurred to that. The demurrer was not
verified, did not have attached to it the certificate of the consul
that it was not filed for the purpose of delay, and that it was well
founded in law as required by the equity rules of the Supreme
Court then in force. The bill came up on demurrer, and Mr. Thayer
dismissed this bill in equity, and that very night Mr. Andrews
went aboard the Princess Alice.. . for Yokahoma [sic], and my
client, who had spent a great deal of money and secured this
judgment, as set forth fully in this report of Mr. Peirce [sic], could
not get a cent .... I claim that Judge Thayer was supposed to know
the elementary rules of equity, and he should have ruled with
US.
The appeals court had occasion to express the convic-
tion that the U.S. Court for China was just like any other
U.S. federal district court when litigants argued that
certain procedural statutes or doctrines did not apply to the
144. Hearings, supra note 36, at 58-59.
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U.S. Court for China. Litigants on appeal from the U.S.
Court for China decisions routinely challenged the notion
that the U.S. Court for China was controlled by the same
procedural rules as were the other federal district courts,
without challenging the underlying validity of those rules.
Common examples of such procedures were objections,
counterarguments to motions and demurrers, and the cir-
cumstances in which the failure to make them at a
particular time waived the right to bring them later.14
According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, a timely exception to a denial of a motion for the
vacation of judgment and for a new trial or a timely objec-
tion to testimony at trial at the U.S. Court for China was
necessary to preserve the issue for appeal, just as it was in
the other district courts. The rule widely accepted through-
out the federal court system at the time was that, to be
timely, the exception to a denial of a motion had to be taken
before judgment.14 In order to preserve for appeal the issue
of sufficiency of evidence, according to the rule, there had to
be a proper and specific objection and an exception taken to
any ruling on the objection.147
The significant difference between the U.S. Court for
China and U.S. district courts, according to the arguments
brought by appellants, tended to have something to do with
the court's location in China or the lack of a jury there. In
rejecting one of these arguments, the appeals court voiced
its preference for uniformity over diversity in federal proce-
dure, and its refusal to recognize that any practical
efficiency could be gained from allowing deviations in pro-
cedure that accommodated the great distance of China from
the United States:
It would seem to be a simple matter to conform to the established
procedure and practice. To take an exception at the time of ruling
145. See, e.g., "Order," Pavel Valevitch Pissarevsky v. Texas Oil Co., (Apr. 6,
1932), Stack Area 4-E 2, Row 10, Compartment 10, Shelf B-C, "Shanghai
Consulate Records," Boxes 10-14.
146. See Wear v. Imperial Window Glass Co., 224 F. 60 (8th Cir. 1915);
Fellman v. Royal Ins. Co., 185 F. 689 (5th Cir. 1911).
147. See McCampbell v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 288 F. 465 (5th Cir. 1923); see
also Marker, supra note 116, at 76-77.
2004] 975
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of the court in the progress of the trial, and duly to present the
same by a bill of exceptions and to prepare the record with the
assignment of error, are steps requiring no more formality in the
course of a law action tried in the United States Court for China
than in an action carried on in a federal court in another locality.
It is evident that the statutes preserve that harmony of system
contemplated by general statutes which are applicable and which
have been judicially construed as controlling.
At the same time that this reference to formality
refuses to accommodate a different set of circumstances at
the U.S. Court for China, it ignores the existence of these
differences and the possibility that the personnel and liti-
gants at the court are acting out of needs dictated by the
local circumstances, rather than out of a lack of the knowl-
edge, intelligence or will to comply with federal procedure.
It insinuates that the U.S. Court for China lacks the capac-
ity to use district court processes properly. In a similar
spirit, the Ninth Circuit interjected in another opinion that
the language of the U.S. Court for China's judgments was
less formal than would be expected of a U.S. district court:
"The judgment [of the U.S. Court for China] follows the
opinion of the court, as seems to be the practice in that
jurisdiction, and is somewhat informal."149 The Ninth
Circuit did not hesitate in that opinion to deride the ability
of the U.S. Court for China properly to build an evidentiary
record by pointing out that the record sent up by the U.S.
Court for China "is somewhat inconsistent on its face.5
These tinges of disdain by the Ninth Circuit's United
States Court of Appeals for the U.S. Court for China,
coupled with the regularity with which procedural mistakes
formed the basis for its reversals of the United States Court
for China's decisions, suggest that the appeals court may
have used procedural technicalities as an excuse for chas-
tising the court for deviance from what, in its view, a
United States district court was supposed to be. Not only
was this unfair in light of the differences between the
structure of federal district courts and the structure of the
148. China Press, Inc. v. Webb, 7 F.2d 581, 583 (1925).
149. Wulfsohn v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 11 F.2d 715, 718 (9th Cir. 1926).
150. Id. at 717.
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U.S. Court for China and the differences in local circum-
stances between the two, but it was also unfair when these
differences were laid aside. The kinds of technicalities the
Ninth Circuit focused on, such as distinctions between
equity and law and waiver of objections and defenses, were
not uniformly observed in any United States district court
at the time, nor were they taught in all law schools in the
United States.' To sanction errors in their observance was
akin to whipping a horse for neighing. Such sanctions, then,
might have been done not out of outrage at the magnitude
of the offense so much as to exercise control over the
offender.
As evidence that the Ninth Circuit protested too much,
a simplistic clarity in the treatises about the distinction
between law and equity in the federal courts 152 failed to
dispel widespread confusion about it throughout the United
States. At least ninety times between 1906 and 1941 the
federal courts either received a request to transfer a case
between law and equity, transferred a case between law
and equity, or reviewed such a transfer. When the United
States Supreme Court became involved, it did not follow
any discernable pattern. 53 These transfer cases show that
one learned jurist was wrong when he asserted that "[a]
151. By 1906, elite law schools such as Harvard and Columbia had adopted
the case method throughout their curricula, which pushed out the teaching of
the more practical and rule-oriented courses of Equity and Pleading Practice
and Evidence. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA
FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980s 39-48 (1983).
152. For example, one of them states that, "[tlhe distinction between law
and equity, imbedded by constitution in the federal jurisprudence, has been
rigidly observed and enforced in the federal courts ever since their organization.
In the courts of original jurisdiction there is a law side for the lawsuits, and an
equity side for the equity suits; and an entirely different procedure on each
side." 8 STANDARD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PROCEDURE 384-85 (1911) (footnotes
omitted).
153. A LexisNexis search of federal cases between 1906 and 1941 using the
key words "transfer to equity" yielded 64 cases and "transfer to law" yielded 97
cases. Cases which appeared in both groups were eliminated, as were cases
involving transfers of land and attachments. Mter this winnowing, there were
90 transfer cases which had appeared at any or all levels of the federal court
system. These cases included both sua sponte transfers and transfers requested
by the parties. LexisNexis, at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
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suit entered on one side of the court could not be changed or
transferred to the other side, but was as entirely distinct
from the cases on the other side as though brought in a
separate court."'54 These requests to transfer, and the
dozens of instances where appellate courts disagreed with
district courts about whether transfer was proper, also
show that even the lawyers and judges who worked in the
Article III courts of the United States disagreed about
where the boundary between law and equity fell.
This lack of clarity throughout the federal courts of the
United States during the life of the U.S. Court for China
was in no way an anomaly of that period, and thus cannot
be dismissed as a fleeting or superficial phenomenon about
which the Ninth Circuit could have no cognizance. For
many years during the eighteenth century, lawyers and
judges in the American colonies debated between two
contrasting conceptions of equity. One maintained that
equity should be a rigid system, one that imposed a set of
technical rules for pleading, discovery and remedies. The
other side in this debate, equally forceful and legitimate,
countered that equity precluded by its very nature the use
of technical procedural rules.' Under Justice John
Marshall, the United States Supreme Court in the early
nineteenth century attempted to narrow the scope of its
equity review by adopting the former position, but in doing
so, further blurred the boundary between law and equity.
The court blurred this boundary even further by turning
equity into a second rigorous system of law,5 6 and then
deciding some cases using the looser version of equity as its
guide. 15
T
A wide diversity in the demarcation of law and equity
existed also among the lower federal courts and the states
throughout the nineteenth century. The framers of the
federal court system refused to set up separate equity
courts. Some states, like Kansas and Arkansas, created a
154. 8 STANDARD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PROCEDURE 385 (1911) (footnotes
omitted).
155. See, e.g., John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the
History of American Judging, 34 Hous. L. REV. 1425, 1433-52 (1998).
156. Id. at 1452.
157. Id. at 1464-66.
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decisive institutional separation of its law courts from its
equity courts, while other states, such as New York, went to
some lengths to ensure that law and equity were not distin-
guished at all.15 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit was not alone among courts in the United
States in arbitrarily using procedure as a means to rein in
the power of lower courts. In Mississippi, the state's inter-
mediate appellate courts so frequently reversed trial courts
for failures to recognize differences between law and equity
that the state's legislature added an amendment in 1890 to
the state's constitution which prohibited reversal on those
grounds.159 The amendment by itself was not enough to stop
litigants in Mississippi's courts, including its appellate
courts, from asking for reversals for errors involving the
distinction between the two jurisdictions. 0 Transfers
between chancery and circuit courts were requested
frequently enough to produce at least eight Supreme Court
158. See Morton Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the
Arkansas Chancery Courts: Historical Anomalies and Political Realities, 17 U.
ARK. LIrrLE ROCK L.J. 215, 233-35 (1995).
159. "No judgment or decree in any chancery or circuit court rendered in a
civil cause shall be reversed or annulled on the ground of want of jurisdiction to
render said judgment or decree, from any error or mistake as to whether the
cause in which it was rendered was of equity or common-law jurisdiction; but if
the Supreme Court shall find error in the proceedings other than as to
jurisdiction, and it shall be necessary to remand the case, the Supreme Court
may remand it to that court which, in its opinion, can best determine the
controversy." MIss. CONST. art. VI, § 147.
160. See, e.g., Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Durr, 192 So. 45 (Miss. 1939);
Rankin v. Ford, 134 So. 178 (Miss. 1931), overruled by Allred v. Nesmith, 149
So. 2d 29 (Miss. 1963); Carter v. Witherspoon, 126 So. 388 (Miss. 1930); Moore
v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 125 So. 411 (Miss. 1930); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v.
Best, 128 So. 565 (Miss. 1930); Talbot & Higgins Lumber Co. v. McLeod Lumber
Co., 113 So. 433 (Miss. 1927); Engleburg v. Tonkel, 106 So. 447 (Miss. 1925);
Yazoo Delta Mortg. Co. v. Huton, 106 So. 5 (Miss. 1925); W.W. Walley & Son v.
L. N. Dantzler Co., 75 So. 433 (Miss. 1917); Dinsmore v. Hardison, 71 So. 567
(Miss. 1916); Metzger v. Joseph, 71 So. 645 (Miss. 1916); Sturges v. City of
Meridian, 48 So. 620 (Miss. 1909); Hancock v. Dodge, 37 So. 711 (Miss. 1904);
Iron v. Cole, 28 So. 803 (Miss. 1900); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Le Blanc, 21 So. 760
(Miss. 1897); Cazeneuve v. Curell, 13 So. 32 (Miss. 1893); Goyer Cold Storage
Co. v. Wildberger, 15 So. 235 (Miss. 1893); Barrett v. Carter Bros. & Co., 13 So.
625 (Miss. 1891).
2004] 979
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
decisions about them in Mississippi between 1906 and
1941.6
D. Local Traits of the Role of the Judge and the Gathering
of Evidence
Compounding the fundamental procedural differences
of the U.S. court from the U.S. district courts spawned by
the lack of a procedural code and a jury were a variety of
local influences on the judge and other officers at the U.S.
court. Shanghai was home to over a dozen foreign consu-
lates and forty-one nationalities of people, including
hundreds of thousands of Chinese. Americans never num-
bered more than a few percent of the city's population.162
The presence of so many Chinese living and working among
this minority of Americans made the Chinese an inescap-
able influence upon the officers and litigants at the U.S.
Court for China. At the same time, these tens of thousands
of Americans called Shanghai their home and valued the
great opportunities for making money that Shanghai
presented. This was not lost on officials in Washington,
D.C., and therefore, the State Department paid special
attention to American institutions in Shanghai, including
the U.S. Court for China."'
1. The Involvement of Diplomats. Despite their rela-
tively small numbers in Shanghai, Americans maintained a
strong financial and political presence there. One conse-
quence of this presence was the involvement of the State
Department in the running of the U.S. court. The American
diplomatic corps influenced the operations of the court and
161. See Wheeler v. Cleveland State Bank, 164 So. 400 (Miss. 1935);
Dilworth v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 154 So. 535 (Miss. 1933); Grice v. McCarty-
Holman Co., 137 So. 741 (Miss. 1931); Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co. v.
Coleman, 109 So. 20 (Miss. 1926); Robertson v. F. Goodman Dry Goods Co., 76
So. 149 (Miss. 1917); Sturges v. City of Meridian, 48 So. 620 (Miss. 1909).
162. See Tahirih V. Lee, Law and Local Autonomy at the International
Mixed Court of Shanghai 21 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University) (on file at Yale University and with author) [hereinafter Lee, Local
Autonomy].
163. See generally EILEEN P. SCuLLY, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE FROM
AFAR: AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP IN TREATY PORT CHINA, 1844-1942 (2001).
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made the court into more of an advocate for defendants
than were federal courts in the United States, and also
made procedure at the U.S. court more subject to the vari-
ability of lay people than was procedure in the federal
courts in the United States. Whereas the U.S. Marshal
gathered evidence for the U.S. Attorney to bring in criminal
trials in United States district courts during the first half of
the twentieth century, the U.S. Marshal, the U.S. Attorney,
and consular officers formed a team for gathering evidence
for use at the U.S. Court for China. Arthur Bassett, who
served as the U.S. Attorney at the court and examined
witnesses for the government in criminal cases there, was
also an officer of the American Consulate and had his office
there.6 ' Whereas in the United States the parties each
independently gathered evidence in civil trials, and occa-
sionally took depositions in front of the judge or a magis-
trate,16 at the United States Court for China, the staff at
the American Consulate in Shanghai helped litigants
gather evidence. The Court also issued orders empowering
people who were not officers of the court to take depositions
164. Consular Officers were charged by State Department rules to protect
American interests. This charge was so important, and so ubiquitously
underlayed the duties imposed upon these officers, that special rules set out
limits on the protection by these officers of others' interests. See Foreign Service
Regulations, Sec, XII-4, "Assumption of Protection of Foreign Interests," (Mar.
14, 1946), Records of the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, China 1833-1965
(Records Related to American Interests) (Foreign Service Regulations), RG No.
84, Stack Area 4E-2, Row 43, Compartment 8, Shelf 2, Boxes 19 and 20. Eileen
Scully makes a strong case for the notion that the U.S. Court for China served
American interests in China. See SCULLY, supra note 163.
165. For an example of Bassett's taking testimony in a criminal case and in
which the witness describes the set up of Bassett's office in the American
Consulate, see transcript from the proceedings in United States v. Demenil
(U.S. Ct. for China, 1907), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84,
Roll No. 3, Frame 410-17 (National Archives).
166. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical
Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 696-99,
703-04 (1998). About half of the states in the mid-1800s adopted procedural
codes which, in some cities, required an officer of the court to be present during
depositions, and, in other places,' for testimony to be taken only at trial. See
GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 17-18, 244 (1932). See, e.g.,
provisions in Arizona requiring the officer of the court to take depositions and
the court to order the production of documents. Id. at 276.
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of witnesses who resided outside of Shanghai.167 Where
witnesses were found in East Asia outside of Shanghai, the
U.S. Court for China also commissioned the American con-
sular officer in charge of that area to take depositions in the
local consulate.
By the mid 1940s, the officers of the United States
Foreign Service were bound by a lengthy set of State
Department regulations that prescribed their involvement
in the gathering of evidence in judicial proceedings. Under
these rules, the officers carried the sole responsibility
outside the United States to authenticate evidence,
authorize affidavits, and swear in witnesses.168 These same
rules also gave predominantly to consular officers the power
to take depositions outside the United States-whether for
the United States by courts overseas or in the United
States. Such depositions could be taken only by three
means: 1) by a consular officer of the United States, 2) by a
person commissioned by the United States, or 3) by letters
rogatory, in which courts in the United States request a
foreign court to authorize the taking of the deposition. The
first method was favored under the rules, while the latter
two methods were restricted to only those situations where
they were absolutely necessary. Even in the latter two
methods, United States consular officers could be desig-
nated to take the depositions. 9
On the whole, consular officers were probably less well-
versed than American judges, magistrates, or lawyers in
taking depositions because they were trained to do many
167. See, e.g., Order from the United States Court for China in Cause No.
3239, Grant Smith & Co. v. Shanghai Bldg. Co., Fed'n Inc., USA (U.S. Ct. for
China, 1930), microformed on Microcopy F535, Record Group 84, Frame 49
(National Archives). Readers should note that any archival sources cited
hereafter from F535 are from a single roll of microfilm, all of which came from a
group of materials known as "Consulate Records, Shanghai, China, 1833 -1965,
Records Related to American Interests," Box 40. In the Washington, D.C.
stacks, these are located in Stack Area 4E-2, Row 43, Compartment 8. Any
materials from "Vol. 7, Civil Cases" may also be found here.
168. See Foreign Service Regulations, Sec, X-5, at 13-22 (Apr. 1945), Records
of the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai, China 1833-1965 (Records Related to
American Interests) (Foreign Service Regulations) RG No. 84, Stack Area 4E-2,
Row 43, Compartment 8, Shelf 2, Boxes 19, 20.
169. See id. at 23-24.
[Vol. 52982
A TRIUMPH OF LOCAL LAW
other things instead. The great length and level of detail of
the instructions in the 1940s version of the United States
Foreign Service Regulations suggest not only that consular
officers provided a wide variety of services to litigants in
American courts abroad, but also that consular officers' lack
of expertise in providing these services was serious enough
to come to the attention of the State Department in
Washington, D.C. In these regulations, officers were
instructed in not just how to take depositions, but also in
what a deposition was.17 °
Depositions at the U.S. court were taken by consular
officers. The deposing party paid for a stenographer who
recorded the proceedings verbatim in English and the
consular officer's time devoted to administering an oath to
the witness and asking the questions devised in advance by
the deposing party's lawyer. The witness was permitted to
object to the form of the question, and when he did, the U.S.
court instructed the consular officer to note the objection
"immediately, so that the party against whom the objection
is taken shall have the opportunity to reframe the ques-
tion."'1
Consular officers were not involved, however, where
testimony destined for use at the U.S. Court for China was
taken from witnesses who resided in the United States or
the Philippines. In such a situation, the judge of the U.S.
Court for China signed an order which directed the clerk of
the court in whose jurisdiction the witness resided to
administer a deposition or interrogatories. In some such
cases, the court permitted parties to file interrogatories and
cross interrogatories with the Clerk of the U.S. court, who
would forward them to the clerk in the witness' jurisdiction.
170. See id. at 23. Note 23 is entitled "Depositions defined" and provides as
follows: "A deposition is the testimony of a witness taken in writing under oath
or affirmation, before some judicial officer, in answer to interrogatories, oral or
written." The officer did not devise the questions, but only supervised the
examining attorney or read the questions prepared by him. See id. 27-28. The
consular officers were also responsible for writing up the deposition in the
correct form. See id. at 29-32.
171. See Order for Commission to Take Testimony in Chartered Bank of
India, Austl. & China v. Hashim, (U.S. Ct. for China, 1932), microformed on
Microcopy F535, Record Group 84 (National Archives).
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The U.S. court directed the clerk to administer an oath to
the witness, to read him the questions, to collect his or her
answers, and to return them to the Clerk of the Court
within a specified period of time.172
The U.S. court also ordered lay people to oversee the
taking of depositions outside of China. For deponents in
Seattle, Washington, Portland, Oregon, and San Diego,
California, for example, the court commissioned people to
administer the depositions who appeared to have no legal or
diplomatic credentials. The court ordered that day that
each of the depositions would be taken and that questions
would be prepared by the attorney for the deposing party.
Such orders came after the court had considered an affida-
vit of the plaintiffs attorney and a motion for these deposi-
tions to be taken.
173
Heavily involving consular officers in the introduction
of witness testimony in criminal and civil cases at the U.S.
Court for China made it more like other courts in Shanghai
than federal district courts in the United States. Twelve
other consular courts were operated in Shanghai by gov-
ernments with treaty relations with the Chinese emperor
and relied upon consular officers to gather evidence and
hear arguments from counsel about it. The American
Consul General in Shanghai acted not just as judge at the
American Consular Court, but also as a prosecutor, spend-
ing many hours gathering evidence for cases before his own
court and those of other American Consuls in East Asia.
1 74
172. See, e.g., order to file Interrogatories in Cause No. 3290, Civil No. 1451,
Simmang v. Tr. in Bankr. of China & Mong. Exp. Co., Inc. (U.S. Ct. for China,
1931), microformed on Microcopy F535, Record Group 84 (National Archives);
Order in Generous v. Generous (U.S. Ct. for China, 1931), microformed on
Microcopy F535, Record Group 84 (National Archives).
173. See, e.g., copy of order filed Mar. 24, 1930, in Grant Smith & Co. v.
Shanghai Building Co., Cause no. 3239, Civil no. 1420, F535 at 49; order filed
Aug. 15, 1929, in William F. Jones v. Claretta Jones and V.H. Spencer, Cause
no. 3197, Civil No. 1394 F535 at 10.
174. See copy of letter from American Consul General, Singapore, to J.L.
Rodgers, American Counsul General, Shanghai (Aug. 11, 1905), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 605 (National Archives);
Letter from Monterey Schuyler, Consul General, Bangkok, Siam, to American
Consul General, Shanghai (June 8, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167,
Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 603 (National Archives); Letter from
Schuyler to American Consul General (June 15, 1905), microformed on
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He wrote to Americans accused of crimes by Chinese to
interview them as part of his investigations.'75 The Vice-
Consuls of most of the nations that had exacted treaty
rights to try their own nationals in China sat on the bench
of the International Mixed Court as co-judges in all cases
involving non-Chinese. Although this was the largest court
in Shanghai, and indeed probably in the world at that time,judging by caseload, these foreign powers sent no more pro-
fessional judges than this to preside in cases there.'76
2. The Judge as Mediator. The expectations by the
State Department for the U.S. court to protect American
interests, combined with indigenous Chinese judicial prac-
tices and the business practices predominant in the inter-
national community of Shanghai, created pressure on thejudge at the U.S. Court for China to depart from the role ofjudge current in the United States at the time, that of a
disconnected neutral and, instead, to act as an intermedi-
ary, consultant, and advocate. As a consequence, the judge
mediated between parties on opposite sides of litigation at
the U.S. Court for China, and between the court itself and
other courts in the city.
The lack of a jury at the U.S. court could be viewed as a
Chinese judicial practice, and certainly as a local judicial
practice, because the dozens of courts in Shanghai, save
one, operated without juries. This lack put more power and
responsibility in the hands of the judge, and as a result,
virtually pushed him into direct communications with the
parties. George Curtis, a lawyer who practiced before the
U.S. court, put a negative spin on it when he described to
members of the U.S. House of Representatives the manner
in which Judge Thayer did his work: "People come up to
him while trials are in progress and talk with him in pri-
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 604 (National Archives).
175. See, e.g., letter to Miss Emily Moore (July 6, 1905), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 645 (National Archives).
176. See Tahirih V. Lee, Benchmarks: The Courts of Shanghai, 1900-1950
(1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author, based on Ph.D.
dissertation, Law and Local Autonomy, supra note 162) [hereinafter Lee,
Benchmarks].
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vate and prejudice him against people and their cases, and
he prejudges their cases without a jury. That is something
unparalleled in the history of our Government." '177
Judges at the U.S. Court for China also had to be mind-
ful of the need to cooperate with the other courts in
Shanghai, even though they were not operated by the
United States, in order to secure the most basic operations
of the court. For example, in 1938 Judge Milton Helmick
asked the president of the largest Chinese courts in
Shanghai, the First and Second District Courts, to order the
delivery of summonses to principal witnesses in the case.178
Not infrequently, the U.S. judge also had to contend with
input from other governments in the region. In the same
case, for example, the Foreign Ministry of Japan objected to
the arrest by a U.S. Deputy Marshal of the American
defendant on Japanese soil, after she traveled from
Shanghai to Tokyo on a Japanese ship. The Japanese
Ministry had the objection sent first to the United States
Secretary of State in Washington, D.C. 79 The U.S. District
Attorney had to contact the Japanese consular court about
a piece of documentary evidence and receive it the following
week through the American Consul-General in Shanghai.
An influential model of the judge as intermediary was
to be found in the American Consul-General in Shanghai,
the person who sat as judge in the American Consular
177. Hearings, supra note 36, at 52.
178. See correspondence between the U.S. Consul-General C.E. Gauss and
Kuo Yun-kuan, President of the First Special District Court of Shanghai, and
Wang Ssu-mo, President of the Second Special District Court of Shanghai, in
the file on United States v. Katherine De Salas (1938), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 2, Frames 497-500 (National
Archives). Readers should note that any archival sources cited hereafter from
F167, Roll No. 2, are from a group of materials entitled "American Consular
Court and U.S. Court for China, 1895-1938," Boxes 853 and 426, (further known
as "Courts 1905-1907"), 2771 (further known as "Record of Foreign Service Post-
Shanghai"), and Volume 3218 (further known as "U.S. Court 1908").
179. See Complaint of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regarding
Activities of American Official, Tokyo (July 11, 1938) and accompanying Cover
Letters, microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 2, Frame
531 (National Archives).
180. See letter from the Consul General of Japan, Shanghai, to C.E. Gauss,
Consul General for America, Shanghai (Mar. 30, 1938), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 2, Frame 502 (National Archives).
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Court in the same compound that housed the United States
Court for China. The Consul-General functioned as a go-
between for official requests by Chinese courts for evidence
or for attachment of American property and for official
notifications of Americans' rights in pending litigation be-
fore Chinese courts. As official documents passed through
the hands of the Consul-General, his interpreter, a consular
officer, translated them for the senders and receivers.
Despite the work that this entailed, the American Consul-
General very much desired to function as intermediary in
these matters. His reasons were two-fold. He wanted to
curry favor with the Chinese courts, so they would feel obli-
gated to return the favor, and he thought it necessary in
order to protect American interests in property and finances
in China. 
181
The American Consul-General served as mediator
between plaintiffs and defendants before his court. When
181. See letter from Mr. David of the China Realty Co. to Consul-General for
U.S.A. (Jan. 26, 1935), reply from C.D. Meinhardt, American Consul to China
Realty Co., and letter from Edwin S. Cunningham, American Consul General to
Shen Hsi-ching, President of Shanghai District Court (Jan. 30, 1935), urging
the court to execute its judgment for an American company against a Chinese
fire department that had been occupying the company's property over its
objections, microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 23,
Frames 118-120 (National Archives); letters and court rulings from January
through July 1940 to and from the President of the District Court of the Second
Special Area of Shanghai and the American Consul General of Shanghai in the
following matters: Request that China Realty Company Consent to Attachment
to Certain Property in Connection with Case of T'ai Ch'uang Construction Co. v.
I.A. Lifshitz; Request for Service of Process on Theodor and Stefon Kotsko of
Brooklyn, N.Y.; American Engineering Corp.; Chase Bank Requested to Submit
Evidence in Case of Marie Bazar v. Alice Bazar; Shanghai Telephone Company
Requested to Maintain Present Status of Telephone 77886; J.A. Pollon
Summoned as Witness in Case of F. Kormilitzlin v. N. Lialin; Request for
Certain Information From the American Chamber of Commerce; Texas
Company Requested to Furnish Certain Information Regarding Sales of
Gasoline. In Jurisdiction-805: (a) Cases in Chinese Courts Involving Americans
Who Are Subject to Jurisdiction of the American Court. Restraining Orders,
Summons, Injunctions, etc., microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84,
Roll No. 3, Frame 324-64 (National Archives); Letter from American Consul
General to Messrs. Ruinart Pere & Fils (May 18, 1906), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 2, Frame 480 (National Archives)
("But for the protection of certain American creditors, I have advised Mr. Silva-
Netto.").
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counsel for the Chinese owners of a ship wrote him that
they wanted to bring an action against American owners of
a ship docked in Shanghai that had collided with theirs and
sunk it with its cargo, the attorney added that "before
commencing proceedings I feel it to be in accordance with
the spirit of the Consular Regulations to address you on the
subject with the view and hope that some friendly adjust-
ment, through your good offices, may be arrived at.""2 The
letter ended with a postscript that reminded the Consul of a
phone call he had received earlier that day about this
matter from an attorney whom the Consul highly
respected. 8 ' The Consul-General wrote a letter to the
captain of the ship, an American, warning him about the
possibility of suit, and also telling him not to move the ship
until the case was resolved.TM The Americans' attorney
wrote the Consul presuming that the Consul was asking
him whether he wanted the Consul to arbitrate the dispute,
rather than defend a lawsuit in the American Consular
Court, and, in oblique and coded language that suggested a
close relationship between attorney and Consul, thanking
the Consul for warning him about the dispute so that the
Americans could sue the Chinese first in their own court:
Ordinarily I very much prefer to arbitrate cases but you readily
understand that I do not like to advise arbitration where my
clients suggest that suit be brought. I know you will understand
what I mean. Personally I would be glad to leave it to you, but as
you have stated to me that it is immaterial my clients seem to be
better satisfied.
8 5
182. Letter from Jernigan to James L. Rodgers, American Consul General
(July 24, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1,
Frame 631 (National Archives).
183. See id. For the Consul's high opinion of the attorney who made the
phone call, see copy of letter from American Vice Consul General in Charge to
Burley & McSurely (Jan. 13, 1904), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record
Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 668 (National Archives).
184. Copy of letter from American Consul General (unsigned) to W.P.
Stetson (July 24, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll
No. 1, Frame 632 (National Archives).
185. Letter from F.M. Brooks to American Consul General Rodgers (July 26,
1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 2, Frame 633
(National Archives).
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Several months later, the Chinese party's attorney
asked the Consul to mediate a settlement between the two
sides after negotiations had broken down. 8' The Consul
agreed, and the parties settled the matter within the week.
The Consul was paid a fee, which he called "costs," and the
parties avoided any risk of appeal from the Consul's "judg-
ment" by labeling their settlement a "private agreement."'
Repeatedly, when the American Consul-General
received requests for informal assistance from merchants or
landlords who claimed that an American owed them money,
but an amount too small to litigate over and pay attorneys
to handle, he complied. Often he served as a go-between,
ferrying messages between the disputants in the form of
letters signed by himself. Sometimes the message became
slightly garbled or truncated in the transmission. "I have to
inform you that the Shanghai Watch Club has deposited
with me the sum of Twenty-five & 50/100 Dollars, the
amount claimed by de Seana against said Company" wrote
one officer to a well-known law firm in Shanghai, stating
that "[i]f satisfactory to you this amount together with your
check for $25.00 deposited for costs in case will be refunded
to you on demand." He added that "[t]he Watch Club denies
liability of any kind in the matter, and this payment is
made because the amount is small and save [sic] itself
expense."'
On many occasions, however, the debtee hoped for a
service that was unofficial but more aggressive than a liai-
son. "[W]e should feel greatly obliged to you if you would
kindly come to our assistance and use official pressure on
186. Letter from Jernigan to American Consul General Rodgers (Sept. 27,
1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 635
(National Archives).
187. Copy of letter from the American Consul General to the British &
China Trading Co. (Nov. 4, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record
Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 635 (National Archives).
188. Letter from American Vice Consul General in Charge, M.P. Boyd, to
Messrs Stokes, Platt & Teesdale (June 26, 1907), microformed on Microcopy
F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 2, Frame 455 (National Archives).
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the said Mr. Korngold," supplicated one German firm.189 In
another dispute, a collection agency contacted the
Consulate with the expectation that his "Dear Friend," the
U.S. Marshal, would "assist me in collecting this amount."
190
A landlord wrote to the Consul- General that "We shall
thank you therefore to have these men summoned and
ordered to pay us the amount due and also to quit the
premises." In the letter, the landlord further directed the
Consul to do all of this without giving the tenants "the
usual one months [sic] notice."'' Without mentioning the
possibility of a lawsuit against a woman who owed money
for "several articles," a French firm asked the American
Consul to "kindly tak[e] the matter in hand."
192
After receiving such requests, the majority of which
came with no evidence attached,' 93 the Consul contacted the
debtor in question and, usually with a strongly-worded
letter ordering payment or an appearance at the Consulate
at a specific time,' elicited an agreement to pay the
189. Letter from Fuhrmeister, Klose & Co. to James W. Davidson, U.S.
Consul General in Charge (Apr. 26, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167,
Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 637 (National Archives).
190. Letter from A.Y. Mink, Shanghai Law and Collection Agency, to
Engelbrecht (June 19, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84,
Roll No. 1, Frame 669 (National Archives).
191. Letter from E.D. Sassoon & Co. to J. L. Rodgers, Consul General for
America (May 31, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll
No. 1, Frame 672 (National Archives).
192. Letter from Lucien Lion of Maison Levy Hermanos to Charles
Engelbracht (Oct. 26, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84,
Roll No. 1, Frame 609 (National Archives).
193. For the minority of requests, a handwritten bill or receipt or some other
supporting document was attached. See, e.g., Guaranty signed by A.W. Danforth
to George McBain for a loan for 1000 Taels and 100 Taels interest (Jan. 9,
1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 600
(National Archives); list of rent due, sent by E.D. Sassoon & Co. to J. L.
Rodgers, Consul General for America (May 31, 1905), microformed on Microcopy
F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 672 (National Archives). Some of
these bills were quite barebones, amounting to little more than the total
amount owed and the year in which the debt accrued, written on the firm's
stationery. See, e.g., Receipt from Yaw Ching Kee, Ladies [sic] Tailor and
Outfitter (May 30, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84,
Roll No. 1, Frame 675 (National Archives).
194. See, e.g., copy of letter from American Consul General to H. Darneal
(Aug. 14, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1,
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amount asked for by the claimant. For some, the Consul
made clear that they would avoid being sued in court if they
paid.'95 After getting the debtors to promise to pay, the
Consul wrote to the claimants informing them of the
agreement.'96 Claimants asked the Consul to act as a high-
powered go-between also after such agreements proved to
be unenforceable.'97 The Consul even helped disputants set
up a payment plan for the debtor.'98
Debtors were not the only targets of pressure from the
Consul. Some claimants received counsel from him to back
Frame 606 (National Archives); copy of letter from American Consul General to
Miss Elsie Harris (Nov. 17, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record
Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 621 (National Archives); copy of letter from
American Consul General to W.D. Hills [sic] (July 28, 1905), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 623 (National Archives);
copy of letter from Consul General to Mrs. Hall (June 30, 1905), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 618 (National Archives);
copy of letter from Consul General to Mrs. H. L. Hall (June 14, 1905),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 617
(National Archives); copy of letter from Consul General to Miss Leslie Spencer
(June 20, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1,
Frame 675 (National Archives) microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group
84, Roll No. 1, Frame 671 (National Archives); copy of letter from Consul
General to Mrs. G.H. Prentiss (June 27, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167,
Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 646 (National Archives); copy of letter from
Vice Consul General in Charge to Miss Margot Hale (Mar. 23, 1905),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 619
(National Archives); copy of letter from Vice Consul General in Charge to Miss
Margot Hall (Mar. 24, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84,
Roll No. 1, Frame 620 (National Archives); copy of letter from Vice Consul
General in Charge to W.D. Hillis (Apr. 6, 1905), microformed on Microcopy
F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 622 (National Archives).
195. See, e.g., copy of letter from Vice Consul General in Charge to Mis [sic]
Zaza VanBuren (May 22, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group
84, Roll No. 1, Frame 673 (National Archives).
196. See, e.g., copy of a letter from Vice Consul General in Charge to
Fuhrmeister, Klose & Co. (May 10, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167,
Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 638 (National Archives).
197. See, e.g., letter from Fuhrmeister, Klose & Co. to L. Rodgers, U.S.
Consul General (June 5, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group
84, Roll No. 1, Frame 641 (National Archives).
198. See, e.g., copy of a letter to Mrs. Kingsbury (Oct. 25, 1905), microformed
on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 642 (National
Archives); copy of letter to Smith Alliston, Esq. (July 17, 1906), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 2, Frame 475 (National Archives).
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down. "I am confident he has not the money and I would
advise giving him a chance unless you know of some prop-
erty belonging to him which can be attached," cautioned an
officer at the American Consular Court acting on behalf of
the Consul-General. 199
The Consul was willing to go to even greater lengths on
behalf of Americans with legal problems in Shanghai. He
gave legal advice to potential litigants in the nearby
International Mixed Court."°° In grave matters that should
have instituted criminal proceedings, the Consul wrote to
Americans telling them to meet with him. For example, he
produced such a letter to an American when he learned that
a Chinese had lodged a complaint with police that she had
shot him in the head.' In complicated matters of the heart,
the Consul was willing to step in and try to persuade
estranged spouses to reconcile. 2 In one such case, where
one spouse was in the United States and was preparing to
divorce her husband who resided in Shanghai, the Consul
General, without any comment about the potential for bias,
agreed to supply to her attorneys in the U.S. the name of an
attorney in Shanghai who might represent her in court
before the Consul.' In another case, the Consul extended
himself so far that he became personally invested and emo-
tionally drained. He sent a series of letters from his sickbed
199. Copy of letter from Vice Consul General in Charge to Messrs. Hanson,
McNeill & Jones, 5 Hong Kong Road (Sept. 27, 1906), microformed on Microcopy
F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 2, Frame 470 (National Archives).
200. Letter from M.P. Boyd to Messrs. Drummond, White-Cooper & Phillips
(July 12, 1907), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 2,
Frame 460 (National Archives).
201. See copy of letter to Miss Emily Moore (July 6, 1905), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 645 (National Archives).
202. See, e.g., letter from F.M. Brooks to C.A. Engelbracht, U.S. Marshal
(July 20, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1,
Frame 661 (National Archives); and letter from American Consul General to
Mrs. J. Suckerman (July 25, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record
Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 662 (National Archives).
203. See letter from Burley & McSurely to John Goodnow, Counsel General
U.S.A. [sic] (Dec. 12, 1904), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84,
Roll No. 1, Frame 667 (National Archives); and letter from American Vice
Consul General in Charge to Burley & McSurely (Jan. 13, 1904), microformed
on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 668 (National
Archives).
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in an effort to cajole a settlement agreement out of a Frank
Hyde in Swatow China and an impoverished and increas-
ingly belligerent R. Collinwood in Shanghai. These letters
included apologies and excuses for not reporting more or
earlier on the matter to Mr. Hyde, as well as excuses for
Mr. Collinwood's delay in payment and exhortations to Mr.
Hyde to be more patient and have some sympathy for
Collinwood. Believing that Hyde had agreed to lower the
amount of the debt, the Consul gushed "I personally believe
that your generosity has made it possible for Collinwood to
reform and live a straight life."2 , In acting as go-between
for these two men, the Consul handled cash, receipts,
telegrams letters, miscellaneous papers, and "a compradore
order for $500"02°5-something like a bank check. Despite all
the Consul's efforts on their behalf, their supposed agree-
ment fell apart after the Consul had delivered to Hyde
$1000 from Collinwood, and the Consul feared that
Collinwood might attack him for "having obtained money
from under false pretences." The Consul also expressed
disgust at Hyde's rejection of the deal: "I object very much
indeed to the tone of your letter.... In helping you had I
thought that I was dealing with a man with so little honor,
I assure you I would have had nothing to do with the
case."
206
While American Consuls in Shanghai embroiled
themselves in complex disputes, at the same time, it seems
that no matter was too trivial to warrant their informal
intervention. They supplied addresses of the last-known
whereabouts of Americans sought by those who complained
about them °.2 A barely coherent American asked a Consul
204. Copy of letter from Vice Consul General in Charge to Frank Hyde (Jan.
31, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame
558 (National Archives).
205. Id. at Frame 587; see also letter of Jan. 21, 1904. Id. at Frame 586.
206. Copy of letter initialed "S.M." to F.H. Hyde (Mar. 18, 1905),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 589-90
(National Archives).
207. See, e.g., copy of letter from "Vice Consul-General in Charge?" [sic] to
Mrs. Clemintina Amble (Apr. 3, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record
Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 601 (National Archives).
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for advice on how to employ Chinese domestics after one
suddenly departed:
I will call on you on monday [sic] and explain this matter more
fully at that time and perhaps you can suggest a plan whereby I
can employ servants and be assured that they will not run off and
leave me as soon as they receive their wages where they feel
inclined as in holding back part of the wages I am simply doing
what has long been recognized as the custom here in the east.
2 0 8
One Consul scolded an American woman to "refrain
from interfering with Miss Hunt's property,"29 and told her
"[ylou will attend to the matter at once,"21° when the Ameri-
can Shoe Co. said she still owed them $12 after paying $10
for two pair of shoes. Admitting that there was not much at
stake in the dispute, the agent for the shoe company was
nonetheless undeterred in asking for assistance from the
diplomat: "[i]t is too small a matter to bring a legal action
for, and [I] think a word from the consulate to the party in
question would set matters right."211 When someone spied
this same woman riding in a rickshaw with his dog at her
feet, he contacted the police for assistance, but was told to
give her one more chance to return the dog. The letter he
addressed to her about this ended up with the American
Consul General, who then told her to contact the U.S.
Marshal about it.
212
208. Letter from The Shanghai Bldg. & Inv. Co., Ltd to J.D. Rodgers (July
29, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame
624-25 (National Archives).
209. Copy of letter from Vice Consul General in Charge to Miss B. Boothe
(Mar. 27, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1,
Frame 565 (National Archives).
210. Copy of letter from American Consul General to Miss Lillian Anderson
(Nov. 17, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1,
Frame 547 (National Archives).
211. Letter from Richard Weil to J.L. Rodgers, American Consul General
(Nov. 16, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1,
Frame 546 (National Archives).
212. See handwritten letter to Miss Lilian Anderson (Nov. 22, 1905),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 548
(National Archives); and copy of letter from American Consul General to Miss
Lilian Anderson (Nov. 24, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group
84, Roll No. 1, Frame 550 (National Archives).
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Potential litigants clearly expected the American
Consul to mediate or apply pressure in an informal way in a
variety of matters, but there were limits to what the
American Consul would do in this regard. When an import
and export firm, probably registered in the Portuguese or
Mexican Consulates in Shanghai, asked for the assistance
of Acting Consul General James W. Davidson in collecting
payments from American citizen A. W. Danforth,"
Davidson contacted Danforth, who told the Consul that he
would not pay. Danforth simply relayed Davidson's refusal
to the supplicants.214 They, in turn, balked at the refusal
and asked for further assistance: "His excuse of not being in
a position to pay this small amount cannot be true, other-
wise he could never keep up the establishment which he
does in the Whangpoo Road."215 Davidson wrote back to
them that Danforth was ill and that, once recovered, he
would "call him down to the Consulate and endeavor to
obtain for you the amount due your firm."216 A month and a
half later, the claimants spotted Danforth along the grand
boulevard lining the city's harbor and, because he looked
obviously healed, asked Davidson to "make him square his
account at once."' This request crossed a line for the
Consul. He replied that "this consulate is not a collection
agency, and that we cannot make Mr. Dongforth [sic]
square his account at once." They had either to negotiate
213. See letters of Figueiredo Brothers to James W. Davidson, Acting Consul
General for the United States (Feb. 21, 1905 & Mar. 14, 1905), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 591-92 (National
Archives).
214. Copy of letter from Vice Consul General to Figueiredo Brothers (Mar.
27, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame
593 (National Archives).
215. Letter of Figueiredo Brothers to James W. Davidson (Mar. 20, 1905),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 594
(National Archives).
216. Copy of letter of Vice Consul General to Messrs. Figueiredo Brothers
(Mar. 21, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1,
Frame 595 (National Archives).
217. Letter of Figueiredo Brothers to James W. Davidson (May 1, 1905),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 596
(National Archives).
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with him themselves or to bring a lawsuit in the American
Consular Court, advised the Consul.218
3. Reliance on Local Police. Insistence by the authori-
ties in Washington that the U.S. Court for China be a court
that was American in character as well as in name spawned
anomalies such as the pains taken by the staff at the court
to hide or unreasonably limit its reliance on the largest
police force in Shanghai for making arrests and gathering
evidence.219
Its great reliance on local police to supply it with
evidence and to carry out its orders in a concrete and very
real way drew the U.S. Court for China into the network of
courts in Shanghai. This network molded the courts within
it in a number of other ways too. All drew most of their
evidence from the same few urban districts within just a
few square miles of each other. All drew many of their
lawyers and judges from the same few law schools in the
city. This aspect of the court touched every case from
beginning to end and determined the important question of
whether the court could gather evidence and enforce its
orders.22 °
The dependency also ran the other way. The Shanghai
Municipal Police need to obtain summons and warrants
from the Consul of the foreign power stationed in Shanghai
whose nationality corresponded with the subject of the
summons or warrant. The American Consul-General was
218. Letter initialed "S.M." to Messrs. Figueiredo Brothers (May 1, 1905),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 597
(National Archives).
219. For statements by the U.S. District Attorney at the U.S. Court for
China showing his reliance on the local police, see letter of Bassett to U.S.
Consul General, dated Jan. 19, 1908, U.S. Court 1908, supra note 66, at 116.
For evidence of the reliance by the American Consular Court on the Shanghai
Municipal Police, see U.S. Court 1906, supra note 79, at 111.
220. For more on the strength of the Shanghai Municipal Police and its
importance to the courts of Shanghai, see Lee, Risky Business, supra note 15, at
1335, 1350-51. For a general and extensive study of the Shanghai Municipal
Police, see FREDERIC WAKEMAN, JR., POLICING SHANGHAI 1927-1937 (1995).
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one of the authorities sought out numerous times by officers
of this local police force. '21
Although a United States District Attorney prosecuted
all of the criminal cases at the U.S. Court for China, the
lack of a police force which would fully cooperate with him
posed a more significant constraint on his activities than
did the U.S. Constitution. He was more zealous than local
police or the U.S. Court for China in working toward convic-
tions of people involved in Shanghai's gigantic vice
industry.2 When Mr. Bassett lamented to the U.S. Consul
General the fact that "we have not under our control the
local police,"2 3 he was thinking of cases like those involving
American prostitutes in which the Shanghai Municipal
Police did not supply him "with any proofs against" the
224
women.
To prosecute cases at either the U.S. Court for China or
the American Consular Court, Bassett as U.S. Attorney
relied extensively on the largest local police force, the
Shanghai Municipal Police.25 This police force, though
Americans made up some of its officers, was headed by
British paramilitary officers and was not bound by the U.S.
Constitution. It was officers from this police force who
apprehended those who escaped from the U.S. Court for
China's prison and brought them to the American Vice
221. See, e.g., boilerplate form filled out in handwriting by Inspector
Mathewson, and approved by Chief Inspector John Ramsey for the Captain
Superintendent of the Shanghai Municipal Police, requesting "Permission" for a
summons against an American woman suspected of prostitution, and a copy of
the American Consul General's typed reply accompanying the warrant and
explaining that a summons was inappropriate in criminal cases (July 5, 1905),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 687-88
(National Archives).
222. For a vivid depiction of the size and scope of this industry, see Frederic
Wakeman, Jr., Licensing Leisure: The Chinese Nationalists'Attempt to Regulate
Shanghi, 1927-49, 54 J. ASIAN STuD. 19 (1995), available at http:ll www.jstor.
orgjournals/00219118.html.
223. Letter dated Jan. 19, 1908, U.S. Court 1908; Vol. 3218, pg. 116;
Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Consular Posts,
Shanghai, China; RG 84; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.
224. Id. at 113.
225. See U.S. Court 1906, supra note 79, at 111.
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Consul-in-Charge for reincarceration and conviction by the
U.S. Court for China of "the crime of jail-break."226 Bassett
responded to leads from Chinese individuals27 or from the
Vice Consul-General-in-Charge 22 by requesting the Shang-
hai Municipal Police to attempt to locate the suspect.29
Bassett used the fruit of the Municipal Police effort to
conduct his own investigations,2 ° after which he filed an
"information" with the American Vice Consul-General-in-
Charge, the document that officially brought the case to the
attention of the U.S. Court for China. At Bassett's behest,
officers of the Shanghai Municipal Police raided casinos and
private clubs to confiscate gambling paraphernalia. 31
Any more extensive gathering of evidence was trouble-
some in a multi-jurisdictional city like Shanghai. Forty-one
nationalities of people lived and worked together there, and
several jurisdictions of courts and police forces operated in
226. Letter from Vice Consul in Charge to F.E. Hinckley, dated Sept. 21,
1908, U.S. Court 1908, supra note 64, at 41.
227. The Consul General forwarded to Bassett letters from Chinese with
claims against Americans, "for such action as [Bassett saw] fit." Letter from
Consul General to Arthur Bassett, dated Jan. 31, 1908, U.S. Court 1908, supra
note 64, at 126.
228. The Vice Consul supplied Bassett with the lead when a prisoner
removed the page with his sentence on it from the criminal docket of the
American Consular Court while he was employed by the Marshal and Clerk of
that court to organize the court records. The recommended charge was "the
destruction of Government records." Letter from W. Roderick Dorsey to Arthur
Bassett, dated Sept. 23, 1909, U.S. Court 1909, supra note 58, at 73-74; Letter
dated Sept. 27, 1909, id. at 75; Letter from W. Roderick Dorsey to Arthur
Bassett, dated Nov. 29, 1909, id. at 77-78.
229. Letter from Arthur Bassett to W. Roderick Dorsey, dated Sept. 27,
1909, U.S. Court 1909, supra note 58, at 77.
230. Letter from Arthur Bassett to Charles Denby, dated Aug. 24, 1908,
U.S. Court 1908, supra note 66, at 164.
231. See correspondence related to U.S. v. Riley, (Sept. 30, 1940; Oct. 4,
1940; Nov. 25, 1940; Nov. 27, 1940; Dec. 4, 1940; Dec. 6, 1940; Dec. 12, 1940),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 3, Frame 199-205
(National Archives); Correspondence related to the raid by local police using a
United States warrant on the club "The Alcazar," (Jan. 3, 1908), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 3, Frame 407-08 (National
Archives); Correspondence related to the raid by local police using a United
States warrant on the International Club, (Oct. 4, 1906), microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 626-30 (National
Archives).
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close proximity, all within the boundaries of the city. The
U.S. Marshal and U.S. Attorney at the court were forced to
rely on Chinese police for help in gathering evidence from
local sources who were Chinese nationals and therefore fell
outside American jurisdiction. This reliance may have
discouraged thorough prosecutorial investigations in crimi-
nal cases. And it was underreported back to Washington.
To add to the difficulty of building an evidentiary record
in each case at the U.S. Court for China was that the
parties or events involved in cases tried at the court could
be from virtually anywhere in East Asia. The population of
Shanghai was highly mobile because of the city's location at
a nexus of international trade and finance.23" In one case,
the court received a motion to issue a commission to take
testimony in Vladivostock, and it issued an order for a
commission to take depositions there.233
To be sure, the staff of the U.S. Court for China could
rely On the parties themselves to produce some of the evi-
dence. Parties in either criminal or civil cases could
contribute to the record. Criminal defendants were free to
file "Statements" or depositions of witnesses, letters, and
exhibits. Parties in civil cases could file affidavits, inter-
rogatories, motions to take depositions, depositions, letters,
and exhibits, although the court played a greater role in
supervising most of these fruits of discovery than they do
now in federal district courts.234 In all these respects, the
court was similar to a federal district court in the United
States at the time.235 Yet, particularly in criminal cases, the
232. For a succinct discussion of these traits of the city during the latter
two-thirds of the U.S. Court's life, see Marie-Claire Berger6, The Other China:
Shanghai from 1919 to 1949, in SHANGHAI: REVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AN
ASIAN METROPOLIS 1, 13-14 (Christopher Howe ed., 1981).
233. See memorandum to James L. Rodgers from F.E. Hinckley, Clerk of the
United States Court for China, dated Dec. 28, 1906, U.S. Court 1906, supra note
79, at 111-19.
234. See Records of Foreign Service Posts, supra note 123; Memorandum to
James L. Rodgers from F.E. Hinckley, Clerk of the United States Court for
China, dated Dec. 28, 1906, U.S. Court 1906, supra note 79, at 111-19.
235. One of the major treatises on the forms used in courts in 1910 set out
rules for civil parties' presentation of all of these types of documents which were
articulated in the Pleading Codes of various states and in opinions of state
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court could not rely on the parties alone, particularly if the
party with most of the information about the case, the
defendant, was in jail awaiting trial. And the barebones
staff at the American Consulate was not extensive enough
to be self-sufficient.
D. The Local Emphasis on Summary Process
Summary justice was the order of the day in Shanghai
during the first decades of the twentieth century. With tens
and even hundreds of thousands of court cases filed every
year in courts across the city,236 judges developed the habit
of processing the cases within a matter of weeks, even days.
The largest court, the International Mixed Court, issued
orders in land and rent cases within hours of obtaining the
names and addresses of tenants whose landlords were for-
eign and who claimed unpaid rent.237 Before 1911, the
Chinese judge at the court signed a warrant before 10:00
am the day after receiving the request, runners delivered it
to the central Shanghai Municipal Police station, and the
landlord picked it up there. In 1911, after it became known
that the runners were delaying their delivery by six hours
courts nationwide. See WILLIAM A. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON CODE PLEADING
AND PRACTICE 1222, 2280-82, 2226-40, 2246, 2250-51, 2253 (1910). A major
treatise on criminal practice from a slightly earlier period shows that state
courts throughout the United States permitted criminal defendants to present
statements and exhibits and to cross-examine witnesses in depositions. See
JOSEPH H. BEALE, JR., A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE 217,
269, 275 (1899).
236. In the International Mixed Court of Shanghai alone, the annual
caseload for criminal and civil cases combined was about 50,000 in 1918, about
40,000 in 1919, about 45,000 in 1920, about 60,000 in 1921, about 96,000 in
1922, 87,000 in 1923, 95,000 in 1924, 83,000 in 1925 and 107,000 in 1926. These
figures are for cases "concluded." Mixed Court Monthly Reports, THE MUNICIPAL
GAZETTE (Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury), 1921, 1918-1919, at 57A-58A,
67A-68A; 1922, at 70A; 1923, at 39; 1924, at 45, 47; 1925, at 39-41 [hereinafter
THE GAZETTE].
237. For examples of sealing orders, or "distress warrants," as they came to
be known after 1908, see, for example, Foreign Office Records, Surrey England
[hereinafter FO] 656/111 (Jun. 5, 1906); FO 656/133 (Nov. 20, 1914). For
examples of warrants for the tenants arrest in such disputes, see, for example,
FO 656/111 (Jan. 3, Feb. 2, 1906); FO 656/116 (Oct. 13, 1908); FO 656/118 (July
2, 1909); FO 656/126 (July 15, 1912); FO 656/131 (Aug. 1, 1913); FO 656/141
(Aug. 10, 1917).
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after receiving bribes from the subjects of the warrants, the
Chinese judge handed the signed warrants to the landlords
directly in court, and the landlord himself sped it over to
the police station closest to the property. Administrative
energy at the even this court was devoted to speeding up
both civil and criminal processes.2 3 9
For its part, the British Consular Court permitted
plaintiffs in civil cases a variety of summary processes. In
cases involving contracts in which the obligation and
amount of damages was clearly stated or trusts or a statu-
torily specified amount of debt, the plaintiff could proceed to
judgment four days after the complaint was served on the
defendant whether or not the defendant had appeared by
that time.' 4° The court could also, by its rules, issue a 24-
hour injunction to stop the unloading of a ship or the
removal of funds with merely "iroof of great urgency or
other peculiar circumstances....
Justice at the United States Court for China kept pace
with the norms at other major courts in the city. The court
processed civil cases, on the whole, with breathtaking
speed. It was not unusual for merely one week to lapse
between the court's receipt of the plaintiffs petition to final
judgment. This timetable was typical especially in cases
where the plaintiff was a company prominent in Shang-
hai.242 Virtually all the rest of the civil cases followed a six-
238. See, e.g., FO 656/126 (Aug. 7, 1911); FO 656/116 (May 9, 1908); FO
656/116 (Jan. 7, 1908); Mixed Court at Shanghai; Rules of Procedure, Rules 91-
97, Civil Proceedings at 22.
239. Particularly in the 1920s, judges there tried to hurry through cases,
and court sessions lasted late into the night in order to wrap cases up as quickly
as possible. As an additional measure, the number of court sessions per day was
increased. See ANNUAL REPORT, 39 (1925); THE GAZETTE, supra note 236 (The
relevant portions of The Gazette appeared on the following dates and pages:
Nov. 27, 1920, at 395; Feb. 24, 1921, at 60; Apr. 28, 1921, at 172; May 11, 1922,
at 171; Jul 27, 1922, at 258; Apr. 27, 1923, at 345; Nov. 20, 1924, at 428).
240. Kennett, supra note 120, at 33-34.
241. Id. at 48.
242. See, e.g., Shanghai Land Investment Co. v. Collinwood, Petition served
on defendant, April 9, 1906, Box 40, 1891-1906, Civil Cases at U.S. Court for
China; RG 84, stack area 4E-2, row 9, Compartment 1, Shelf 2 (National
Archives).
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step course that took about two to three weeks from petition
to judgment.
1. The plaintiff initiated the court's machinery by filing a petition
at the American Consulate. The plaintiff could use a printed form
available at the consulate, though most did not.
2. The clerk of the court filled out on a printed form a summons of
the defendant to court and attached a copy of the plaintiffs
petition.
3. The Consul General signed, sealed and stamped the summons.
4. The U.S. Marshal served the summons.
5. The clerk of the court set the hearing date, usually for one week
after the delivery of the summons.
6. The Judge conducted the hearing and, usually one week later,
signed and handed down the judgment.
The plaintiffs main procedural weapon was the default
judgment, which the court awarded after the time to
answer, as specified in the summons served upon the
defendant, had expired and after hearing evidence from the
plaintiff as to the amount that should be awarded in the
judgment. The court carried out the default judgment by
way of a decree which appointed an attorney to act as
"referee" to sell the defendant's property, to the extent nec-
essary to satisfy the judgment, at a public auction.243 Where
the defendant responded with a motion or answer or
demurrer before the time specified in the summons,
however, the plaintiff typically could do little else but
deploy motions to help preserve issues for trial and muster
evidence for that trial. One exception to this was when the
243. See, e.g., decree, Credit Foncier d'Extreme Orient v. Sino Am.
Syndicate and Eleanor L. Miller and Thomas N. Miller as heirs at law of
Thomas Lake Miller, deceased (filed June 11, 1931), microformed on Microcopy
F535, Record Group 84 (National Archives).
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United States brought suit to dissolve companies found in
violation of the China Trade Act. In such cases the United
States made a motion for judgment on the pleadings and
the court summarily granted it."
Default judgments at the U.S. Court for China were lib-
erally and quickly handed down, especially in divorce cases.
Liberally, because the orders signed by the judge appeared
in some kind of boilerplate form. Quickly, because of the
short timeline along which the various procedural hurdles
leading to default were arrayed. In the typical case to
receive such summary treatment, the U.S. Marshal
attempted to personally serve the defendant in Shanghai,
but if he could not, he wrote on the summons "Defendant
cannot be found within the jurisdiction of this Court" and
inserted the summons in the case file. The plaintiff then
filed an affidavit stating that his or her spouse was not a
resident "within the jurisdiction" of the Court, and stated
the length of time during which he or she was, not a resi-
dent. Then, pursuant to District of Columbia law ,246 the
court ordered service by publication once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper in China chosen by the
court. The court also set the deadline for the defendant to
make an appearance in court in order to avoid a default
judgment, a date that was supposed to be the fortieth day
after the period of service by publication. This series of pro-
cedural safeguards against too hasty a judgment against
the defendant without the benefit of his defense on its face
might make the process look deliberate. But the first four
244. See, e.g., judgment in U.S. Ex relatione A. Viola Smith, China Trade
Act Registrar v. The Far East Trading Co., Fed. Inc. U.S.A. (filed July 20, 1931),
microformed on Microcopy F535, Record Group 84 (National Archives);
Judgment in U.S. Ex relatione A. Viola Smith, China Trade Act Registrar v.
The Lam Trading Corp., Fed. Inc., U.S.A. (filed Dec. 14, 1931), microformed on
Microcopy F535, Record Group 84, Frame 126 (National Archives).
245. See, e.g., order in the debt case of Christopher A. Poklonsky v. M.H.
Bunting, signed by Judge Purdy (filed Apr. 4, 1930), microformed on Microcopy
F535, Record Group 84, Frame 50 (National Archives).
246. Sections 105-108 of "the code of law for the District of Columbia" are
cited in the Interlocutory Order in Ella Feltus v. Cornelius A. Feltus, signed by
Judge Purdy (filed July 23, 1930), microformed on Microcopy F535, Record
Group 84, Frame 51 (National Archives).
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steps could, and did, occur within a day of each other, or on
the same day, and the court could order that the forty-day
period had begun one week before the service by publication
had begun.247 Then, on the very date ordered by the court to
be the defendant's deadline, the plaintiff entered a motion
for default judgment and the judge granted it and handed
down the judgment for the plaintiff on the same day.248
Default judgments were a common way to dispose of
cases with great speed in other courts in Shanghai too. In
the American Consular Court, in open court with a jour-
nalist present, the court treated as the defendant's
admission to all the allegations a statement by the plain-
tiffs lawyers that the defendant "had admitted the
correctness of the claim and confessed judgment." The de-
fendant was not present in the courtroom, nor was he rep-
resented by anyone there. The plaintiffs lawyer then asked
for a default judgment, and the American Consul General,
James L. Rodgers, agreed to grant the default judgment
because "the claim had been admitted. 249
At the International Mixed Court plaintiffs could argue
orally or by letter that their cases were urgent and thereby
obtain an injunction to sequester the defendant's money or
goods and attach the defendant's property before the court
247. See, e.g., order in the case of Latham v. Latham (July 8, 1929),
microformed on Microcopy F535, Record Group 84, Frame 6 (National
Archives); Order in the case of Cook v. Cook, (Nov. 15, 1929), microformed on
Microcopy F535, Record Group 84, Frame 41 (National Archives).
248. See, e.g., decree ordering the dissolution of marriage upon plaintiffs
motion for judgment by default, in Mehringer v. Mehringer, in the United
States Court for China at Shanghai, signed by Judge Helmick (Feb. 29, 1936),
microformed on Microcopy F535, Record Group 84 (National Archives);
Judgment in Muraour v. Harrison, signed by Judge Purdy (Aug. 27, 1930),
microformed on Microcopy F535, Record Group 84, Frame 40 (National
Archives).
249. Excerpt of newspaper article published in Shanghai reporting on a
hearing in the case of Ling v. Passano, attached to an evidentiary statement
signed by Mr. Passano on Mar. 14, 1905 setting out his promise to stick to a
payment schedule to a Dickson, Jones & Co, signed by the U.S. Marshal, and a
copy of a letter from the Vice Consul General to Dickson, Jones & Co., Mar. 16,
1905, (Nov. 27, 1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll
No. 1, Frames 647-49 (National Archives).
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notified the defendant of the proceedings.5 ° In addition, the
court developed some versions of summonses and warrants
whose service approximated judgments in their reversibility
and in the detriment they caused the person named in
order to suffer.5 1
In following a liberal and rapid default process, the U.S.
court was not following federal courts in the United States.
The common law on default as was applied in United States
district courts at that time relied upon a United States
Supreme Court decision handed down in 1885 which im-
posed the requirement of an ex parte hearing at which the
plaintiff had the burden of proving that the amount claimed
was the amount owed. This decision aimed to protect defen-
dants from an overly harsh procedure, which until then
permitted the plaintiff to recover simply upon the state-
ments in the complaint."2
The defendant's main weapons at the U.S. Court for
China were the demurrer, the motion to dismiss, and the
answer. The defendant bought time with the demurrer,
because he had twenty days to answer the complaint once
served, but gained an additional twenty days to answer as
soon as the court overruled a demurrer."' At least one judge
who paid lip-service to the rule departed from it in favor of
plaintiffs by giving defendants only ten days to answer after
overruling the demurrer."' The court also departed from the
250. See MIXED COURT AT SHANGHAI; RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rules 1, 9, Civil
Proceedings, at 7.
251. See Lee, Local Autonomy, supra note 162, at 145.
252. See Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104 (1885); see also CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 9 (3d ed. 1998)
(characterizing Thompson as changing the practice of federal courts in the
United States).
253. The former rule for the American Consular Court is stated in a copy of
a letter from Vice Consul General in Charge to Miss Helen A. Bradley, (Feb. 20,
1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 2, Frame 566
(National Archives). The 20-day rule after the overruling of a demurrer was
stated in the order in the case of Pierce v. Pierce, (July 1, 1930), signed by
Judge Purdy microformed on Microcopy F535, Record Group 84, Frame 89
(National Archives).
254. From orders filed by Judge Purdy in 193, it is clear that once he
overruled a defendant's demurrer and denied the defendants' motions to
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rule in the other direction, either waiving it on defendant's
behalf or granting extensions.255 Motions to dismiss were
based on insufficiency of the complaint or misjoinder of
claims and parties,5 ' as were those in other federal courts
in the United States. Plaintiffs were permitted to file writ-
ten "statements" opposing defendants' demurrers.257
The judgments of the U.S. Court for China were carried
out swiftly and certainly. First, at some point, plaintiffs
assigned their claims to the court, specifically to the U.S.
Marshal. Then, the plaintiffs showed the U.S. Marshal the
property of the defendant, if defendant was not around to
do it. Thereupon, the Marshal seized it and sold it at public
auction after thirty days notice. 58
The enforcement of judgments at other courts in
Shanghai was similarly swift and sure. At the American
dismiss the complaint and strike portions of the complaint, the defendant had
10 days to answer. See, e.g., "Order" in Wooking-Hsun v. Pemberton & Penn,
Inc., (Nov. 6, 1931), microformed on Microcopy F535, Record Group 84, Frame
158 (National Archives). In this case, a Chinese compradore-cultural and
commercial middleman for foreign businesses in China-sued for breach of
contract a U.S. tobacco company that had hired him to sell tobacco for it. The
company had terminated him, and during the notice period, the compradore
contracted to work for another tobacco company. The defendant argued that the
compradore's sales of its tobacco during this period did not result in payments
transferred to the defendant. The court agreed and set this amount off from the
damages claimed by the plaintiff.
255. For example, thirty-four days elapsed between the filing of the
complaint and the answer in Poole v. Poole, "Order Allowing Plaintiff
Temporary Alimony and Costs of Court," filed at Shanghai (June 23, 1931),
microformed on Microcopy F535, Record Group 84, Frames 125-26 (National
Archives).
256. See, e.g., "Order," Wooking-Hsun v. Pemberton & Penn, Inc. (Nov. 6,
1931) microformed on Microcopy F535, Record Group 84, Frame 158 (National
Archives); "Order," Pavel Valevitch Pissarevsky v. Texas Oil Co., (Apr. 6, 1932),
Stack Area 4-E 2, Row 10, Compartment 10, Shelf B-C, "Shanghai Consulate
Records," Boxes 10-14.
257. See, e.g., "Order," Pavel Valevitch Pissarevsky v. Texas Oil Co., (Apr. 6,
1932), Stack Area 4-E 2, Row 10, Compartment 10, Shelf B-C, "Shanghai
Consulate Records," Boxes 10-14 (case dismissed upon defendants' demurrers
for "misjoinder of causes of action and of Parties defendant .... ").
258. The U.S. Marshal at the court had "possession" or "control" of the goods
that the court awarded by judgment to the plaintiff. See, e.g., J.B. Williams Co.
v. Standard Prods. Co. Fed. Inc., U.S.A. (May 19, 1931), microformed on
Microcopy F535, Record Group 84, Frame 94 (National Archives).
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Consular Court, the U.S. Consul-General issued restraining
orders to preserve confiscated property for distribution in
his court's awards. The International Mixed Court impris-
oned thousands of debtors and took their property to satisfy
its judgments. At this court, a successful plaintiff could
enlist the help of the court to enforce its judgments, either
with a "warrant of execution" to the Shanghai Municipal
Police or others, which authorized them to use force to
collect the amount of the judgment, to eject a defendant
from his home,259 to auction the defendant's property, or to
ensure that the defendant performed any act specified in
the judgment.6 °
If a defendant had fled the jurisdiction or refused to
comply with an order of the British court in Shanghai, the
court's rules permitted it to take any of the defendant's
property if requested by the plaintiff. The British court did
not even require its own permission in order to issue a
warrant to enforce the payment of a judgment by the defen-
dant. Such warrants were written by the court's Registrar
and delivered along with a notice to the Marshal who deliv-
ered the notice to the defendant. 6'
A rapid process can be a sign that the court is catering
to the needs of litigants, particularly plaintiffs. In Shanghai
during the first half of the twentieth century, merchants
comprised the primary civil litigants.262 In the nineteenth
century, British merchants lobbied Parliament to set up
commercial courts modeled on those in France, the essential
259. See, e.g., FO 656/131 (Nov. 7, 1913) (ejectment orders against Yah Fong
and Sun Mow, subtenants of Fong Yuen).
260. See Mixed Court at Shanghai; Rules of Procedure, Rules 67-71, Civil
Proceedings, at 16; FO 656/110 (Jan. 27, 1906) (order for auction of furniture
belonging to defendant Ko Peng Yun; FO 656/110 (Jan. 11, 1906) (order for the
closing and sealing of a tea house belonging to Wu Ts'eng Lou, and order for its
auction); FO 656/118 (April 5-6, 1909) (report by Municipal Police Sergeant D.
Brewster on sealing orders); FO 656/111 (Aug. 3, 1906) (request by David
Sassoon & Co. for the furniture of a tenant whose premises had been sealed by
an order of the Mixed Court Magistrate, even though Sassoon was not a party
to the suit that resulted in the sealing order).
261. BRITISH JURISDICTION IN CHINA: RULES OF COURT 51, Rules 185-88.
262. See Lee, Risky Business, supra note 15, at 1345-50.
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characteristic of which was rapidity of disposition.263
Shanghai was a city driven by commerce and finance, and
the courts there grew up largely in response to the people
who thrived in that world.
E. How Procedure Reflected the Tensions Between Local
and Distant Sovereign
The inattention by U.S. Congress and federal appellate
courts to the differences between the U.S. Court for China
and federal district courts in the mainland United States,
differences that needed to be reflected in procedure, repre-
sented one front in the battle by the U.S. Court for China
with authorities in Washington over control of procedure.
Such a struggle was not unique to that court, as this was
the period when Congress fought with judges over who had
the right to devise procedure for federal courts throughout
the United States. But, for all these courts, the struggle was
caused by the distance between the congressional authori-
ties and the courts.
It is possible to see some sort of resolution of this strug-
gle in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) adopted
by the United States Court for China in 1939. Even while
the court adopted the code devised in Washington for all
United States courts, it was nonetheless able to make some
accommodations to the special needs of Shanghai, both in
the Supplementary Rules it adopted at the same time
pursuant to the authority delegated in FRCP Rule 83, and
in the Federal Rules themselves.265 Yet these rules repre-
sent not so much importation of American federal procedure
into Shanghai as accommodation of American procedure to
Shanghai procedure. The Supplementary Rules of the U.S.
Court for China, for instance, were several times longer
than those adopted by most federal districts, suggesting
that the U.S. court needed to do more than they to give
263. See, e.g., FRANCIS LYNE, TRIBUNALS OF COMMERCE (1854).
264. I painstakingly support this argument about the courts of Shanghai
during the early twentieth century in Lee, Risky Business, supra note 15, at
1335.
265. See RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA
(1939).
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procedural expression to its peculiar character. The
Supplementary Rules were also longer than the Federal
Rules, suggesting by simple mathematics that the local
character of the court's procedure outstripped the American
character.
A majority of the Supplementary Rules were devoted to
accommodating the lack of a jury and the lack of jurisdic-
tion over non-American defendants. To accommodate the
lack of a jury, the U.S. court's version tended to compensate
by strengthening the role of the party's attorneys. The
Rules provided for the parties to file with the Court findings
of ultimate fact and legal conclusions, any of which the
Court might adopt. Where the FRCP provided that the
clerk of the court enter the judgment, the China Rules
required counsel to prepare the judgment. Unlike the
FRCP, under which the court or its clerk could enter default
judgment sua sponte, the China Rules permitted default
judgment only when plaintiffs requested them. '66
Coupled with the inattention by authorities in Wash-
ington to necessary differences between the Shanghai court
and those in the United States was an effort by those
authorities to make the Shanghai court into a United States
district court. The rules of equity were imposed without any
regard to the diversity of practice in the United States, but
instead, as if practice was uniform in all federal districts,
and therefore should be the same in Shanghai too. The
FRCP were adopted without much made of the adaptations
of it to the situation in Shanghai.
One of the Supplementary procedural rules to the
FRCP, the very last one, stated: "Nothing contained in any
of the foregoing rules (numbered 1 to 85 and A to V) shall
be held to limit or abridge the inherent powers of this court
as a court of record of the United States; and practice,
procedure, function and conduct of this court shall adhere
as closely as may be to those of a United States District
Court.""' Drafted by Judge Helmick with the assistance of
four American lawyers who lived and practiced law in
266. See id. at Rules 55, 58.
267. See id. at 101.
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Shanghai at the time, 68 this rule indicates an insecurity on
the part of the judge and the Americans who practiced
before his court about how American the court was. It is
virtually impossible to change the nature of institution by
declaring it, in a procedural rule, to be of that nature. What
else could one hope to accomplish with such a rule, except to
convince people who were nervous about this. The group to
be convinced would have included oneself, others who prac-
ticed before the court, and appellate judges in San
Francisco and Washington, and federal congressmen and
the President of the United States.
Written rules belie the daily practices of courts as plau-
sibly as they reflect them, and the procedures followed in
the U.S. Court for China were no exception. It is probably
better to see the written rules as the tip of the iceberg, the
iceberg of the different process that civil cases were subject
to at the U.S. Court in Shanghai. Issues peculiar to Shang-
hai required different treatment, and the great distance
between Washington, D.C. and Shanghai meant that those
in the distant capital attempted to impose on the court in
Shanghai procedures that made little sense in that context.
The codification of procedure in 1939 was also too late
to affect much practice at the court. It came just two years
before the Japanese invasion of Shanghai and incarceration
of the Americans there ended the operation of the U.S.
Court for China. On May 20, 1943, while Judge Helmick
languished in a Japanese concentration camp outside
Shanghai, Congress terminated the existence of the court.
The instrument that rang the court's death knell was the
ratification of a treaty with China abolishing the United
States' extraterritorial privileges that it had enjoyed for a
century.269
268. See id. at iv.
269. For a reference to this effect of the treaty, see letter of Henry P.
Chandler, Administrative Director, United States Courts, to Congressman
McGhee, (June 2, 1944) (appended to S. Rep. No. 78-1267, at 2 (1944)). Congress
made the termination even clearer when it repealed in 1948 the law that
established the court. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §39, 62 Stat. 992 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 724 (1994)).
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CHAPTER IV
How CHOICE OF LAW REFLECTED THE TENSION BETWEEN
LOCALITY AND DISTANT SOVEREIGN
A. The Mandate to Apply Law
Congress established the U.S. Court for China ostensi-
bly to ensure that American judicial decisions in China
were guided by American law. American consular officers
already adjudicated cases there, had for almost sixty years,
and the Secretary of State alleged that they tended to
ignore legal standards when they did.27° Other observers
reinforced this notion when they mentioned the lack of legal
training of even those consular officers in China who were
charged with judicial functions.271
Proof of the tendency to ignore law in consular judicial
decisions is nicely illustrated by a case that made its way to
the American consular court four years after the United
States Court for China was established. In 1910, a servant,
Tsang Ah San, accused George Bushey, a fireman with the
U.S.S. Villaboa, of attempting to rape him. Shanghai
Municipal Police arrested Bushey and charged him at the
Hongkew station with 1) "attempt to commit an unnatural
offence with a Chinese mafoo.. .in [a] licensed carriage, 2)
violently assaulting the mafoo [servant], 3) being drunk and
disorderly in the police station." The police then incarcer-
ated Bushey in the American Consulate's jail. Neither the
police nor Judge Hadley referred to statute or case prece-
dent during the trial, although one witness mentioned the
term "sodimy" [sic]. 272
270. Letter from John Hay to President Theodore Roosevelt (Dec. 7, 1904)
(attached to MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
87).
271. See Lobingier, supra note 60, at 273; United States Court for China,
supra note 102.
272. United States. v. Bushey, Criminal Action No. 44 (Dec. 10, 1910), in
"American Consular Court," Box 8, Compartment 198 (National Archives).
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An approach to civil lawsuits where law did not govern
the outcome would have been troublesome to the federal
government in Washington. Where formal law did not con-
strain the decisions of Americans sitting as judges, their
own discretion was free to enter in. Discretion opened the
way for self-interest to serve as the basis for decisions.
Indeed, rumors of corruption at the American consular
courts was a veiled reason for establishing the U.S. Court
for China by the turn of the century.273
Other causes for embarrassment surely resulted, even
though they were not stressed in the public statements of
those who called for the creation of an American court in
China. Just the perception of corruption among officers
appointed in Washington, D.C, tarnished the image of the
United States. Plus, where law did not constrain judicial
decisions, the adjudication lost the formality of a judicial
proceeding. Instead, it came to resemble something like
mediation, which was not recognized by American jurists at
that time to be a legitimate legal process. As set out in the
previous section on procedure, mediation was a common
way for Chinese to settle their civil disputes, and American
officials, horrified at the turn of the century by the apparent
inability of China's emperor to reign in violence against for-
eign missionaries during the Boxer Rebellion, were eager to
distinguish western legal practices from Chinese legal prac-
tices. They propagated the notion that Chinese law was
really no law at all. Therefore, foreign law was necessary to
fill a legal vacuum.
B. The Mandate to Avoid Local Law
Creating the illusion of an American institution was
paramount, however, and so, even more important than
273. SCULLY, supra note 163, at 105-07.
274. For some of the prominent voices of the time, see G. W. Keeton, 2 THE
DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA 94-97, 150-153 (1928); ANATOL
M. KOTENEV, SHANGHAI: ITS MIXED COURT AND COUNCIL 239-250 (1925); A. M.
KOTENEV, SHANGHAI: ITS MUNICIPALITY AND THE CHINESE 179, 181, 190, 234
(1927); FRANCIS PIGGOTT, EXTRATERRITORIALITY, 12, 22, 159 (1907); H.G.W.
WOODHEAD, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA: THE CASE AGAINST ABOLITION 1-3,
26-27, 37, 46-47 (1929); A.M. Latter, Extra-territorial Jurisdiction in Hong-
Kong, 4 J. OF THE SOC'Y OF COMP. LEGIS. 67, 68-69 (1902).
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strengthening the application of law itself was the goal
that, whatever law Americans applied in Shanghai, it
looked like American law and not something else. Although
the desire to strengthen the force of law was loudly voiced
by those who established the court, the statute that offi-
cially created the U.S. Court for China did not explicitly
state that law had to be applied in every case. It did,
however, specify which law should be applied. Congress
authorized the court to apply "treaties and the laws of the
United States now in force in reference to the American
consular courts in China .... But in all such cases when
such laws are deficient in the provisions necessary to give
jurisdiction or to furnish suitable remedies, the common
law and the law as established by the decisions of the courts
of the United States shall be applied ...""'
The wording of this clause of the statute implies that
any law not listed in this clause was off-limits. Chinese law
was not listed, but not because there was no national law in
China at the time. There was the vast Qing Code, the impe-
rial compendium of laws which had accumulated for at least
fifteen hundred years, which technically applied to every
place in the Chinese empire, including Shanghai. The Code
applied in its entirety to every place until the last emperor
was overthrown in 1911, and parts of it applied to every
place between 1911 and 1949, when the Chinese
Communist Party assumed control over China's national
government.276
The absence of any mention of Chinese law in the stat-
ute establishing the U.S. Court for China was surely meant
to ensure that the court perpetuate one of the privileges
enjoyed by Americans in China under the Treaty of Nanjing
of 1844. After the American victory over the Chinese in the
so-called "Opium Wars," Caleb Cushing signed the first of
several Sino-American Treaties which provided for the
administration of American justice in China. In vague lan-
guage, the first treaty gave Americans in China immunity
275. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 3, 34 Stat. 814, 815 (creating a United
States Court for China and prescribing the jurisdiction thereof).
276. Lee, Benchmarks, supra note 176.
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from Chinese law.277 Chinese did not know how important
this was to the Americans and other westerners who
obtained the same privilege. They did not imagine in their
wildest dreams just how creative foreigners could be when
it came to litigation and crime control.
Immunity from Chinese law did not necessarily mean
the right to administer American justice on Chinese soil.
So, on August 11, 1848, Congress passed a statute that gave
United States consuls in China judicial authority in both
criminal and civil matters .2 The consular court did not be-
gan operation, however, until 1864, after the American
settlement merged with the British settlement in Shanghai
to form the "International Settlement," the site of the fa-
mous "Bund," and most of Shanghai's very lucrative inter-
national commerce until at least 1949.
Another notable omission from this list was local law.
Congress made no mention of the rich and growing body of
law enacted in or for Shanghai by various law-making bod-
ies there or nearby. The extent to which the force of
national law in China had in practice receded was the ex-
tent to which local law had risen up to take its place. There
was the Prefect of Shanghai, who in the eyes of the emperor
of China who was still in power in 1906, was the principle
officer of the government for Shanghai and the area imme-
diately surrounding it. There was the heavily British and
American Shanghai Municipal Council, that enacted
hundreds of regulations for urban activities ranging from
dairy sales to street vendors to child labor to local elections
to eminent domain. There was the French Municipal
Council, that did the same for the French district of the
city. In fact, Shanghai's laws, enacted by local residents for
local residents, was a most robust, complete, and sophisti-
cated law, surely outstripping local law in most other cities
in the world at that time.
277. The Sino-American Extraterritorial Treaties, July 3, 1844, art. XXV, 8
Stat. 597, reprinted in 1 EXTRATERR. CASES 1, 2 (Charles S. Lobingier, ed.,
1920).
278. U.S. Rev. Stats., §§ 4062-4130 at 788 (1874).
279. This is the conclusion I came to after archival research on the courts of
Shanghai. See Lee, Benchmarks, supra note 176.
[Vol. 521014
A TRIUMPH OF LOCAL LAW
Why ignore local law in the mandate of the court,
particularly when the purported mission of the court was to
look to law when deciding any issue? Willfulness offers a
more plausible explanation than ignorance. The investiga-
tions conducted by the State Department in the years
immediately preceding the court's establishment, not to
mention the decades of reports back to Washington from
the American Consul-General in Shanghai, provided infor-
mation about local law. Not all of these reports downplayed
the robustness of local courts and lawmaking bodies.
Consul-General Cunningham reported on a ruling by the
British Supreme Court for China that held that a statute
enacted in Great Britain for Great Britain applied to sub-jects of Great Britain in China. Cunningham appears to
have thought this ruling worth reporting because it would
serve as a model for other foreign courts in Shanghai:
"While the [local court's] decision under discussion affects
only British subjects directly, it would unquestionably have
considerable persuasive force were similar cases to come
before other foreign judicial officials in Shanghai."' 8 ° Per-
haps to ease its reception in Washington by recasting the
focus on a major underpinning of the American policy
favoring Extraterritoriality in China, namely the insuffi-
ciency of law in China, the report stressed that the ruling
was necessary to combat weaker traffic regulations enacted
by the Shanghai Municipal Council.28
Notwithstanding a certain amount of information about
local law in Shanghai, Washington ignored it as a source of
law for the United States Court for China. To prevent the
court from applying local law, even that created by non-
Chinese residents of Shanghai, surely was meant to avoid
acknowledging the sophistication of Shanghai's local laws.
To do otherwise was to deny Washington an important
source of its authority over Americans in Shanghai. The
United States federal government needed to portray its
280. See e.g., memorandum from American Consul General in Shanghai
Edwin S. Cunningham to the Secretary of State, regarding Judicial Decision on
Applicability of English Traffic Act to British Subjects in China (Aug. 6, 1935),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 3, Frames 1-2
(National Archives).
281. Id.
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establishment of a court as necessary to fill a void of
lawlessness in that city with respect to American affairs.
The locals needed rescuing, and American law, though
formulated half a world away, without the city of Shanghai
in mind, was the means to rescue them.
C. The Court's Erie Problem
Because Congress excluded local law from the law that
could be applied at the U.S. Court for China, it wiped out
the possibility of a local legislative body for the court that
was the equivalent of the law of the forum state for the U.S.
district courts. Without this fundamental underpinning of a
U.S. district court, Congress's attempt to make the Ameri-
can court at least superficially resemble a U.S. district court
complicated rather than settled the problem of which law
this court would apply. Even before Erie v. Tompkins,
28 2
federal courts saw as their duty to apply the law of the state
in which they sat. Federal courts were called upon to
address the constitutionality of, or otherwise "adhere to any
local law determinative of state-created rights."283 Federal
statutes were relatively rare. The bulk of the law in the
United States was state law.284
The exclusion of local law from the sources of law avail-
able to the U.S. Court for China was made even more illogi-
cal and impractical by the subject matter jurisdiction that
Congress gave to the court. It specifically charged the court
with jurisdiction over inheritance cases, and as noted,
spelled out in unseemly detail-the kind reserved for
agency regulations today-the way the court was to handle
those cases. Congress also explicitly drew contracts,
commercial, and criminal cases, all traditionally within the
282. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
283. Comment, Federal Rule 43(a): The Scope of Admissibility of Evidence
and The Implications of the Erie Doctrine, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1962).
284. At least one contemporary observer of the court was aware of the
inadequacy of federal statutes as a primary source of law for the United States
Court for China, because, as he said, "[tihe bulk of the controversies involve
such matters as crimes, commerce, or the administration of decedents' estates,
the contemporary solution of which is typically determined in this country by
state legislation." United States Court for China, supra note 102, at 794.
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nearly exclusive authority of the states, within the court'sjurisdiction. Thus, in the U.S. Court for China, Congress
had created a court that was more like a state court than a
federal court for the purposes of applying law.
Without the ordinary and necessary source of law
available to the U.S. Court for China, Congress had the
responsibility to specify which other law could be applied.
Unfortunately, it carried out this responsibility with only
the most basic of statutory language. Who the lawmakers
were for this court was not comprehensively spelled out, but
the most obvious candidate was Congress. The statute pro-
vided first that the court apply "treaties and the laws of the
United States now in force in reference to the American
consular courts in China," "' all of which were enacted by
Congress.
The founding statute put all court decisions, whether
state or federal, in a secondary position, by further provid-
ing that, only where that body of law failed "to givejurisdiction or to furnish suitable remedies, the common
law and the law as established by the decisions of the courts
of the United States shall be applied . ,,2 6 Despite the
addition in the statute of federal judicial decisions as a
source of law immediately after "the common law," the term
did not necessarily refer by contrast to the decisions of state
courts, because in 1841 the U.S. Supreme Court declared
that the decisions of "local tribunals" did not constitute
"law.""7 Whether it included statutes was also unsettled in
1906. Some federal judges believed that the common law in-
cluded federal interpretations of state statutes, and even
federal judicial efforts to fill in gaps in state law. Federal
case law that created rules in tort, contract, property,
criminal law, and other state areas of law was a part of
what the U.S. Supreme Court had dubbed "federal common
law" in 1901.28 Both this view and the reaction against this
285. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, 34 Stat. 814, §4 (creating a United
States Court for China and prescribing the jurisdiction thereof).
286. Id.
287. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1841).
288. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92 (1901) (Brewer, J.,
writing for the Court).
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view in the early twentieth century in an indirect way
brought state statutes into the fabric of the common law,
the former by allowing federal judges to interpret state
statutes on their own, the latter by trying to get federal
judges to focus on state rather than federal law whenever
the action was based on the common law rather than on
federal law.
Another problem left unresolved by this statutory
language was which state law to apply. Could the court pick
and choose, or was it constrained to go first to the law of a
single state? When Congress wrote this statute, a move-
ment promoting the focus upon the law of the state in which
the federal court sat was gaining ground in the United
States.289 If the court in Shanghai was to follow the trend
among United States district courts, it needed a local law-
making body. The lack of any mention of one in the statute,
particularly in the clause directing the court to state law
whenever federal statutes did not cover the instant case,
strongly suggested that Congress precluded the court from
turning first to such a body.
The statute also left unclear whether the "common law"
included the laws of England, or indeed, any other country
connected to England's common law, like Canada, India,
Australia, or Hong Kong. Nor did Congress clarify whether
statutes in these countries formed a part of their common
law, and indeed, if they did, whether there was any cut-off
date after which the statutes were deemed not part of the
common law.
It was unclear also whether the reference to "common
law" in the 1906 statute meant to include the court's own
precedents. The statute did not extend the lawmaking
power of the ambassador to the judge. Nonetheless, because
of a long tradition of lawmaking by the United States
ambassador to China, an argument could have been made
that the judges of the U.S. Court for China possessed a kind
of legislative power. The power stemmed from the original
dual function of the judges as consular officials as well as
judges. Congress, in 1848, delegated to the American con-
suls in China the authority to issue official regulations on
289. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015, 1036-38 (1982).
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any matter that affected the "justiciable rights" of U.S. citi-
zens in China. This authority covered a wide range of civil
matters, such as divorce and alimony, bankruptcy, wills
and intestate succession, and property interests. The con-
sular courts' jurisdiction was to "in all cases, be excercised
.. in conformity with the laws of the United States, which
are hereby, so far as is necessary to execute [the] treaty...
and so far as such laws are suitable to carry the said treaty
into effect; but ... where such laws are not adapted to the
object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish
suitable remedies, the common law shall be extended in like
manner.... .29o The statute had granted the top-ranked
U.S. diplomat in China the authority to make law to fill in
any remaining gaps, but this law could not come in the form
of judicial decisions, it had to come in the form of "decrees
and regulations."29'
Thus, the only clear constraints on the type of law ap-
plicable by the court were that it apply federal statutes
before all else, and that it avoid any law that was not of the
United States. Did the statute creating the U.S. Court for
China actually constrain the selection of legal sources by
the U.S. Court for China? The court applied federal statutes
on dozens of occasions, and the selection of them seemed
largely a function of the discretion of the U.S. Attorney at
the court. One federal statute he seemed eager to enforce
was the White Slave Traffic Act, popularly known as the
Mann Act, a statute made directly applicable both in its
text and legislative history to the transport of foreign
women from foreign countries to the United States for pros-
titution.292 Neither the prosecutor nor the court in Shanghai
appeared deterred by the United States Supreme Court's
ruling that similar legislation was unconstitutional because
it called for the punishment of aliens beyond simply depor-
tation. Even Congress itself glossed over this problem in
290. Act of Aug. 11, 1848, ch. 150, §4 (giving certain judicial powers to
Ministers and Consuls of the United States in those countries).
291. Id.
292. See White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910), cited
in United States v. Thompson, 1 EXTRATERR. CASES 261 (1912).
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favor of greater consternation over the usurpation of states'
rights posed by the statute.93
The U.S. District Attorney for Shanghai also persuaded
the court to enforce the anti-gambling provisions of the code
enacted for the District of Columbia by Congress."4 But the
presence in Shanghai of the Shanghai Stock Exchange
complicated the application of this law because of an equa-
tion current at that time between gambling and stock
market activities.2 5 Troubled by the fact that Americans
placed large sums of money on this risky exchange, the
court tried to distinguish this activity from the business of
casino-style gambling dens by calling the stock exchange
wagers "speculation," an act that was legal because it was
intended to be an investment or a settlement of debt.
9 6
The court did not limit itself to federal statutes. In fact,
the bulk of the law it applied was statutory law and com-
mon law from dozens of states of the United States and
statutory law of other nation states. Using what was reput-
edly the most valuable federal government law library
outside of Washington D.C.,9 the court cited the English
common law, United States federal common law, and the
common law of dozens of states. The Court cited to the
British Orders in Council for the Ottoman Empire, for
China and Japan, and for Zanzibar, to the California, the
French, the German, the Italian, the Japanese, and the
Spanish Civil Codes; the Manchu Code; the Illinois Public
Utilities Act; to statutes of Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
293. For a reference to the Supreme Court ruling involving the punishment
of foreign women, see CONG REC. 805, 809 (1910). For the relatively brief
mention of the origin of the Mann Act in the immigration laws of the United
States, see id. at 1032. For the relatively short discussion of the need for a
treaty to lay the constitutional foundation for the bill, see id. at 1037. For
consternation over the deprivation of states of their rights under the bill, see
generally id., at 10-14, 811-823, and especially 814.
294. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, §§ 865-68, 31 Stat. 1189.
295. For an expression of this view of future markets by a treatise of the
period, see 20 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 931-932 (1906).
296. See Toeg & Read v. Suffert, 1 EXTRATERR. CASES 112 (1907); United
States v. Hadley, 1 EXTRATERR. CASES 207 (1910).
297. Hearings 2, supra note 63, at 9, 17.
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Massachusetts, Oregon, Nebraska, New York, Texas. The
Court also cited to the United States Constitution. 98
Nor did the court cite to state law only when there was
no relevant federal statute that might cover the instant
case. The court's U.S. Attorney, his assistants who gathered
evidence and legal support for impounding roulette wheels
and slot machines, the clerk of the court, and the U.S.
Marshal, all relied on state statutes and common law, the
pre-digested kind without specific citations to cases that
could be found in practitioners' treatises of the period such
as the "Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure,"99 a forty-volume
encyclopedia published by the American Law Book Com-
pany between 1901 and 1912.00
Gambling cases provided another example of how the
court did not turn first nor foremost to relevant federal
statutes. Though the court often turned to the D.C. Code in
divorce cases and a host of other matters, and though the
court wrestled with the question of whether the provisions
of the D.C. Code that punished the gambling industry 1
applied to investment on the Shanghai stock exchange, the
statute did not figure at all into the opinions of the U.S.
Attorney about the law that authorized the confiscation of
gambling paraphernalia in Shanghai.0 2 An argument could
298. Lobingier, supra note 60.
299. See the abbreviated reference to 20 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE
920 (1906) in correspondence related to United States, microformed on
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 3, Frame 199-205 (National
Archives); correspondence related to the raid by local police using a United
States warrant on the club "The Alcazar," microformed on Microcopy F167,
Record Group 84, Roll No. 3, Frame 407-08 (National Archives); correspondence
related to the raid by local police using a United States warrant on the
International Club, microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No.
1, Frame 626-30 (National Archives). The treatise cited state cases from six
states to support the proposition that gambling devices seized in raids "should
be retained by the police authorities as evidence against the accused." 20
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAw AND PROCEDURE 920 (1906).
300. According to the forward, it was written for practitioners, although
there are over 500 references to it on Westlaw from the period before 1950. My
thanks to Mary McCormick for this online search (May 9, 2003).
301. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, §§ 863-69, 31 Stat. 1189, 1325-26.
302. See letter from A. Bassett, District Attorney, to the Honorable Charles
Denby, American Consul-General, Shanghai (Jan. 3, 1908), microformed on
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have been made that the D.C. code did not explicitly
authorize the confiscation of gambling paraphernalia, in
that it provided for the fining and imprisonment of people
who ran casinos or permitted gambling on their property, or
who themselves engaged in virtually any kind of wagering
imaginable. But Bassett failed to anticipate even this kind
of argument in his memo, an omission that suggests that he
was not in the habit of exploring potentially applicable fed-
eral statutes before turning to other law in the United
States. He turned instead to a state court ruling from the
east coast and to general "police powers," an authority that
could hardly have provided stronger support than the D.C.
code for the confiscation by Shanghai police of roulette
wheels and slot machines, given that police powers resided
in the states, and the United States consistently refused to
regard Shanghai as the equivalent of the state forum for
the United States Court for China.
By prosecuting owners of roulette wheels with barely
any reference to the law, the U.S. Court for China was fol-
lowing a practice established earlier by the American
Consular Court. Before the U.S. Court for China heard its
first case, the Clerk of the Court, the American Vice Consul,
and a person convicted by the American Consular Court of
the crime of illegal possession and leasing of gambling
paraphernalia all signed a settlement agreement that cited
no law. In the contract the American Consul-General (who
did not sign the contract) promised to give the defendant
back his roulette wheel if the defendant bound himself, his
heirs, executors, and administrators in a promise not to use
the roulette wheel in his casino or rent it out to anyone
else."3
Despite the prohibition against developing judicial
precedent, the court developed its own common law and
applied that too. In 1914, Judge Lobingier fined a man a
total of U.S. $250.00 for running a saloon:
Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 3, Frame 407-08 (National
Archives).
303. Contract dated April 28, 1906, Record Group 84, Box 8, Compartment
198 (National Archives).
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[Wiherein and whereby certain evil-disposed persons, both men
and women, of evil name and conversation, intemperately and
unlawfully drinking intoxicating liquors and cursing, quarrelling,
and indecently, wantonly and lewdly misbehaving themselves, he
did cause to come together, associate and remain, to the common
nuisance of persons there passing and residing, against the
treaties between the United States and China, and against the
laws of the United States in force on June 30, 1906, in reference to
American Consular Courts in China and against the public304
peace.
Judge Lobingier's opinion made it sound as if the
Chinese emperor agreed in 1844 to incorporate the U.S.
prohibition laws of the 1930s into the Opium War Treaty!
The judge justified this stretched interpretation of law, not
on the text of the treaty, nor on a federal statute forbidding
the operation of rowdy pubs, but on "the common law in
force in this jurisdiction."35 He relied upon only one of his
own decisions, one that went to the proper weight of wit-
ness testimony. The rest of his citations were to a federal
statute "generally forbid[ding] women to frequent bars"', 3 a
Delaware state decision (which he called "[a] recognized
authority" on bars),3 07 an Iowa state decision, three U.S.
District court decisions from the District of Columbia that
charged people with keeping "'disorderly'" and "'ill-
governed"' houses in which the morals of youths might be
corrupted, 30 some dicta from the U.S. Supreme Court about
the noticeability of the "common tippling house,"0 9 and a
New Jersey state decision noting the independent crime of
selling liquor without a license.
With this patchwork of laws that Americans could
expect to face in Shanghai, it is not surprising that an im-
pression of substantive legal lacunae was created. In fact,
304. See United States v. Allen, 1 ExTRATERR. CASES 326, 327, 332 (1914).
305. See id. at 326.
306. Id. at 327.
307. See id. at 328.
308. See id. at 329-30.
309. See id. at 330.
310. See Allen, 1 EXTRATERR. CASES at 330.
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many appeals to San Francisco challenged the U.S. Court
for China's subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that
no law defined the relevant action as a legal offense. In one
challenge, just a year after the court's creation, an
American, C.A. Biddle, brought the issue before the court
after the U.S. Court for China convicted him of obtaining
money from four Chinese under false pretenses, a state
statutory crime. Biddle argued that obtaining money under
false pretenses was not a crime under the common law, nor
was it made a crime by any federal statute, thereby imply-
ing that this crime fell outside the mandate of Congress,
which did not explicitly name state statutes as a basis for
the decisions of the U.S. Court for China. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals responded by hinting at the huge omission
that this represented, given that "under our system of
government the right to punish for such acts committed
within the political .urisdiction of the state is reserved to
the several states."' The court nonetheless held that state
statutes fell within the court's mandate, though not as part
of the common law, but instead as part of the "treaties and
the laws of the United States now in force in reference to
the American consular courts in China."31 ' This rationale
rested primarily on the idea that Congress had codified the
crime for the territories of the United States before they
became states.313 In another challenge, the appellant argued
that the court lacked jurisdiction because no statute defined
the offense." 4
Rather than let itself be chastened by Biddle to redirect
its focus toward federal statutes, the U.S. Court for China
used this appellate opinion to justify a broadening of its dis-
cretion to take local conditions into account. This was the
view of one contemporary observer, an observation based on
a careful survey of the court's published case law."5 The
observer was steeped in the euphoria about statutes of his
311. Biddle v. United States, 156 F. 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1907).
312. See id. at 763.
313. See id. at 762-763.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 1 EXTRATERR. CASES 261, 262
(1912).
315. See United States Court for China, supra note 102, at 794 (citing
Sexton v. United States and Cavanaugh v. Worden).
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time, a bias that showed in his critical tone when he noted
the court's efforts to take its locality into account, and also
in his negative attitude toward the common law in gen-
eral.316 Despite his bias, however, his observation can be
trusted because it fits with so many other indications of the
court's efforts pay attention to the circumstances of its
immediate surroundings even while it refrained from citing
to local law.
Despite its willingness to cite to virtually any kind of
law in existence, except the law right outside its doorstep,
quite often the U.S. Court for China did not feel bound to
apply law of any kind at all. " ' The appeals court in San
Francisco, in a 1926 opinion, commented on the lower
court's vaguely worded judgment in a banking case involv-
ing foreign currency exchange. The court hinted in a polite
way that the opinions of the court tended to be less than
well-grounded in law: "The judgment follows the opinion of
the court, as seems to be the practice in that jurisdiction,
and is somewhat informal."318
Similar examples abound. In a breach of contract suit
involving the sale of iron roofing, the appellate judge placed
fault for the vagueness of the delivery time on the defen-
dant despite the possibility that such vagueness was
common practice in Shanghai. The judge annulled the con-
tract on a finding that the delay in delivery frustrated the
purpose of the contract. The judge's rationale used the fol-
lowing language: "one of the plainest principles of
commercial integrity" is that corporations or their agents
should not be allowed to obtain "orders by false representa-
tions as to ability to deliver."319 The appellate judge made no
attempt to contextualize this principle or geographically
limit its origin or application.
316. See id. at 793, 796.
317. See, e.g., Chiang Zung Match Factory Corp. v. Yek Tong Lin Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 1 EXTRATERR. CASEs 200 (1910).
318. Wulfsohn v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 11 F.2d 715, 716 (9th Cir. 1926).
319. Letter from Bassett to Charles Denby on United States Court for China
stationery (Jan. 3, 1908), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84,
Roll No. 3, Frames 407-08 (National Archives).
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Not only did the judge at the court justify his decisions
without references to specific laws or cases, but the prose-
cutor there relied on "the police power of the United States"
to justify action by the U.S. Court for China where there
was no specific statutory authority. The U.S. Attorney in
Shanghai opined to the American Consul-General there
that "[t]he duty to prevent crimes obligates the authorites
[sic] to seize and destroy such property [a slot machine]. I
am of the opinion that under the police power the United
States authorities have the power to seize and destroy such
property without a statute covering the subject."32 °
Given the confusion over which substantive law was
referred to in the statute that created the court and over
the lacunae in the substantive law landscape that emerged,
it is not surprising that the court did not always cite to law
in its decisions. Of 160 of the published opinions of the
Court, 137 of them cited cases. Judge Lobingier managed to
get these decisions published in Shanghai against the
wishes of Congress. His aim was to bolster the creation of a
common law of the court, a local common law that could be
widely known and legitimately applied there. Given that
aim, the Judge likely selected, or even wrote, these opinions
for inclusion in the publication with the rigor of their appli-
cation of law in mind. As Judge Lobingier stated in his
preface to the first volume, "In selecting cases for publica-
tion it has been the aim to include only those in which a
question of law has been decided or discussed."321 Congress's
aim in preventing the publication of the court's decisions no
doubt was the reverse, to keep the U.S. Court for China
from creating and applying local law.
In the opinions that were not published, there was
virtually no citation of law. Of the several dozen I read, vir-
tually none of them cite cases. In landlord-tenant cases and
in small debt and breach of contract cases, including suit to
recover unpaid wages, the court rarely cited statutes or
cases. 1 2 In automobile accident cases, negligence and con-
320. Id.
321. Charles Lobingier, Preface to 1 EXTRATERR. CASES, at iii (Charles
Lobingier ed. 1920).
322. See, e.g., Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China v. N. Hashim,
Civil No. 1511, Order for Commission to Take Testimony, filed April 6, 1932
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tributory negligence doctrines formed the basis of the
court's decision, but the court tended not to locate those
doctrines in statute or cases.323 Nor did the China Court cite
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, even though those
decisions bound the China Court as it did all the district
courts in the Ninth Circuit.
The U.S. Attorney's "informations" showed little
concern with American criminal law or procedure. In them,
he charged the defendant with the crime he believed appro-
priate, in some cases after advice from the Vice Consul. The
crimes specified in these documents did not always corre-
spond to those recognized in the United States, nor were
they backed up by citations to the United States Constitu-
tion or to any statutes . 4
When it came to sentencing, the court's discretion knew
no bounds. In the same case, Judge Lobingier declared:
In the imposition of the punishment... we are vested with full
discretion for the common law did not prescribe a penalty for the
offense charged, and this would seem to be a case for this court to
exercise the authority conferred upon its predecessors, the
consular courts, "to award punishment according to the magnitude
and aggravation of the offense."325
And this from a man who announced to the American
Bar Association a few years later that "[t]he basis of the
court's jurisprudence is the legislation of Congress and it is
(breach of contract); Pattison v. Pemberton & Penn, Inc., Civil No. 1522,
Decision and Judgment filed Mar. 11, 1933 (Suit to recover unpaid wages), Vol.
7, Civil Cases, supra note 167 and accompanying text.
323. See Lovell v. Estes, Civil No. 1489, Decision and Judgment filed May
29, 1931, Vol. 7, Civil Cases, supra note 167 and accompanying text; Elahi v.
Hogan, Decision and Judgment filed Oct. 12, 1931; See Bound Volume of Orders
and Judgments, U.S. Court for China, 1929-1933, Vol. 7, Civil Cases, supra note
167 and accompanying text.
324. An example of a typical information filed by Bassett can be found at
U.S. Court 1908; Vol. 3218, p.154; Records of Foreign Service Posts the Dept. of
State, Consular Posts, Shanghai, China; RG 84: National Archives at College
Park, College Park, MD.
325. Id. at 330-31 (citing 14 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 514
(William Mack ed. 1904)); Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, 12 Stat. 72, 75.
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one of the very few courts ... which apply none but federal
statutes .' 326
The House Foreign Affairs Committee held a hearing in
late September and early October of 1917 to explore the
possibility of legislating a substantive law code to serve as
the law of the forum for the U.S. Court for China. Then U.S.
Court for China Judge Lobingier, fearful that the code
would constrain the broad discretion he currently enjoyed,
desperately wanted Congressional confirmation of the use
of the polyglot law already in use in the Shanghai court.
Lobingier misrepresented to Congress the polyglot, trying
to make it seem more regularized and rational than it actu-
ally was. He said, first, that after the Supreme Court
handed down Gsell v. Insular Customs Collector,27 the U.S.
Court for China was bound to apply only federal statutes
designed for special jurisdictions, such as Alaska and the
District of Columbia. He maintained that copies of the
Alaska code of 1900 were widely used in Shanghai after
1907.328 He portrayed the Alaska code as good for most civil
and criminal matters, particularly probate, and the D.C.
Code of 1901 as good for supplementing it, particularly in
matters of marriage and divorce. In criminal matters, he
said, he first looked to the federal criminal code, but that a
section of Maryland law imported into the D.C. Code was
good for prosecution of escaped prisoners. He urged
Congress to allow him to retain the discretion to choose be-
tween the two codes on a case-by-case basis.329
In so testifying, the judge misstated the holding in
Gsell, ignored the provision in the Act of 1906 for resort to
the "common law" to fill any gaps in "the laws of the United
States," and shunted aside the Ninth Circuit's directly
controlling decision in Biddle which ruled that the U.S.
Court for China could apply state statutes and common law.
Contrary to the impression given in his testimony, Gsell did
not overturn Biddle, nor could it have done so without some
reaching, as it did not involve a ruling by the U.S. Court for
326. See Lobingier, supra note 60, at 275.
327. 239 U.S. 93 (1915).
328. Hearings 2, supra note 63, at 9-12.
329. See id. at 40.
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China, but rather an appeal from the Philippine Supreme
Court's review of a decision by a customs inspector. The
United States Supreme Court's main task in Gsell was to
establish its jurisdiction over the case given Congress's re-
cent enactment of a statute that restricted the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction to, among other things, issues arising
from statutes of the United States. The court held in the af-
firmative, declaring that the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909
was "a statute of the United States," and that "the decision
as to the classification of the [wool noils] in question in-
volves a statute of the United States.""'° Notwithstanding
Lobingier's trepidation about Congress drawing up a sub-
stantive code for China, he and the first judge of the court,
Lebbeus Wilfley of Missouri, made strenuous efforts to se-
cure Congress's blessing of their own codes. Lobingier
wanted Congress's immediate approval of this legal crazy
quilt he had concocted, before it could draft any comprehen-
sive code, because, as he vaguely alluded, he was afraid
that without Congress's approval people in Shanghai would
question his authority to devise procedural rules and to se-
lect laws to be applied.331 Perhaps his near desperation at
Congress's refusal to recognize any local law for him to ap-
ply is what made him present an overly narrow reading of
the extant law on what law his court could apply. The ef-
forts of Lobingier and Wilfley are no small testament to the
great magnitude of pressures on them to apply forum law. 2
Yet, despite their efforts, and despite what should have
seemed like an obvious need for local law, Congress de-
clined to create a substantive law code for the U.S. Court
for China. Congress's inaction was not because its members
doubted their authority to legislate for a court on foreign
soil or their ability to legislate solutions for problems there.
Nor did Congress worry about offending China by enacting
American law for application solely in China. The Chinese
government was not mentioned once in the three days of
hearings on the Court. The predominant feeling among the
330. Gsell, 239 U.S. at 95-96.
331. See Hearings 2, supra note 63, at 48.
332. See id. at 11.
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members of the Foreign Affairs Committee was that
Congress had the power to enact a code for China.33
The Congressmen were worried most about giving a
federal judge too much discretion to modify the law that it
enacted. Revealing supreme faith in the precision of stat-
utes, Congressman Cooper warned his fellow members "not
to leave to the discretion of anybody what the law shall
be. 33' 4 A sample of the discussion at the Hearing illustrates
Congress's indifference to both the geographic distance and
the possibility of distinct local needs in Shanghai.
Representative Henry A. Cooper, of Wisconsin, declared:
I do not see how property rights in China can differ essentially
from property rights in the District of Columbia. I cannot see how
they can .... Or the power of a man over his estate to make a will
or let it go intestate. I do not see how there is any difference in
such matters no matter what the geography may be; in other
words, it seems to me the property rights of American Citizens are
identical.
3 5
Only one Representative out of many who spoke felt
that since China was a "foreign jurisdiction" Congress's
possibly possessed less authority to legislate for it (but was
not bereft of authority).3
It seems that Congress dropped the idea of a code for
China for the practical reason that it was too ambitious, too
complicated, and too much work. The foreignness of the
context of the court was relevant insofar as it meant
Congress had extra homework to do in order to make the
code fit. While Mr. Cooper felt the itch to codify, and virtu-
ally the entire Committee assumed it had the authority to
codify, none of the other Committee members shared Mr.
Cooper's conviction that they could just dash it off and it
would be easy.
Congress had proven its ability to draft a comprehen-
sive code just a few years earlier, for the District of
333. See id. at 12.
334. Id. at 51.
335. Id. at 41.
336. Id. at 9.
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Columbia. In 1901, Congress attempted to consolidate that
code in all major statutes enacted by state legislatures.337
This code tackled even the toughest problems of what
existing laws would remain in force in D.C., and therefore
not be displaced by the code.338
Thirty-two years after the organic statute of 1906 pro-
vided that the U.S. Court for China could apply the
"common law" and federal decisions, Erie v. Tompkins
denied the existence of a "federal general common law
3 39
and moved federal courts away from federal law and toward
the law of the state in which the court sat, whenever com-
mon law issues arose. Jurists of the time called this "the
law of the forum state,,34° or "local rule."341 But, unlike the
district courts, which were territorially situated within
states, the U.S. Court for China did not sit in a territory
recognized by the United States as a part of the United
States. Therefore, there was no "forum state" for the court,
and therefore no "local" lawmaking body recognized by the
United States whose laws the court could apply.
To which lawmaker could it turn? Congress never
answered this question. The court's own solution to the lack
of a local lawmaking body was to treat District of Columbia
law as its "state" law. By its final decade or so, the court
followed Sections 105-108 and 982 of the District of Colum-
bia code in its divorce cases34 and applied other sections of
the code in wrongful death cases.
The version of the FRCP adopted by federal courts in
1938 left questions in the gray area between substance and
337. See Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, 31 Stat. 1189 (1901).
338. Id. § 1.
339. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
340. Lehan Kent Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and
"Procedure"After Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 34 U. ILL. L. REV. 271, 298 (1939).
341. Id. at 271.
342. See Bound Volume of Orders and Judgments, U.S. Court for China,
1929-1933, Vol. 7, Civil Cases, supra note 167 and accompanying text.
343. See, e.g., Wong Tsang Sze v. Upson (Cause no. 3214, Civil no. 1404,
Decision and Judgment filed Jan. 17, 1930, U.S. Court for China), Vol. 7, Civil
Cases, supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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procedure up to the law of the forum state. Such questions
encompassed those related to personal service of a sum-
mons (Rule 4), capacity to sue or be sued (Rule 17), rules of
evidence and competency of witnesses (Rule 43), and execu-
tion of judgments in the forum state (Rule 69) up to the law
of the forum state. Chinese law contained sophisticated
rules for all of these procedures except for service of proc-
ess, 3" and the other courts of Shanghai followed fairly uni-
form rules about service, evidence, and executions ofjudgment.3 45 The U.S. Court for China did not formally
adopt these local rules for itself, but instead, in the final
two years of its operation, formally adopted the FRCP and
substituted District of Columbia law each time one of these
rules referred to "state" law. The court further specified
that District of Columbia law be used to resolve issues re-
lated to divorce, change of name (Rule 81), statute of
limitations (Supplementary Rule [SR"] G), security for costs
from a non-American suing an American (SR J), and gar-
nishment proceedings (SR Q).
But the D.C. Code was by no means the equivalent of
local law for the U.S. Court for China. One limitation on its
utility in Shanghai was that the bulk of its substantive law
provisions were tied in specific ways to the District of Co-
lumbia. Trespassing on "Capitol Grounds" was prohibited,
as was using the roads in that area in ways that were ob-
structive or violent or for commercial gain "except to or
from the Capitol on Government service.,344' Regulation in
the D.C. Code of the nearby harbor and river-Shanghai
was situated on both a small river and a harbor that was an
international hub for trade and commerce-was tailored to
the geographical specifications of the Potomac River, its
channels and tributaries, and the street map of the District
of Columbia.347 The section entitled "Stealing or Injuring
344. Written petitions whose contents had to conform to official
specifications were a feature of litigation in China throughout the Qing dynasty
(1644-1911). See discussion in Duli Cunyi [A Study of Unsettled Points in the
Substatutes], Xue Yunsheng, Comp., Vol. 39, at 977-1025 (section on
substatutes regulating the initiating of lawsuits).
345. See, e.g., Mixed Court at Shanghai; Rules of Procedure; Kennett, supra
note 120.
346. Act of Mar. 5, 1901, ch. 854, §§ 881-82, 31 Stat. 1189, 1333 (1901).
347. See id. §§ 895-903.
1032 [Vol. 52
A TRIUMPH OF LOCAL LAW
Books, and So Forth" covered only books in libraries in the
District of Columbia. 48
Additional provisions required a nexus between the
District of Columbia and a relevant act, a nexus that would
have been meaningless in Shanghai, even if the area of
Shanghai were substituted for the District of Columbia. The
U.S. Court for China's jurisdiction covered acts that
occurred throughout China and Korea, and occasionally far-
ther afield in East Asia and even the United States. In the
D.C. Code, the limitations placed upon carrying concealed
weapons and upon selling weapons to minors covered only
weapons within the District.349 Punishable acts of adultery
and incest had to occur within the District."' Residency for
a certain period of time within the District was required of
parties to divorce suits filed at the supreme court there,5 1
and most of the provisions regulating the validity of mar-
riage covered only marriages performed within the District
of Columbia.5 2 Provisions for the disposition of property
assumed a basket of ownership rights available in the
District of Columbia (and perhaps throughout the entire
United States with only minor variations) that were un-
available to non-Chinese residents of Shanghai.
Yet another problem with the use of the D.C. Code in
Shanghai was that the substantive law in the D.C. Code
was intimately bound up in the institutions that Congress
created just for the District of Columbia in the very same
statutory provisions. The code set up a court system for the
District that would not have had any force in Shanghai, and
those very provisions contained substantive law rules in
various types of common law cases. 4 The code also set up
an administrative bureaucracy for the administration of
348. See id. § 849.
349. Id. §§ 855, 857.
350. Id. §§ 874, 875.
351. See id. §§ 963, 971.
352. See Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, §§ 1283-1297, 31 Stat. 1189, 1189,
1345 (1901).
353. See id. §§ 940-956, 984-1055.
354. See id. §§ 2-233.
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wills and trusts that could not have been replicated in
Shanghai, due to a lack of American personnel and exper-
tise, and these provisions, too, contained substantive law on
inheritance and trusts.3 5 Other provisions in the code
established governmental and private institutions through
which the District was to regulate banking, insurance,
trade, construction, other areas of business, religion, chari-
ties, fraternal societies, and the maintenance of public
lands, and the substantive law related to these matters was
included in these very provisions. 36 The provisions for
criminal procedure frequently referenced institutions in the
District of Columbia.357
By laying to rest a troublesome choice of law problem
for federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court aggravated the
choice of law problem for the U.S. Court for China.
Congress failed to step in and solve the problem by enacting
a substantive law code or by approving any number of local
law codes or other collection of sources of law in Shanghai.
In so doing, the United States' highest court and highest
legislature mired the judge at the U.S. Court for China even
further in the difficulty of a mandate to ignore the law
immediately around it.
E. Sovereign Law a Poor Antidote to Local Law
Authorities in Washington feared that Americans' deci-
sions in Shanghai over local disputes and violent conflicts
would not be guided by sovereign law. They believed that
where formal law did not constrain the decisions of Ameri-
cans sitting as judges, their own discretion was free to enter
in. The dire warnings issuing from Washington implied that
discretion was bad because it opened the way for self-
interest to serve as the basis for decisions. But it is hard to
imagine that the siphoning off of a few hundred35" American
estates from family members into the pockets of foreign
355. See id. §§ 259-394.
356. See id. §§ 574-797, 1574-1616.
357. See id. §§ 911-939.
358. Judge Lobingier estimated that in the court's first ten years it decidedjust under 600 cases. See Lobingier, supra note 60, at 275.
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servicemen was enough to galvanize Washington to create a
wholly new type of legal institution.59 No, this discretion
threatened officials in Washington because it was exercised
half a world away by people who were as much residents of
Shanghai as they were residents of the United States.
By attempting to create a court that resembled on the
surface a federal district court, but refusing to recognize
any local law or local lawmaking body, however, Congress
doomed its stated goals for the court to increase the amount
of law and the amount of United States law applied to dis-
putes and criminal matters involving Americans in China.
The court got around the illegitimacy in the United States
of Shanghai law by creating its own local law and applying
it anyway. It accomplished this by citing its own decisions
or refusing to cite to law at all, all occasions for imple-
menting the norms of its time and place without revealing
that it was doing so. The discretion seized by American
judges and prosecutors in Shanghai opened the way for
local law to serve as the basis for decisions.
Congress's goals of more law and no local law were
incompatible, and, though the latter loomed larger in im-
portance to its members than the former, this incompati-
bility created room within which the court exercised its
discretion to apply the law or norms that, in its view, best
fit local circumstances. But even if Congress had pursued
only compatible goals for the court, the court was bound to
exercise a great deal of discretion because of its great
distance from its official lawmaker, a distance made signifi-
cant in an age where trans-oceanic travel was by boat and
trans-oceanic communication was by telegraph, telegram,
or a seafaring postal system. Distance unbridged by intense
interest and familiarity with conditions in Shanghai made
local discretion a necessity. Discretion opened the way for
local law to serve as the basis for decisions because the
discretion was exercised by a court staff that resided for
years in Shanghai and was familiar with local circum-
stances and the needs of the parties.
359. Lobingier stated in the same address that the U.S. Court was the first
court established by Congress "to sit and exercise jurisdiction entirely outside of
American territory." Id. at 273.
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Local law was just as threatening, or more threatening,
to authorities in the American capital than no law at all. No
law at all meant that Americans in China were less likely to
be controlled by Washington than if sovereign law was
strictly followed there. But to allow Americans to become
part of a legal system indigenous to China meant something
worse, that the United States was not sovereign over all its
citizens and the territories where it had won the right to
exert influence. American participation in the law of
Shanghai legitimized local law. Boosting the legitimacy of
local law threatened the claim to legitimacy of lawmakers
in Washington, a claim based on sovereignty and treaty, but
already made vulnerable to attack by their distance half a
world away from the court that was to apply the law.
Boosting the legitimacy of local law also unsettled the
comfortable assumptions of federal lawmakers in the
United States that they were the most capable creators of
law, for any place.
Faced with the refusal by any powers in Washington to
authorize the U.S. Court for China to apply law created in
Shanghai for Shanghai, the court did so anyway. While the
court was careful not to cite to local laws, it strayed far from
its statutory mandate to apply first and foremost federal
statutes of the United States. Instead, it creatively and in
an open-textured manner, invoked the law of various states
of the United States and of countries other than the United
States or China. Its invocation of positive law was not only
loose, but also relatively rare. Most of the time, the judges
and prosecutors of the court arrived at their decisions solely
by responding to the facts of the case. This approach
amounted to a de facto application of local law, at least in
the sense that the court was responding to local needs and
local circumstances, unfettered by sovereign law created far
away with different needs and circumstances in mind. The
court also created local law for its own application by
collecting its own cases in voluminous records and publish-
ing dozens of its opinions.
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CHAPTER V
THE TENSION BETWEEN LOCAL AND SOVEREIGN AS
REFLECTED IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The U.S. Court for China was caught between its sover-
eign mandate to sit in the Ninth Circuit, on the one hand,
and the functional reality that none of its jurisdictional
characteristics resembled those of any court in the Ninth
Circuit, on the other hand. The jurisdiction of the U.S.
Court for China resembled the jurisdiction of the courts in
its vicinity more than the federal district courts of the
United States which it was supposed to mimic. The strong-
est resemblance resulted from the court's adherence to the
jurisdictional rule that plaintiffs sued defendants in
Shanghai only in courts operated by the defendants' home
country. This aspect of the court touched every case from its
beginning and was the single most important determinant
of whether the court could hear the case.36 ° The rule, though
it originated in the consular court system of Great Britain,
the United States, and other foreign treaty partners of
China in the mid-nineteenth century, formed the basis of
the jurisdictional contours of all the courts of Shanghai,
even those run by Chinese. As a result of this local influ-
ence, the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court for China was
defined more by personal jurisdiction than territorial juris-
diction.
The U.S. court did not, and could not, follow the juris-
dictional rules and doctrines that marked the U.S. district
courts on the mainland back home. Territory rather than
nationality defined the limits on the jurisdiction of the
stateside courts.36' Nothing about the court's jurisdiction
resembled the Article III district courts except for the right
360. Evidence for the paramount importance of nationality at the court can
be found in Judge Lobingier's remark to American lawyers that "The test of
jurisdiction over the person in this extraterritorial court is the nationality of the
defendant." Id. at 275.
361. For the strong orientation toward the territorial limits of the states in
the late nineteenth century, see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled
by Shaffer v. Heirner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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of litigants to appeal to the U.S. court of appeals. The rea-
sons for this jurisdictional disparity lay in the constraints
imposed by the United States treaties with China and in
Congress's purposes for creating the court, which were to
curb corruption in the execution of Americans' estates in
China and to rescue Americans accused of crimes from the
vicissitudes of the Chinese criminal process.
One would be hard pressed to conclude that the right of
appeal did anything to change the contours of the China
court's jurisdiction. It was seldom used and it seldom pro-
duced reversals. Litigants from the U.S. Court for China
appealed about two decisions per year, and the court of
appeals affirmed most of the judgments. An appeal usually
took two to three years from judgment in the U.S. Court for
China to judgment in the court in San Francisco, where it
was published in the Federal Reporter. The reversals did
occasionally admonish the court, as noted earlier, for failing
to follow rarified rules of equity pleading or joinder that
were not required in Congress's founding statute nor help-
ful in Shanghai because of a lack of access to the case
reporters and treatises containing these rules and an utter
lack of experience with an equity-law cleavage. Such admo-
nitions made little sense and therefore probably had little
impact.
Congress was responsible for the disparity between thejurisdictions of the U.S. court and the federal district
courts. Congress granted to the U.S. Court for China the
basic outlines of jurisdiction it granted the U.S. consular
courts in 1848,362 while it never attempted to grant to it the
basic outlines of the jurisdiction of the Article III U.S.
district courts. The founding statute made the court's sub-ject matter jurisdiction larger than the federal district
courts, extending beyond it to most types of civil and crimi-
nal cases, and in the most explicit way imaginable, to
probate cases. The statute also made all of China and Korea
the territory over which the court could exercise original ju-
risdiction. By limiting the court's jurisdiction to that which
was in conformity with the extraterritorial treaties between
the U.S. and Cina in effect at the time, the court's personaljurisdiction, covering only defendants who were citizens of
362. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 1, 34 Stat. 814 (1906).
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the United States or the Philippines, more restricted than
the personal jurisdiction of the district courts.363
The court's appellate jurisdiction was in part Congress's
innovation just for the U.S. Court for China, and it made
the court even less like the U.S. district courts and unique
among U.S. consular courts as well. Congress empowered
the U.S. Court for China to serve as the court of appeal for
the consular courts in China, of which there were fourteen,
located mainly in port cities, and in Korea.364 Both this ap-
pellate jurisdiction and the territorial coverage of its origi-
nal jurisdiction made the U.S. Court for China's territorial
jurisdiction larger than that of any other U.S. district court,
and indeed any U.S. court of appeals as well.
A more detailed look at each set of jurisdictional rules
for the court and the court's response to those rules shows
that the court was faced with an entirely different set of
jurisdictional questions from those faced by federal district
courts. At the same time, the court resolved those questions
without resort to any law of the United States, but rather,
according to the rules current in Shanghai's other courts at
that time. So, while the local and sovereign aspects of the
court's nature were in tension, in a jurisprudential sense,
and in a practical, operational sense, the court was more
local than sovereign.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
The U.S. Court for China had jurisdiction over only
defendants and third parties who were citizens of the
United States or of its territories. Philippinos, who by 1906
were inhabitants of a United States territory, were sued not
just in the U.S. Court for China,365 but also in the American
Consular Court before the U.S. court was established. 6 The
363. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 4, 34 Stat. 815 (1906).
364. Id. § 2.
365. See United States v. Juvenile Offender (filed Feb. 9, 1918), published in
MILLARD'S REVIEW, supra note 107, Feb. 16, 1918, at 380.
366. See, e.g., complaint for uncollected rent brought in the letter sent by
E.D. Sassoon & Co. to J. L. Rodgers, Consul General for America (May 31,
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officers of the two American courts in Shanghai referred to
the Treaty of Paris of 1898, the document in which Spain
ceded the Philippines to the United States, and to an act of
Congress in 1902 which extended the "protection of the
United States" over citizens of the Philippines, for authority
for the courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction over
Philippinos whether they were of Spanish or native
Philippine heritage.367
Corporations were considered citizens of the United
States if they registered with the American Consulate in
Shanghai, and the requirement for registration centered on
whether the corporation was incorporated in a state of the
United States. Difficult questions arose in regard to the
possibility of additional requirements. During World War I,
the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai did not automatically regis-
ter a corporation registered in Delaware because its owners
were of Japanese citizenship. Instead, the consulate
referred the question to the American Minister in Beijing."
The origins of this restriction by nationality lay in
Congress's response to the Sino-American treaties which
gave Americans immunity from Chinese law. Congress in
1848 had granted the consular court jurisdiction "over all
citizens of the United States in China (and over all others to
the extent that the terms of the treaty justify or require). In
1860 Congress limited the jurisdiction by deleting the refer-
ence to "all others" and adding the additional qualification
of "suitable" to carry the treaties into effect.6 9 The 1906 Act
merely referenced the jurisdiction of the consular courts, so
Congress left open which nationalities could sue U.S.
citizens in the U.S. Court for China.37 ° The basic jurisdic-
1905), microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 1, Frame 672
(National Archives).
367. See reference by American Consul-General, Shanghai, Charles Denby,
to Art. IX of the treaty and to specific language of the 1902 Act (Jan. 11, 1908),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 3, Frame 409
(National Archives).
368. For a discussion regarding the Oriental Trust Guarantee & Exchange
Company, see In the Field of Business and Finance, MILLARD'S REVIEW, supra
note 107, Oct. 6, 1917, at 164.
369. Act of June 30, 1860, ch. 179, § 4, 12 Stat. 73 (1906).
370. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 4, 34 Stat. 815 (1906).
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tional rules current among all the courts of Shanghai was
that the plaintiff could be a citizen of any nation."1 The U.S.
State Department qualified this to exclude anyone classed
as an enemy by the State Department. This rule in practice
defined both the appellate and original jurisdiction of the
U.S. Court for China.
There was one exception which broadened in divorce
cases the court's personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs had to be
both American citizens and bona fide residents of one of the
treaty ports in China, and usually the U.S. court looked to
the number of years of residence in making this determina-
tion. Four years seemed to be the unwritten rule of thumb.
Defendants in divorce cases, on the other hand, could be
living anywhere at the time of the filing, even outside
China.7 2 This rule worked against defendants in divorce
cases because it left them with no place to run to if they
wanted to evade the court's jurisdiction. Of course, the rule
restricted beyond the general personal jurisdictional rule
the types of plaintiffs who could file divorce cases, because
the general rule permitted plaintiffs of any nationality and
any place of residence to file suit. The restriction in cases of
divorce was probably because of the great transience of
Shanghai's population and the consequent risk that travel-
ers from all over the world might flood the court's docket
with their efforts to get out of marriages while their spouses
remained unwittingly at home. Neither in China nor in the
United States at this time did courts try to make divorces
easy to obtain.
The China Court was strict about limiting its jurisdic-
tion to defendants under the protection of United States
sovereignty. The principal method of enforcing it was to
371. The International Mixed Court, as the most prominent example, tried
thousands of suits by foreign subjects of nations that had signed treaties with
China granting them immunity from Chinese law. From 1918 to 1925, among
thousands of these "mixed" civil cases, not one involved a Chinese suing a
foreigner. On the contrary, all but 150 or so were cases of foreigners suing
Chinese. The rest were foreigners suing foreigners who lacked the immunity
flowing from the treaties. See all sections entitled Summary of Foreign Cases
Heard, THE GAZETTE, supra note 236 (1918-1925).
372. See Bound Volume of Orders and Judgments, U.S. Court for China,
1929-1933, Vol. 7, Civil Cases, supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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require all criminal defendants to produce proof of citizen-
ship. The U.S. Attorney there verified the citizenship of
criminal suspects before he began his investigation of them
before prosecution. To do this, he asked the U.S. Consul
General, who under orders from the State Department kept
a Register containing registration papers for all American
citizens in Shanghai, for certified copies of these papers. In
civil cases, the defendant's citizenship had to be pleaded, or
in inheritance cases, the decedent's." '
Not surprisingly, defendants in criminal cases, and in
civil cases apart from inheritance cases, tried to evade the
court's jurisdiction by claiming not to be American. Plead-
ings of American citizenship could be challenged by offering
written statements from U.S. government officers anywhere
in the world that a party had said he was not American or
was born outside the United States. The court took these
challenges seriously, because nationality was fluid in
Shanghai in the last nineteenth and early twentieth
century. The population of Shanghai was highly diverse and
mobile, and no passport was required for entrance to the
city from anywhere, including from outside of China.
Documentation of citizenship came in principally in the
form of registration with one of the thirteen consulates in
Shanghai, and marriage and residential history determined
nationality as much as did circumstances of birth. Foreign
consuls in Shanghai promiscuously extended their nation-
alities to Chinese and to other foreigners who had minimal
or even no contacts with the consul's country. 74 Many
Chinese businessmen purchased British
37 or Portuguese3 1
373. See, e.g., In Re Last Will and Testament of Robert Edmund Lee,
Deceased, published in MILLARD'S REVIEW, supra note 107, April 6, 1918, at 217
(testimony, a consular document, and a parish register presented showing that
Robert Lee was born in the United States of a Chinese father who later
acquired U.S. citizenship and of an American mother. The court's ruling, spelled
out in a lengthy opinion, turned on the issue of whether this evidence was
internally consistent and in an acceptable form).
374. For complaints about the practice, see Shanghai Municipal Council
Annual Report, 39 (1925); THE GAZETTE, supra note 236, at 407 (Oct. 30, 1924).
375. See, e.g., Whang Tung Ling v. Yen Yoong Sun, FO 656/175 (Nov. 20,
1924) (letter from British Consul General to Mixed Court Registrar).
376. See, e.g., Tung Hua v. Jui Liao Sse, FO 656/137 (July 9, 1915) (letter
from Portuguese Consul to British Assessor at the International Mixed Court).
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or other37 foreign citizenship. Corporations and banks also
had nationality status and shifted citizenship when advan-
tageous for profit-making or tax purposes, or for evading
the jurisdiction of various courts.
The fluidity of nationality was matched only by the
technicality with which the court applied its personal juris-
diction rules, a combination that sometimes thwarted the
court's efforts to enforce laws. A measure of how strictly the
court adhered to this local jurisdictional rule can be found
in the court's willingness to adhere to it even when to do so
thwarted its zealous efforts to combat the gambling that
was rampant in Shanghai at the time. The U.S. Attorney,
Bassett, during the early years of the court, attempted in
vain to close down a casino in Shanghai owned by an
American, H.I. Hennage, who had a Cuban citizen hold
himself out as owner. Bassett tried unsuccessfully to get the
Cuban Consul General to shut the place down, only to find
that the Cuban Vice Consul was a frequent patron there.
Bassett, appropriately named to play the role of an irre-
pressible prosecutor, continued his dogged attempt to close
down this gambling den by imprisoning the American for
"vagrancy and gambling at a common gambling house."
While in jail, Hennage transferred ownership of the Alcazar
to his mistress, who was successful in evading Bassett's
effort to prosecute her by claiming to be a French citizen.378
The court's investigations into the nationality of defen-
dants consumed a similar proportion of its resources to that
of other courts in Shanghai. At the city's largest court, the
International Mixed Court, it could compel the transfer or
release of assets to satisfy its judgments only from banks
were owned by nationals of China or countries without trea-
ties with China granting them extraterritorial rights in
377. The proprietors of the firm Foh Hsing Chong Hong bought Spanish
citizenship. See FO 656/175 (May 6, 1924) (petition in the case of Foh Hsing
Chong Hong v. Yue Hsing Co).
378. Letter from Bassett to Denby, Mar. 26, 1908, RG 84; Records of Foreign
Service Posts, Consular Posts, Shanghai China, Volume 3218, U.S. Court 1908,
at 128-29.
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China.379 The nationality of some litigants at this court was
either untraceable,38 or changed in the middle of a
lawsuit.38' Some, in fact, waited until a summons to the
International Mixed Court from one consulate had been
served on them, and promptly registered in another consu-
late.8 2
International crises increased the fluidity of national
status and complicated the exercise of the rule on national-
ity jurisdiction. World War I disturbed the local conventions
in Shanghai for classifying people by nationality.
International law at the time prohibited access of citizens to
the courts of their wartime enemies.383 In Shanghai, this
would have meant a steep decline in caseloads for all of the
courts, which all depended upon dozens of nationalities to
file suit or defend themselves against civil and criminal
suits. Rather than meekly surrender some of their jurisdic-
tion, the courts of Shanghai saw in the sudden evaporation
of local conventions an opportunity to expand their jurisdic-
tion. The national labels of German, Russian, and Austro-
Hungarian that were respected before the war by
Shanghai's courts were during the war ignored, and citizens
of these nations were lumped into a category of stateless
citizens who enjoyed no right to be tried in a court presided
over by their own nationals in Shanghai. This right disap-
peared just as the courts of these countries were closed and
judges of these countries were refused access to the bench of
other courts in Shanghai. Nationals of these countries were
then brought before the International Mixed Court of
Shanghai, the court that tried cases whose defendants were
Chinese or of any foreign nationality without treaty
379. See FO 656/131 (May 19, 1913) (letter from Hansen, McNeill & Jones to
British Mixed Court Assessor).
380. Defendant I.L. da Cruz was not registered in any of the consulates in
Shanghai. See FO 656/111 (May 26, 1906) (letter from Fuhrmeister, Klose & Co.
to British Mixed Court Assessor).
381. See FO 656/160, (July 12, 1920) (letter from M.L. Heen, Esq. to British
Mixed Court Assessor regarding Koltzoffv. Meyer).
382. See FO 656/175 (Aug. 31, 1923) (extract from Mixed Court Register,
homicide case no. 1/19478).
383. CHINESE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 20 (1916-19).
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arrangements with China.384 British and American judges
at that court thereby expanded their jurisdiction over Ger-
man, Russian, Austrians, and Hungarians.
Falling in step with the other courts in Shanghai during
World War I, the U.S. Court for China aggressively asserted
its jurisdiction in the face of the threat of its diminution.
Judge Lobingier refused to let the international law rule
deter him from accepting cases brought by Germans,
Russians, Austrians, Hungarians against Americans. He
pronounced that in cases arising in China the U.S. Court
for China's territorial jurisdiction controlled when nation-
ality might exclude an enemy plaintiff from bringing suit
there. In other words, if the claim arose in China against an
American, the U.S. Court for China would hear the case
regardless of who brought it.
385
Such jurisdictional questions related to the definition of
nationality rarely confronted the federal district courts of
the United States. Their personal jurisdiction was founded
upon a blend of state service of process rules and common
law notions rooted in territoriality that protected defen-
dants from suit outside states where they were domiciled.
The emphasis on territoriality stemmed from the strength
of state sovereignty that was one of the legacies of the
founding of the United States.3" The territoriality of the
rules governing the personal jurisdiction of these courts
made little sense for the U.S. Court for China, whose juris-
diction stretched throughout much of East Asia and ran up
against no other court that had jurisdiction over American
384. Local regulations enacted by a foreign council elected by foreign
taxpayers in Shanghai gave jurisdiction over foreigners unrepresented by
consular authorities in the city to the "Chinese Chief Authority." See 1845 Tudi
Zhangcheng [Land Regulations], in Shanghai Gonggong Zujie Zhidu [The
System of the Shanghai International Settlement] (Zhongguo Kexue Gongsi
Chengyin 1931) [China Science Press 1931], Article 8, at 200-13. See chapters
three and seven for discussion of the Land Regulations. Eighteen years later,
roughly the same group of foreigners established the International Mixed Court
to serve as this authority, even though it included foreign as well as Chinese
judges.
385. CHINESE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 20 (1916-19).
386. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled by Shaffer v.
Heirner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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defendants except for the American consular courts.
Despite this mismatch, neither Congress nor the U.S.
Supreme Court liberated the U.S. court from the personal
jurisdiction rules that prevailed in the United States.
Mapping onto a United States court a personal jurisdic-
tion system based on nationality also threw into question
the applicability there of the federal rules related to third
party practice. Third party practice in the district courts
expanded the jurisdiction of the courts in a way that ran up
against their limited subject matter jurisdiction. This same
third party practice when exported to the U.S. Court for
China ran up against limited jurisdiction over not subject
matter but nationality. If third parties at the U.S. court
lacked American citizenship, could the court assume juris-
diction over them? Neither Congress nor the U.S. Supreme
Court ever recognized the clash between the U.S. Court for
China's personal jurisdiction and federal third party prac-
tice, let alone liberated the court from the rules of federal
third party practice.
The relevant appeals courts in the United States that heard
arguments about whether certain third parties at the U.S.
Court for China were properly a part of an action or not
remained silent about the problem of whether third parties
not of American nationality could be brought within the
court's jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit applied to an appeal
on that issue from the U.S. Court for China common law
about indispensable parties, which consisted of U.S.
Supreme Court precedent and appeals from the U.S. Court
for China to the Ninth Circuit. District courts of that period
were applying Supreme Court precedent and federal
appellate opinions on indispensable parties in much the
same way, but to resolve issues involving diversity jurisdic-
tion which did not apply to the U.S. Court for China.387 In
the U.S. court case, a Chinese electric company sued the
National City Bank of New York to recover funds deposited
in the bank. The funds were held in an account opened
jointly by the electric company and an American construc-
tion company that was not headquartered or incorporated
387. See Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 27 F.2d 753 (W. D. Va. 1928);
Milliken v. Transcon. Oil Co., 55 F. Supp. 381 (D. Wyo. 1928); Lowry & Co. v.
Nat'l City Bank of New York, 28 F.2d 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
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in China. The electric company on appeal from a judgment
from the U.S. Court for China argued that U.S. statutes or
cases that applied to indispensable parties in other federal
courts did not apply in the U.S. Court for China to parties
who were not present within China. The Ninth Circuit
expressly rejected this argument, without even dignifying it
with an explanation. It reversed the judgment below on the
ground that the construction company was an indispensable
party that had not been joined." Although there was no
non-American indispensable party here, the Ninth Circuit
never acknowledged that there was anything different ju-
risdictionally about the U.S. Court for China that might
complicate third party rules.
The U.S. court addressed the problem on its own by ex-
trapolating from the limitation on its personal jurisdiction
limits on summoning and sanctioning third parties who
were not American. Judge Helmick's version of the FRCP
contained several modifications of the third party rules that
flowed from the court's lack of jurisdiction over non-
Americans."9 The U.S. court's Rule 13 permitted counter-
claims to exceed opposing claims, as did Rule 13 of the
Federal Rules, but only where the opposing party was an
American citizen. Under Rule 14, defendants could bring in
third parties, if the third party's liability was contingent on
the defendant's liability to the plaintiff, as they could in
other U.S. district courts, but in the U.S. Court for China,
an additional requirement was that the third party defen-
dant be an American citizen. The language "subject to thejurisdiction of the court" was added to the China court's
rules on necessary and permissive joinder of parties, Rules
19 and 20.390
Although the court did its best to reconcile its personal
jurisdiction with the related jurisdictional rules of the
388. See Nat'l City Bank of New York v. Harbin Elec. Joint-Stock Co., Ltd,
28 F.2d 468, 471-72 (9th Cir. 1928).
389. See id. at Rule 37 (failure to comply with discovery), Rule 41 (voluntary
dismissal of claims by plaintiffs against defendants who counterclaim and then
object to dismissal), and Rule 45 (subpoena).
390. RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA 20-22,
26-27 (1939).
2004] 1047
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
federal courts, this effort merely tinkered at the margins of
the court's character and could not make the court into an
American institution. Not only did its personal jurisdiction
rules resemble those of the other courts of Shanghai more
than those of the federal district courts, but its personal
jurisdiction stymied in a systematic way its sovereign's goal
that it promote American interests in China. This is
because its principal personal jurisdiction rule prevented
the court from targeting foreigners who had wronged
Americans. Why go to such lengths to limit its jurisdiction
to a single category of defendant, when this effort consumed
so much of the court's time and energy, and led to the per-
verse consequences of a confused third-party practice and
constraints on the court' ability to carry out its primary
purpose of protecting American interests in China? The
answer may lie in a peculiarity of the system of Extraterri-
toriality that prevailed in China at the time. The foreign
powers who signed treaties with China aimed to carve out
as broad an immunity of their citizens from Chinese law as
possible. The treaties themselves referred to immunity from
actions in Chinese courts, the foreign officials in China
worked hard for decades to expand this immunity to include
immunity from all types of regulation of the Chinese
government, including taxation. 1 Much American money in
China was at stake and in part rested on the ability of the
United States Court for China to maintain its end of the
bargain of Extraterritoriality, that is, refraining from
applying American law to Chinese. Thus, the United States
Court for China prudently curtailed the exercise of Ameri-
can sovereignty in exercise of the court's personal jurisdic-
tion because this helped to maintain a unique, local system
of privilege for Americans who lived in China.
391. See "Cross-Reference Sheet" regarding "Chinese Government Income
Tax," which noted a question raised by Swan, Culbertson & Fritz, "whether
citizens of the Philippine Islands enjoy extraterritorial rights in China and also
whether they are subject to Chinese income tax." (August 30, 1940),
microformed on Microcopy F167, Record Group 84, Roll No. 3, Frame 323
(National Archives).
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B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In contrast to the limits upon the court's personal juris-
diction and its strict enforcement of those limits, the court
enjoyed a broad subject matter jurisdiction, and it aggres-
sively extended that jurisdiction as if it had no boundaries
at all. Congress did not write the court's founding statute
with the language limiting the subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal courts that was written into Article III of the
federal constitution.392  Rather, Congress extended the
court's subject matter jurisdiction beyond that of a U.S.
district court. Congress specifically charged the court withjurisdiction over testate and intestate estates of Americans
in Shanghai, with a special responsibility to make invento-
ries of those estates."' Congress also expressly included all
types of civil cases involving between $500 and $2,500,
exclusive of court costs, and all types of criminal cases, but
explicitly homicide and political rebellion.394 With the excep-
tion of political rebellion, all of these subject matters tradi-
tionally fell within the nearly exclusive authority of the
states. Thus, in the U.S. Court for China, Congress created
a court that was more like a state court than a federal court
for the purposes of applying law.
Federal district courts of the time had an even
narrower subject matter jurisdiction than they have today.
It encompassed primarily federal crimes, admiralty, bank-
ruptcy, federal constitutional issues, and patent. Federal
case law explicitly excluded common law crimes from
federal jurisdiction.395 Criminal cases and admiralty occu-
392. "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority; Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party... [and] between Citizens of different
States." U.S. CONST. art. III §2.
393. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, § 2, 34 Stat. 814-155 (1906).
394. Id.
395. 4 FEDERAL STATUTES ANNOTATED § 563 (1904) lists the areas of subject
matter jurisdiction for the district court that Congress proposed in REV. STAT. §
563 and cites to U.S. v. Lewis, 36 F. 449 (D. Or. 1888) to the effect that only
crimes defined by federal statute, and no common law crimes, fell within thejurisdiction of these courts. See also Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat.
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pied the bulk of federal dockets,39 and federal courts had
deemed that murder, extortion, conspiracy, perjury,
kidnaping, counterfeiting, and embezzlement all could be
defined by federal statute and therefore fall within their ju-
risdiction.397 No lawsuits could be initiated under diversity
of citizenship or federal question until 1911.398
Perhaps taking their cue from the conservative
approach to subject matter jurisdiction followed by the fed-
eral courts, litigants at the U.S. Court for China challenged
the court's aggressive approach to its subject matter juris-
diction. Most appeals to San Francisco challenged the
Shanghai court's rulings on jurisdictional grounds. Between
1906 and 1910, a number of appeals to San Francisco
argued that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction
over their cases. The appellants tried to show that no fed-
eral cases or statutes existed that prohibited whatever it
was that the defendant was supposed to have done. In
Biddle v. United States, appellant Biddle's issue on appeal
was that his charge of obtaining money under false pre-
tenses was not a crime defined by federal statute, and
therefore the U.S. Court for China did not have jurisdiction
over his case. The Appeals Court denied the validity of
Biddle's argument, but without fully clarifying the bounda-
ries of the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
In its exercise of a broad subject matter jurisdiction and
in the types of cases that made up the bulk of its docket, the
U.S. court behaved like other courts in Shanghai."' The
1091.
396. Erwin C. Surrency, History of Federal Courts, 28 Mo. L. REv. 214, 216
(1963).
397. See 6 DECENNIAL EDITION OF THE AMERICAN DIGEST § 95 (1876-1906).
398. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091.
399. See, e.g., Biddle v. United States, 156 F. 759 (9th Cir. 1907).
400. Case records from the largest court in Shanghai, the International
Mixed Court of Shanghai, show that the court handled a wide range of cases,
including small debt claims, claims by large corporations of breach of contract
or by banks of defaults on mortgages, claims of bankruptcies, and tortious
accidents. See, e.g., archival documents from the British Foreign Office filed in
the Foreign Record Office in Surrey, United Kingdom as FO 656/124 (Aug. 24,
1910) (letter from Shanghai Gas Co. to British Assessor); FO 656/111 (June 5,
1906) (letter from Stokes, Platt & Teesdale regarding Kishan Singh v. Zang
Hang Sun v. Tsung Tsun Zee); FO 656/131 (June 27, 1913) (letter from
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typical civil case at the U.S. court centered on probate, debt,
or dissolutions of corporations. This mix of cases fit with the
needs of Shanghai's financially sophisticated economy.
Criminal cases involved mostly assault, robbery, larceny,
homicide, gambling, or trafficking in liquor. And, mirroring
the Chinese courts in the area, the U.S. Court for China
blurred the lines between civil and criminal. For example,
some of the debt cases where the defendant skipped town
were eventually treated as criminal matters. Some of the
criminal cases were eventually settled by contract with an
officer of the court as co-signatory.
C. Venue, Territorial Jurisdiction, and Appellate
Jurisdiction
The U.S. government operated consular courts in four-
teen cities in China,4 °' but the U.S. Court for China was the
only officially federal U.S. court in China. Therefore, there
was only one venue in its jurisdiction. For this reason,
apparently, and possibly also because of its great distance
from the United States, the court permitted no challenges
to venue. When it adopted the Federal Rules of Procedure
in 1938, it omitted 12(b)(3), the provision for challenges to
venue to be brought in a pre-answer motion.4"2 This meant
that defendants could not argue that they should be sued in
a district court in any particular venue of the federal court
system. This probably also precluded the court itself from
transferring cases to another federal district court. Thus,
venue rules provided another difference between the U.S.
Shanghai Gas Co. to British Assessor Garstin,); FO 656/116 (Feb. 18, 1908)
(letter from T.L. Bickerton & Co. to British Assessor Barton,); FO 656/124
(Sept. 1910) (letter from Daniel Wood to British Assessor regarding his suit
against Kwa Yseng & Co.); FO 656/111 (Jan. 22, 1906) (letter from J. Moosa to
British Assessor Twyman); FO 656/175 (May 30, 1924) (petition, notice of
motion, and answer in Foh Hsing Chong Hong v. Yue Hsing Co.); FO 656/124
(May, 1910) (petition in the case of Chun Shun Yee v. Chun Shing Cheong); FO
656/131 (Feb. 4, 1913) (petition and judgment in the case of Chen Yih Tsai v.
Yuen Woo, Yah Hsing).
401. See Lobingier, supra note 60, at 275.
402. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA 18
(1939).
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Court for China and the U.S. district courts, and, what is
more, cut off in a meaningful way the U.S. Court for China
from the federal court system.
At the same time, the court's venue rule made it similar
to the other courts in Shanghai. Only one of them was
linked to a national court system. This court sat in the
Chinese magistrate's yamen in Shanghai, a relic of the
imperial Chinese bureaucracy that did not permit venue
challenges. °3 This court proved to be one of the most short-
lived and the least influential of all the courts in Shanghai
during the first half of the twentieth century. By 1905 it
was phased out in favor of a more modern and western-
style court run by local Chinese officials, and in 1911 it was
officially disbanded."4 Shanghai operated as the headquar-
ters of a circuit. The judge received the papers filed in first
instance cases at American consular offices in Beijing and
Tianjin. These papers were considered filed at the U.S.
Court for China. The judge at the U.S. Court for China in
Shanghai occasionally traveled to Beijing and Tianjin to
hear some of them, and others he processed solely from
Shanghai from the records sent to him there. 5
During at least the first four decades of this century,
Americans could file divorce suits in China in any consular
court, and there were several, one each in the cities in
which Americans had lived since the 1840s as permitted by
a treaty between China and the United States. But only the
U.S. Court for China was empowered to grant divorces. If a
403. In T'ung-Tsu Ch'u's masterful study of the yamen during the Qing
period (1644-1911), he stresses the comprehensive nature of the responsibilities
over the territory assigned to him of the magistrate who manned that post.
Each magistrate was assigned to a single territory and his authority over that
territory, which included the adjudication of disputes and criminal inquests,
was unchallenged by anyone except for higher-level authorities to whom he
reported. See generally LOcAL GOVERNMENT IN CINA UNDER THE CH'ING 15-16
(Stanford University Press 1962).
404. See Lee, Benchmarks, supra note 176.
405. See, e.g., Ells v. Ells, filed at Tianjin, China, interlocutory order
granted May 17, 1930, Civil no. 1439; Peking Medical College case tried in
Beijing. It also appears from the stacks on level 4, where all the RG 84 records
are located (all the Shanghai consular records at the National Archives), that
Suzhou, Ningbo, and even Nanjing sent their land registration books to
Shanghai.
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divorce case was filed in Tianjin, for example, the U.S.
Court for China in Shanghai had jurisdiction over it so long
as the plaintiff was shown to be a a bona-fide resident of
Tianjin, China. Most of the divorce suits were filed by
women living in China whose husbands had abandoned
them. The U.S. Court for China granted them a divorce
once 90 days had elapsed after the granting of an interlocu-
tory order, and if the plaintiff applied for a final decree
within 30 days after the 90 days. The husband usually did
not show up, even after a summons was served upon him,
or after some legally prescribed effort was made to serve
hime. In that case, the divorce was granted in his
absence." 6 The marriages dissolved at the court were
entered into in Manila, Philippine Islands; Kobe, Japan;
Vancouver, British Columbia; Lowell, MA; "Vladivostok,
Siberia" and 'Vladivostok, Russia" (in 1931); San Diego,
California; Omaha, Nebraska.4 °7
The territorial component of the court's original juris-
diction made it broader than any federal court anywhere in
the United States. The court acted as a court of first
instance for cases arising anywhere in China or Korea. The
court's appellate jurisdiction was also defined by territory
and was broad as well. It included cases from all U.S. con-
sular courts in China (Shanghai, Tianjin, other cities(usually coastal ports)) and Korea, involving matters aris-
ing anywhere in China and Korea. This gave the U.S. Court
for China the largest territorial jurisdiction of any U.S.
federal district court, larger even than any of the federal
appeals courts, except of course, the Ninth Circuit's own
territorial jurisdiction after it was given the responsibility
to hear appeals from the U.S. Court for China.
"China" eroded as a territorial concept after the Russo-
Japanese war of 1894. Thereafter, the Chinese imperial
government increasingly was forced to lease or cede por-
tions of its territory, particularly in coastal cities, to foreign
powers. So the definition of "China" for purposes of deter-
mining the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. Court for
406. See, e.g., Ells, supra note 405, at 294.
407. See Bound Volume of Orders and Judgments, U.S. Court for China,
1929-1933, Vol. 7, Civil Cases, supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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China grew more problematic throughout the life of the
U.S. Court for China. In 1924 one defendant challenged the
jurisdiction of the court over a case arising in the city of
Dairen on the Liaodong peninsula. China had leased the
peninsula to Japan in 1905. The judge at the U.S. Court for
China ruled that his court maintained jurisdiction over the
case, even though China's lease occurred after China
granted U.S. citizens immunity from Chinese law in the
nineteenth century treaties. His rationale was that the U.S.
Congress had not passed an Act relinquishing U.S. treaty
rights.
The court's territorial jurisdiction was limited within
the city of Shanghai when it came to enforcing the court's
decisions. It extended only to the International Settlement,
an area that ran for much of the court's existence from a
prime section of the wharf of the harbor known as the Bund
westward toward an area around a large park called Jesse's
Field. The rest of the city was off-limits to American court
orders simply because it was deemed to be controlled by
either French or Chinese local governments.
These limits grew out of a local practice whereby the
various local governments of Shanghai cooperated with one
another in exchange for respecting each others' turf. The
practice bound the American Consular Court in Shanghai
as well. For example, a few years after the founding of the
U.S. court, the American Consular Court issued a judgment
against an American for a British landlord in the amount of
$700.65 for unpaid rent on a leased nightclub. The Interna-
tional Mixed Court of Shanghai had already ordered the
nightclub sealed and the Shanghai Municipal Police had
seized the American's possessions for auction to pay off his
debtors. The main issue in the consular suit was whether
the American had sold the club to a third party with a right
to re-enter reserved to himself. The defendant claimed to be
its owner up until he transferred it to the third party. The
Judge Hadley examined a written "bill of sale" and
concluded that it did not put the club in the possession of
the third party, even though it named him as purchaser.
The court reasoned that he had not made payment, and a
clause in the contract specified that the property would
revert back to the defendant if the third party did not keep
the terms of the contract. Upon judgment, the consular
court issued a document it called an "Execution" which be-
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gan with a salutation "The President of the United States of
America to the Marshal of the United States Consular
Court at Shanghai, China Greeting," and then a statement
of the amount of judgment, plus six percent annual interest
from the date of judgment and the accruing costs, and the
order:
[Y]ou are hereby directed to collect the same and unless paid on
demand, you are to seize any of his property within the jurisdiction
of this Court that may be shown to you by Jardine, Matheson &
Co., Ltd., and to sell sufficient thereof at public auction, after due
notice, to satisfy said judgment. And of all your acts herein make
due return within sixty days.
40 8
Thus, the venue and territorial jurisdiction of the court
bore no resemblance to those of the federal district courts
and much resemblance to those of the other courts of
Shanghai. In these ways, the U.S. Court for China was a
local court more than a court of the United States.
D. The Tension Between the Jurisdictional Rules and the
Court's Mandate to Promote American Interests
Although Congress aimed to create in the U.S. Court for
China a vehicle for promoting American interests,4 °9 it im-
posed on the court jurisdictional rules that prevented it
from redressing wrongs by non-Americans against Ameri-
cans and that made the court more like a court of Shanghai
than a federal court of the United States. The constraints of
treaties with China and of Congress's aim to curb the dis-
cretion of American judges in China combined to create a
court that, jurisdictionally speaking, was more local than
American in nature. The court was faced with an entirely
408. Jardine Matheson & Co. v. Gunther (Feb. 24, 1911); U.S. Consular
Court for the District of Shanghai, China; Box 22, B373; National Archives at
College Park, College Park, MD. (Filed Jan. 4 1911, signed and sealed by Vice
Consul General Hadley, acting judicially (emphasis added)).
409. See EILEEN P. ScuLLY, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE FROM AFAR:
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP IN TREATY PORT CHINA, 1844-1942 105-06 (Columbia
University Press 2001).
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different set of jurisdictional questions from those faced by
federal district courts.
The court resolved those questions without resort to
any law of the United States, but rather, according to the
rules current in Shanghai's other courts at that time.
Rather than spend all of its resources to determine whether
Americans had been wronged, personnel at the court
injected a great deal of energy into their investigations of
the nationality of defendants at the court, and into their
prosecutions of American defendants, even when foreign
plaintiffs were pressing the case.
Did the court's rulings nonetheless favor Americans
over non-Americans? American plaintiffs were spared the
deposit to defray court costs that non-American plaintiffs
had to pay.41° The practice of non-American plaintiffs as-
signing lawsuits to Americans, and the court's permission of
this practice, suggests that the court was more likely to rule
in favor of plaintiffs if they were both U.S. citizens and law-
yers, than if they were neither. The U.S. Court for China
recognized as valid the assignments by Chinese to
American attorneys, for a token amount ($ plus a fee),
their claims in commercial disputes against American citi-
zens. After securing the assignment, the attorneys then
litigated them in the U.S. Court for China and stood to gain
or lose as would the plaintiff.
Because a significant portion of the cases were brought
by non-Americans, a pro-American bias could be shown if
the court's rulings favored defendants over plaintiffs. They
did not. In fact plaintiffs almost always won. By my count,
plaintiffs prevailed in about 98 percent of the cases that
reached final judgment. A few patterns of exceptions stand
out, namely when the personnel of the court faced suit there
and when the U.S. government faced suit there. As an
example of the former, a British firm lost when it sued for
410. The Supplementary Rule J authorized the Court to require non-
American plaintiffs to pay security for costs, while Supplementary Rule N
shifted this payment from non-American plaintiffs onto their American co-
plaintiffs. The reason for this most likely was to discourage Americans from
serving as fronts for non-American plaintiffs who wished to evade paying
security for costs. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR
CHINA 18 (1939).
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unpaid rent the person who served both as the Clerk of
Court and the U.S. Marshal. In his answer the defendant
admitted owing some rent. But the U.S. Deputy Consul
General had affixed his signature and seal to the defen-
dant's answer. And the court found both parties equally at
fault, requiring the defendant to pay about half of what the
plaintiff asked for.
Apart from asserting citizenship of dozens of different
nations, who were the plaintiffs at the U.S. court? They
came from a wide range of society in Shanghai, including
some who were not very literate. About twenty percent of
the civil cases at the U.S. Court for China were Chinese
suing an American. The cases usually involved a Chinese
company suing an American individual for an outstanding
debt. Generally, the Chinese company was a contractor who
had built a house or refurbished an office for the American.
The American either had not paid in full or had not paid at
all. Most of the cases brought by Chinese never reached
final judgment, but were either dismissed or discontinued.
All Chinese applications for visas, in the form of a civil peti-
tion, through the court were denied between 1926 and 1939.
In cases that reached final judgment, Chinese plaintiffs
won about fifty percent of the time. In the sample I read, all
had hired American attorneys. While only American attor-
neys were permitted to practice before the court, the fact
that attorneys were hired at all in these cases suggests that
professional representation had something to do with the
favorable outcomes for Chinese plaintiffs. Chinese plaintiffs
tended to lose when the defendant was a U.S. corporation
rather than an individual.
An examination of each set of jurisdictional rules for
the court and the court's response to those rules has shown
that the court was faced with an entirely different set of ju-
risdictional questions from those faced by the federal
district courts of the period. At the same time, the court re-
solved those questions without resort to any law of the
411. See, e.g., Mafel & Co. v. George Collinwood, Box 40, 1891-1906, Civil
Cases at U.S. Court for China (National Archives). This group of cases was
decided in 1906, and appears to be among the first decided by the U.S. Court for
China.
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United States, but rather, according to the rules current in
Shanghai's other courts at that time. The jurisdiction of the
court also prevented it from targeting non-Americans who
had wronged Americans, and in this way it was impotent to
protect American interests in China. So, while the local and
sovereign aspects of the court's nature were in tension, in ajurisprudential sense, and in a practical, operational sense,
the court was more local than sovereign.
CHAPTER VI
A TRIUMPH OF LocAL LAW OVER SOVEREIGN LAW
The United States Court for China was more like the
other courts of Shanghai than like the federal district
courts of the United States. Its American veneer did not
penetrate its essentially local core. The court's similarity to
local institutions was not intended or promoted by its foun-
ders and others in Washington, D.C. and San Francisco in
charge of running it. Although these people could have been
better informed about the court and more vigilant about
helping it deal with its problems, they did not intend the
disjunction between the court's ostensible nature and its
local nature. All of this suggests that, at least in this case,
American local law was stronger, more stable, superior in
adaptability, more indelible, and more stubbornly rooted
than national law was when imposed extraterritorially.
The United States Court for China operated amidst a
tension between an overseas lawmaker and local subjects
and appliers of the law. Legislators and judges in Washing-
ton, D.C. and San Francisco aimed to impose the will of the
United States government upon Americans living in China,
while Americans living in China aimed to go about their
business there in ways they knew best after years of living
in Shanghai. These Americans were denizens of the special
communities of foreigners and Chinese created by the sys-
tem of Extraterritoriality, a system that was carved out by
treaties between China and thirteen other countries in the
nineteenth century.
This tension between overseas lawmakers and local
subjects and appliers of the law produced in the U.S. Court
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for China absurdities such as reliance on local police along
with care never to mention them in the court records; an
adherence to common law rules of evidence although no
jury was ever empaneled; the resort to law produced outside
of the United States but never to any law produced in
China, even by a law-making body dominated by Ameri-
cans; a subject matter jurisdiction that was as broad as that
of the state courts in the United States, but no recognition
of any forum of state law that could be applied at the court.
One way to view these absurdities is as evidence that
the American veneer of the court never quite penetrated to
the core of the institution. Calling it a "U.S. Court" and its
jurisdiction a "District" did not shrink the court's territorial
and subject matter jurisdictions to those of the U.S. district
courts. Making it subject to appeals to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals did not make it a creature of the Justice
Department, nor did it bring its procedures into conformity
with those of the U.S. district courts, namely by adding a
jury or a procedural code. Although Congress intended that
the court's judge possess the powers of a federal district
court judge and the Senate confirmed his appointment, he
did not serve a lifetime appointment, he was not listed in
the Federal Reporter, nor did the United States government
report his decisions. The personnel of the court served at
the pleasure of the President and assumed the titles of
personnel at U.S. district courts, but they performed tasks
that fell outside those job descriptions.
One reason that the U.S. Court for China was not fully
American in nature was the style of its management by fed-
eral officials. A cheaper way than direct and daily supervi-
sion to limit judicial discretion is to enforce on appeal a
narrow reading of the federal statutes granting the local
court jurisdiction, a reading which relies on interpretive
rules developed by the sovereign in its capitol. The efforts to
control the court from afar primarily by trying to limit judi-
cial discretion may have been easier than a more compre-
hensive and informed approach, but this approach was
relatively weak and required resort to legal fictions to make
the sovereign's rules fit the local circumstances.
An arms-length management style was not the sole
reason for the great impression that local law made upon
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the court. Congress, the President and the Secretary of
State, and the federal court system tried to create a wholly
American court in China, but the blueprint was not thought
through well enough to create an institution that resembled
courts anywhere in the United States nor one that was im-
mune to the allure of law closer by. No federal court in the
United States was allowed to adjudicate any kind of civil or
criminal case involving American defendants with no jury
and apply primarily federal statutes. Their efforts failed to
fashion an institution that was fully American in character
in part because of a desire to withhold from the court some
of the accoutrements of federal district courts that threat-
ened to root it even slightly in its locality, accoutrements
such as a jury, or a designated forum lawmaking body or a
law code or a procedural code tailored to its special circum-
stances. Ironically, however, by not giving the court these
elements of a federal court, Congress made the U.S. Court
for China more like the courts of its locality.
The failure of American officials in the United States to
create a wholly American institution cannot be attributed to
their actions or inactions alone. An important reason that
the court never became fully American in character was
that the personnel of the court resisted deviating much
from local practice. Though the Ninth Circuit expected the
judges of U.S. Court for China to abide by the distinction
between law and equity, the judges spent more energy on
helping one or both parties reach speedy solutions to their
conflict, as did the Chinese courts of the city. The U.S.
Attorney ignored Congress's mandate for the court to apply
federal statutes first and foremost, and instead based his
crusades against the vices that Shanghai was known for at
the time on general digestions of common law or on his own
sense of what was justified in that context. The court sur-
reptitiously applied local law, daring not to cite it, and
looked to local practice when enforcing its jurisdiction and
resolving jurisdictional questions.
These are all examples of a strong local orientation of
the U.S. Court for China, and they suggest an almost
ineluctable pull of local law upon the court. Why else would
the personnel of this court respect local law? They risked
censure from Washington and San Francisco if the respect
for local law were discovered. The court faced a climate of
disdain and almost paranoia in these two American cities
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about China and the U.S. Court for China. Federal
Congressmen launched several investigations of the court's
judges, and judges of the Ninth Circuit reproached the court
in their published appellate opinions. The absence of any
mention of any kind of state or local law in the statute that
established the court signaled loud and clear that local law
was off-limits as a source of authority.
Despite the efforts of American authorities back home
and the risks of censure to Americans in Shanghai, the
court remained at its core an institution of its immediate
surroundings, bearing the major traits of courts in the city
of Shanghai at that time. These traits were the lack of a
jury and the absence of any force of the U.S. Constitution, a
pro-Plaintiff bias in procedure and a pro-Defendant bias in
jurisdiction, a mediating role by the judge, cooperation with
courts in Shanghai run by other sovereigns, the lack of a
local or regional lawmaking body that supplied the court
with its primary source of legislated rules, the relative lack
of guidance of the court's decisions supplied by case law, the
application of national laws from around the world, and the
jurisdiction of the court defined more by the local orienta-
tion toward personal jurisdiction than the orientation in the
United States at the time toward territorial jurisdiction.
Most of these traits differed from the traits common to
federal trial courts in the United States at that time.
Federal district courts empaneled juries, applied the U.S.
Constitution, promoted a distant and neutral role for the
judge, an appearance of autonomy from the neighboring
court systems of the states, the existence and application of
forum law, along with the application of appellate case law
produced in their territorial jurisdictions, no attention
payed to laws of other countries, and a jurisdiction defined
more by territory than the characteristics of the defendant.
Not only was the U.S. Court for China local in the sense
that it jurisprudentially resembled local courts more than
the U.S. district courts, but also in the sense that the court
failed in crucial ways to serve American interests. The
court's personnel were familiar with the needs of parties
and with local interests, and this familiarity helped to pre-
vent the court from becoming a vehicle for protecting the
interests of the United States. The personal jurisdiction of
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the court prevented it from prosecuting or holding liable
non-Americans who had wronged Americans.
Thus, while the local and sovereign aspects of the
court's nature were in tension, in both a jurisprudential
sense and a practical, operational sense, local won out over
sovereign. The consistent record of failure by lawmakers in
the United States to keep the court, from operating in so
many ways as a local institution suggests that the locality
exerted a strong pull on the court. One could speculate
about the motives of officials in the United States to create
a court in China that would masquerade as a United States
federal district court even as it lacked the essential ingredi-
ents of such a court, a procedural code, a jury, a state
lawmaker, and a jurisdiction defined largely by the terri-
tory of a state. A number of explanations for this
incongruence are plausible, including inattention, indiffer-
ence, ignorance, arrogance, and even racism. Whichever
mixture of these factors one is convinced by, however, the
U.S. Court for China stands as an example of local law tri-
umphing over sovereign law.
A. Local Law and Extraterritorial Law Generally
This summary of the evidence that the court was more
a creature of its immediate surroundings than of its official
analogs half a world away raises the difficult problem of the
meaning of "local law." What is "local law"? Of course the
inhabitants of cities, and even of neighborhoods within cit-
ies, do not think alike in all respects. But clusters of
interests coalesce around the circumstances in which these
people live, and these interests, as diverse as they might be,
are all local. We have seen how the court was influenced by
U.S. consular officers stationed in Shanghai, and that these
officers were supposed to protect American interests over
the interests of other nationals in Shanghai. But these offi-
cers were influenced by practices and interests and
concerns of the people near whom they lived. The structure
of the court, which resembled more that of courts in Shang-
hai, than those in the United States, in turn encouraged the
orientation of these officers toward Shanghai. Furthermore,
the Americans whose interests the officers protected or
promoted resided in Shanghai, some for many years, some
their whole lives, and their connection to the United States
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despite the formality of their citizenship, was not necessar-
ily stronger than their connection to Shanghai. In this sense
we can say that their interests were at least to some extent
local and not sovereign. Even when it dared not cite to any
Chinese law or law legislated in Shanghai, which happened
in most of its decisions, the court had room to apply and
develop local law in the form of custom.
Even if one accepts that the U.S. Court for China was a
local institution, might this conclusion tell us little about
the nature of law more generally? If the court was a thor-
oughly idiosyncratic institution, then yes, we would be ill-
advised to generalize from it that local law tends to triumph
over law imposed from a greater distance. So the problem of
the court's uniqueness must be examined.
Of course the U.S. Court for China was unique, as all
courts are. But the real question is whether the court was
atypical of courts in a way that would prevent us from gen-
eralizing from it. To be sure, the court appears bizarre to
those of us familiar with federal courts in the United
States. It would be tempting to dismiss the U.S. Court for
China as an oddity with no relevance to anything, simply
because it operated outside the territory governed by the
United States. This view is misguided, however, because it
assumes that the attempt to impose law from a great dis-
tance upon an alien jurisdiction is unusual, for the United
States or for other sovereign states. The falsity of this
assumption is clear from the dozens of places in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries where law was imposed ex-
traterritorially.
This type of court was not unique in Shanghai. For the
same reason that the officers of the U.S. Court for China
helped to make it a local institution, the law legislated in
Shanghai by British and American residents of the city was
more local than foreign in nature. By the same token, too,
the decisions by the Chinese courts of Shanghai were more
controlled by local than national agendas. Being a prime
cite of the "system of Extraterritoriality,"as it was called at
the time, a rubric that governments outside of China im-
posed on China in a time of weak central rule there,
Shanghai was riddled with tensions between local and sov-
ereign, whether sovereign referred to Chinese nationalists
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or the federal government of the United States or the gov-
ernments of Great Britain and others. Despite these
tensions and their affiliations with these different sover-
eigns, all the courts of Shanghai shared fundamental
characteristics. Chinese governmental control over the city
was so tenuous during the period of the U.S. Court for
China's existence, and so decentralized, that Shanghai's law
and legal institutions should not be described as primarily
"Chinese" in nature.412
Nor was the system that prevailed in Shanghai
unknown elsewhere. Dozens of extraterritorial courts oper-
ated in other places around the world during the late nine-
teenth century and through the first seven decades of the
twentieth. France ran consular courts and mixed courts in
China and Egypt 413 and colonial courts in Algeria, 14 Britain
ran them in India, 5 China, Japan,4"6 Hong Kong, 7 and
Singapore, the United States ran consular courts elsewhere
412. Lee, Local Autonomy, supra note 162, at 350-354.
413. For a comprehensive study of French influence in Egypt, including the
part played by courts, see TIMOTHY MITCHELL, COLONIZING EGYPT (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988). For a thoughtful reflection on the French effort to build a
legal system in Egypt, see Nathan J. Brown, Law and Imperialism: Egypt in
Comparative Perspective, 29 LAW & SockY REV. 103, 103-25 (1995). For a
reference to the mixed courts in Egypt and French involvement in the legal
system there at the end of the nineteenth century, see 2 LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE
WORLD: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 463-64 (Herbert M.
Kritzer ed., 2002) [hereinafter Kritzer].
414. See Mohammed Bedjaoui, Algeria, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMPARATIVE LAW, NATIONAL REPORTS, at A21 (Victor Knapp ed., 1972)
[hereinafter Knapp] ("The French authorities did not replace [Islamic] law or
abrogate it.. .but introduced their own law side by side with the existing law.");
Kritzer, supra note 413, at 35-37.
415. See W. Ross JOHNSTON, SOVEREIGNTY AND PROTECTION: A STUDY OF
BRITISH JURISDICTIONAL IMPERIALISM IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 3
(1973).
416. See F.C. JONES, EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN: AND THE DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS RESULTING IN ITS ABOLITION: 1853-1899, 35-41 (AMS Press 1970)
(1931).
417. See Erick Marcks, English Law in Early Hong Kong: Colonial Law as a
Means for Control and Liberation, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 265 (2000); YASH GHAI,
HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 25 (H.K. Univ. Press 1997).
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in China, and in Japan,418 and federal courts in Panama,419
Hawaii,42° Guam,42 ' Puerto Rico,42 and Berlin.423 This is only
a partial list of courts that were established by govern-
ments oceans away with the purpose of exerting the
sovereignty of the distant government upon the territory
surrounding the court.
The courts of the territories of Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Utah, and other areas in the
western United States in the few decades before they be-
came states experienced a similar tension between the role
of enforcing the sovereign's interests that Congress
intended, on the one hand, and the pull from local interests
and residents on the other. Each of these territories had a
legislature and a court system topped by a supreme court,
whose decisions were appealable to the United States
Supreme Court.424 The courts of these territories struck
down some of the laws enacted by their legislatures,425 a
practice that does not necessarily suggest that either the
courts or the legislatures were puppets of the federal gov-
ernment. Though they used the United States Supreme
Court as their basis, these disagreements could have been
418. JONES, supra note 416, at 41-44, 49, 52, 65, 69; Crawford M. Bishop,
American Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in China, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 284.
419. See Gilberto Boutin, Panama, in 1 Knapp, supra note 414, at 17, 20
("The Panamanian legal system is essentially civilian, despite strong Anglo-
American influences.").
420. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, § 246, 36 Stat. 1087, 1158.
421. See GUAM; FEDERAL DIGEST, 1950-1987: A DIGEST OF ALL PUBLISHED
GUAM CASES REPORTED IN THE SUPREME COURT REPORTER, FEDERAL REPORTER 2D
AND THE FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT (Territory of Guam, Compiler of Laws, Office of
the Attorney General, Agana, Guam, 1988); 2 Kritzer, supra note 413, at 610-
11.
422. See 3 Kritzer, supra note 413, at 1341-43.
423. See generally Herbert Stern, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN (Universe Books
1984).
424. For the federal authorization for appeals from the supreme courts of
Arizona, New Mexico, and Alaska to the United States Supreme Court, see Act
of Mar. 3, 1911, §§ 245, 247, 36 Stat. 1087, 1158.
425. See Gordon Morris Bakken, Judicial Review in the Rocky Mountain
Territorial Courts, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 56, 60-62 (1971), reprinted in JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 14, 18-20 (Kermit L. Hall ed. 1987).
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largely local in nature, the constitutional language masking
personal disputes of the local residents.
The United States also exerted its law extraterritorially
by placing a foreign court system under the appellate juris-
diction of the United States Supreme Court. An example of
this, in the Philippines just after the turn of the twentieth
century, suggests that Shanghai was not the only locality
abroad whose law the authorities in Washington attempted
to supplant through the action of its federal courts. As in
Shanghai, too, the effort did not immediately wipe out the
application of local law, which at that time in the
Philippines was a slightly Germanified version of Spanish
law. On the contrary, local law remained in place, with the
greatest influence from the United States exerted in the
public law area.426
The lack of not just respect for, but even recognition of,
local law by United States authorities dealing with the U.S.
Court for China echoes through the treatment by the
United States of choice of law questions in the Philippines
when it was a territory of the United States. In 1902,
Congress gave to the United States Supreme Court "juris-
diction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm the finaljudgments and decrees of the supreme court of the
Philippine Islands" in most types of cases. 27 The failure to
capitalize in the statute the name of the Philippine's high-
est court signaled a lack of respect for local prerogatives
that went along with Congress's giving the President of the
United States the authority to select those judges for
confirmation by the Senate. Congress also authorized pro-
cedures for ensuring input by United States officials into
the selection of the judges of all the other courts of the
Philippines.428
When the United States Supreme Court exercised
jurisdiction over appeals from the Supreme Court of the
426. See Thomas H. Reynolds & Arturo A. Flores, Foreign Law Guide:
Current Sources of Codes and Basic Legislation in Jurisdictions of the World,
"Philippines," at http://foreignlawguide.com/login.htm (last visted Sept. 8, 2003)
(subscription database available at Florida State University College of Law
Library).
427. Act of July 1, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-235, § 10, 32 Stat. 691, 695.
428. See id. § 9, 32 Stat. at 695.
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Philippines, as it regularly did between 1902 and 1927 after
Spain ceded the islands to the United States in 1898, it ex-
ercised broad discretion in deciding where in the Philippine
legal landscape U.S. law trumped and supplanted other
conflicting law. Congress made none of these decisions, and
the Supreme Court acted as if the rest of these decisions
were up to it. In exercising this authority, however, the
Supreme Court produced results that were confusing
mainly because they were inconsistent and arbitrary. For
one thing, in some decisions the Court asserted that the
presumption was that local law be left undisturbed,
whereas in others the presumption was that sovereign law
trumped local law.
When the U.S. Supreme Court overrode local law in the
Philippines during this period, it showed a willingness to
concede the existence of local law, and that local law re-
mained vital throughout this period of extraterritorial rule.
Justice Holmes writing for a majority of that Court in one
opinion came closest to admitting this when he asserted
that "every presumption is and ought to be against the
[sovereign] government" as to issues about land ownership
of indigenous people.129 His position attests to the pull of
local law upon the courts of the Philippines even when their
judges were appointed by the United States and their deci-
sions reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
At the same time, the United States Supreme Court
was even more forthright about the exercise of American
sovereignty in the Philippines than it was about it in China.
In appeals from the Philippines, the Court often took the
position that sovereignty trumps local power. Justice Day,
for example, writing for the majority, invoked a watered-
down historio-anthropology to bolster the notion that
United States sovereignty supplants local power wherever
it may reign:
Even in the older states, where society is most homogeneous and
has fewest of the elements of disquiet and disorder, the state
reserves to itself the right to shape municipal institutions; and
429. Mateo Carino v. Insular Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 212 U.S. 449,
460 (1909).
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towns and cities are long formed under its directions, and
according to the rules and within the limits the state prescribes.43 °
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority in the same
opinion in which he touted a presumption in favor of local
land custom, ruminated that sovereignty is a question of
strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign
shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to
the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual
facts, are matters for it to decide.43'
To compound this confusion over the official boundary
between local and sovereign law, the Court did not always
specify whether a law was local or sovereign in character.
Embarking on such a delineation would have been difficult,
since the dichotomy would have broken down upon exami-
nation. How, for example, would the Court have categorized
the regulations enacted by the government of the Philip-
pines that the United States installed after it acquired
sovereignty from Spain? Congress delegated to this gov-
ernment the power to enact laws for the Philippines, but
Congress itself also exercised that power. Whether for want
of the stomach to tackle such intellectual conundrums, or
some other reason, the Court did not attempt to develop a
legal framework for categorizing laws as local or sover-
432
eign.
430. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 147 (1904).
431. Carino, 212 U.S. at 458.
432. For cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the scope of United
States law in the Philippines, see Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911)(U.S. constitutional law imported into the Philippines by U.S. statute and by
U.S. common law); Reavis v. Fianza, 215 U.S. 16 (1909) (read a rule from local
law into a section of the United States 1902 Act for the Philippines); Dorr, 195
U.S. at 142-44 (Congress may refuse to incorporate into the United States a
territory ceded to the United States by treaty and yet retain full powers to
legislate for that territory); Carino, 212 U.S. at 449; Bosque v. United States,
209 U.S. 91 (1908) (United States law on professions supplanted Spanish law);
Ong Chang Wing v. United States, 218 U.S. 272, 280 (1910) (a lawmaking body
of the Philippines has the power to alter the scope of provisions in the Penal
Code of the Philippines); Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549 (1913) (the Philippine
government had the power to deport aliens from the Philippines while the
United States was sovereign); Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106, 111 (1913) (U.S.
principles of law supplant Spanish law with the establishment of U.S. courts in
the Philippines).
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The Supreme Court failed to take up this task even
though it used these categories to define its jurisdiction
over appeals from the Philippines. Under the influence of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Supreme Court limited
its jurisdiction over the Philippines with a doctrine exclud-
ing from it "local" decisions about "local" law unless there
was "clear error."'433 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court heard
appeals involving what in the United States were beyond
its jurisdiction because relegated to the states-divorces,434
contracts, 435 property,4 36 and inheritance. 37 Congress limited
the Court's jurisdiction over appeals from the Philippines
by jurisdictional amount 38 but not by the type of law that
needed to be interpreted in order to resolve the issue on
appeal. 39 In exercising this jurisdiction, the United States
Supreme Court did not hesitate to interpret the statutes of
the legislature of the Philippines," ° the Philippine Code of
Civil Procedure," 1 the Spanish Civil Code which had been
in force in the Philippines since its takeover by the Span-
433. See Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541, 544 (1927); Tayabas Land
Co. v. Manila R.R. Co., 250 U.S. 22, 27 (1919); Gauzon v. Compania General de
Tobacos de Filipinas, 245 U.S. 86, 89 (1917); De la Rama v. De la Rama, 241
U.S. 154, 158 (1916); De Villanueva v. Villanueva, 239 U.S. 293, 299 (1915).
434. See, e.g., De la Rama v. De la Rama, 201 U.S. 303 (1906).
435. See, e.g., Beaumont v. Prieto, 249 U.S. 554 (1919); Philippine Sugar
Estates Dev. Co. v. Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 247 U.S. 385 (1918).
436. See Roura v. Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 218 U.S. 386, 396-97
(1910).
437. See Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, 228 U.S. 335 (1913).
438. The amount was $25,000 between 1911 and 1916. See Act of March 3,
1911, Pub. L. No. 475, § 248, 36 Stat. 1087, 1158. For appeals from the
Philippines dismissed by the United States Supreme Court for want of
jurisdiction amount, see Enriquez v. Enriquez, 222 U.S. 123 (1911); Enriquez. v.
Enriquez, 222 U.S. 127 (1911); Martinez v. Int'l Banking Corp., 220 U.S. 214
(1911); Tupino v. La Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 214 U.S. 268
(1909); Harty v. Municipality of Victoria, 226 U.S. 12 (1912); Exp. & Imp.
Lumber Co. v. Port Banga Lumber Co., 237 U.S. 388 (1915).
439. See Act of September 6, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-258, § 5, 39 Stat. 726, 727;
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, § 248, 36 Stat. 1087, 1158.
440. See Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 555-58 (1913); Ling Su Fan v. United
States, 218 U.S. 302 (1910); Ubeda v. Zialcita, 226 U.S. 452 (1913).
441. See, e.g., Ibanez v. H. K. & Shanghai Banking Corp., 246 U.S. 621, 623-
27 (1918); Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Campbell, 205 U.S. 403, 408 (1907).
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ish ,442 the Philippine Penal Code,443 but the United States
Congress left them alone.444
In exercising its broad discretion over which law
applied to the Philippines, the U.S. Supreme Court often
turned to United States law for the crucial tiebreaker in a
stalemate between conflicting legal authorities. 45 It ex-
tended the extraterritorial reach of United States law in
this way even where local law arguably applied. 46 The mainjob of the United States Supreme Court in its appeals from
the Philippines, then, appears to have been to replace local
law with sovereign law in a slow, case-by-case fashion. That
the effort was confused and protracted suggests that local
law exerted a strong pull on the courts of the Philippines
despite the great pressure from authorities in the United
States to extend United States law to that area.
442. See Calvo v. Gutierrez, 208 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1908); Roura v. Gov't of
the Philippine Islands, 218 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1910).
443. See Carrington v. United States, 208 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1908).
444. See Foreign Law Guide, supra note 427.
445. See, e.g., Jover v. Insular Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 221 U.S. 623,
668 (1911) (United States precedent supplies the relevant presumption about
the authority of a prior Spanish governor of the Philippines to dispose of a tract
of land); Vilas v. Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 356-57, 360 (1911) (United States
precedent supplies the crucial rule about municipal liability of a previous
Manila government); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909) (U.S.
constitutional law, via the 1902 Act for the Philippines, trumps conflicting
provision in the Philippines Penal Code); Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431
(1909) (U.S. law supported the result even if local law did not); Grafton v.
United States, 206 U.S. 333, 350-351 (1907) (Anglo-American legal treatises
cited to interpret the Philippines Penal Code); Freeman v. United States, 217
U.S. 539, 593-594 (1910) (United States precedent used to interpret 1902 Act for
the Philippines); Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. v. Gov't of the Philippine Islands,
219 U.S. 17, 219 (1910) (United States and English precedent invoked to
interpet a contract); Reavis v. Fianza, 215 U.S. 16, 24-25 (1909) (United States
precedent applied to interpret the 1902 Act for the Philippines); Tiglao v.
Insular Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 215 U.S. 410, 417 (1910) (United States
precedent applied to interpret a provision of the Spanish Civil Code); Enriquez
v. Go-Tiongco, 220 U.S. 307, 310 (1911) (United States and Philippines
precedent cited to resolve an inheritance question).
446. See, e.g., Phil. Sugar Estates Dev. Co. v. Gov't of the Philippine Islands,
247 U.S. 385, 390 (1918); Beaumont v. Prieto, 249 U.S. 554 (1919); Ker & Co. v.
Douden, 223 U.S. 268, 275 (1912); Chantangco v. Abaroa, 218 U.S. 476, 483
(1910).
A TRIUMPH OF LOCAL LAW
B. The Future of Local Law in the Face of
Extraterritoriality, Federalism, and Globalization
If extraterritorial courts could be relegated to a by-gone
era, then the experience of the United States Court for
China might not say much about law today. The United
States continues to run such courts, however, such as in
American Samoa,44 7 Puerto Rico and the Territorial Court of
the U.S. Virgin Islands, and they do not appear to have
wiped away local law. The latter court applies as a first
resort a local code that remained largely unchanged after
the United States assumed governance of the area in
1917.448 The local code is the touchstone in contract cases,
though only where it conflicts with law in the United States
and does not cover the instant case. In this event, the
United States' Restatement of Contracts controls and case
law from any state of the United States may be applied.449
Similarly, in criminal cases, the relevant local statute
should be applied, though where its language tracks a
United States federal statute, the local statute should be in-
terpreted as courts in the United States have interpreted
the language from the federal'statute.450 Procedure follows
that of federal district courts in the United States, with the
court's own rules filling in the gaps,451 just as is done in the
district courts.
Not only does the United States continue to operate
courts that are products of a colonial policy a century ago,
but its current ministrations abroad leave it open to estab-
lishing new extraterritorial courts. With the United States
447. Ninth Circuit Judges sit by designation on the High Court of American
Samoa, Appellate Division, see, e.g., Moananu Va v. Alofipo, 25 Am. Samoa 2d
37, 38 (1993). Appeals from the High Court are to the United States Secretary
of the Interior. See Alamoana Recipe v. Am. Sam. Gov't, 25 Am. Samoa 2d 97
(1993).
448. 4 Kritzer, supra note 413, at 1759.
449. See Tourism Indus. v. Hourigan, Civ. No. 892/1992, 1995 WL 217607
(Terr.V.I. Mar. 7, 1995).
450. See Guadalupe v. Simmonds, Civ. No. 539/1994, 1995 WL 301699
(Terr.V.I. Mar. 21, 1995).
451. See Marcano v. Cowpet Beach Resort, Inc., Civ. No. 570/1990, 1995 WL
217600 (Terr.V.I. Mar. 9, 1995).
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setting up a new government in Iraq with a tribunal to try
452
members of its recently ousted regime, the creation of a
new territorial court in the Middle East is not completely
removed from the realm of possibility in the foreseeable
future. While the United States has been housing fighters
from Afganistan in Cuba for a few years now, preparations
are being made for setting up a court in Cuba to try them.
4 5 1
While more exhaustive studies might prove otherwise,
it appears that in all the extraterritorial courts mentioned
here, past and present, local circumstances exerted an ine-
luctable pull on the operations of the court, despite their
charge to implement laws and policies emanating from
Washington. Though not identical with one another, the
territorial and colonial courts of the United States form a
pattern of sovereign dictates bowing in one way or another
before the exigencies of local practice. Set against this pat-
tern, the ineluctable force of local law at U.S. Court for
China appears less like an aberration and more like a vivid
example of a common phenomenon.
The pattern appears not just in extraterritorial courts,
but also in other ways that the influence of sovereign law is
extended outside the sovereign's territory. The Central and
Eastern Europe Law Institute of the American Bar Associa-
tion and programs funded by the United States government
452. See, e.g., Bill Keller, Editorial, Digging Up The Dead, N.Y. TIMES, May
3, 2003, A19; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Patrick E. Tyler, Iraqi's Plan War-Crime
Court; G.I.'s to Stay Until Elections, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2003, at A9; Thorn
Shanker & Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Wants Iraqis to Judge Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
1, 2003, at Al.
453. See, e.g., K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, Comment, The Executive Policy
Toward Detention and Trial of Foreign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21
BERKLEY J. INT'L L. 662 (2003); Joan Fitzpatrick, Soverignty, Territoriality, and
the Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 303 (2002); Michael Ratner,
Moving Away From the Rule of Law: Military Tribunals, Executive Detentions
and Torture, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513 (2003); Juan R. Torruella, On the
Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commissions and the Exercise of
Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648 (2002); Richard J. Wilson, United
States Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights Responds to a "Legal Black Hole," 10 HUM. RTS. BR., Spring
2003, at 2; Neil A. Lewis, Six Detainees Soon May Face Military Trials, N.Y.
TIMES, July 4, 2003, at Al; Sarah Lyall, Families of 2 British Terrorism
Suspects Oppose Military Trials by the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2003, at A7;
Katharine Q. Seelye, U.S. Seeking Guantanamo Defense Staff, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 2003, at A16.
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send American lawyers abroad to train local lawyers in
American law, and although at least one observer main-
tained over two decades ago that such programs led in
Africa to the "displacement" of local law,"' the results since
then do not support that.
The practice of federalism requires an extension of sov-
ereign law beyond the geographic boundaries of its creation
and into the local arena. Even in the most centralized
federations, like Germany, and in legal systems with the
strongest federal courts, like the United States, local law
flourishes. In unitary legal systems like China and France,
local law survives and even flowers from time to time,
though it may have to be hidden in the silent application of
custom or common law.4 5
In this electronic age, are distances collapsing, thus
facilitating the imposition of law over great distances? Yes,
but only to the extent that information about local circum-
stances and a stake in those circumstances is enhanced by
the technology. The phenomenon known as the "globaliza-
tion of law" is portrayed as an ever-expanding extraterrito-
rial imposition of law.45 6 The degree to which local law is
454. See JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM 5, 11 (1980).
455. See, e.g., Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits:
Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L. J. 1325 (1995);
Tahirih V. Lee, The Future of Federalism in China, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE
OF LAW IN CHINA 271, 291, 295 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000); NEVIL
JOHNSON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: THE
ExEcuTIvE AT WORK 119-34, 138-39, 142, 149 (2d ed. 1983); PHILIP M. BLAIR,
FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN WEST GERMANY 4-6, 246, 254 (1981);
RICHARD H. LEACH, STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE FEDERALISM: AUSTRALIA, CANADA,
THE UNITED STATES, AND WEST GERMANY 22 (1982); DWIGHT HERPERGER,
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS AND FUNCTIONS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS 5 (1991); EDWARD
MCWHINNEY, FEDERAL CONSTITUTION-MAKING FOR A MULTI-NATIONAL WORLD 46-
47 (1966).
456. For just a few works that portray it this way, see Anthony King,
Architecture, Capital and the Globalization of Culture, in GLOBAL CULTURE:
NATIONALISM, GLOBALIZATION AND MODERNITY 399 (Mike Featherstone ed.,
1990); Lucie Cheng, Chinese Americans in the Formation of the Pacific Regional
Economy, in ACROSS THE PACIFIC: ASIAN AMERICANS AND GLOBALIZATION, 61-78
(Evelyn Hu-DeHart ed., 1999); Arif Dirlik, Asians on the Rim: Transnational
Capital and Local Community in the Making of Contemporary Asian America,
in id. at 29; AZIZUR RAHMAN KHAN AND CARL RISKIN, INEQUALITY AND POVERTY IN
CHINA IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (2001); GLOBALIZATION-AND THE WORLD OF
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being transformed under the pressure from a western or
globalized law encroaching from far away is poorly under-
stood but there is evidence that local law is holding its
own.
4 57
All of these various types of efforts to extend sovereign
law over geographical space ultimately run up against local
law. Though the size, status, and military force of sover-
eigns appear to be greater than those of localities, local
residents possess a power that sovereigns do not. Local
residents possess a familiarity with their needs and circum-
stances that is superior to that possessed by operatives of
the sovereign who remain in their distant home. This
familiarity constitutes a unique and invaluable genius that
makes for more workable laws and laws that have a good
chance of surviving pressures from distant law.
What about the superior recruiting capability of
national legal institutions over local ones? National law
schools, courts, governments, and legislatures may be able
to attract personnel who are ambitious or worldly because
they offer more power. The power comes from the size of
territory over which these people have responsibility. But
more intelligent, more hard-working? Better at their jobs?
Surely not. Even if they exceeded local institutions in these
latter respects, national institutions face the perennial
LARGE CITIES, (Fu-Chen Lo & Yue-Man Yeung eds., 1998); XIAOHUA YANG,
GLOBALIZATION OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY: THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1995); Srilata Zaheer, Currency Trading and
Information Networks: The Role of Foreignness (presentation at Workshop on
International Economic Policy, Humphrey Institute and University of
Minnesota International Trade Consortium, Jan. 25, 1994) (discussing research
that relates survival in global currency trading to both the parent bank's
multinational network and to the local information network of the affiliate) (on
file with author); Stephen J. Kobrin, Beyond Geography: Inter-Firm Networks
and the Structural Integration of the Global Economy (presentation at
Workshop on International Economic Policy, Humphrey Institute and
University of Minnesota International Trade Consortium, Feb. 8, 1994)
(attempting to devise a new way to conceptualize global economic integration)
(on file with author); RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE
(1999); ROBERT W. COMPTON, JR., EAST ASIAN DEMOCRATIZATION: IMPACT OF
GLOBALIZATION, CULTURE, AND ECONOMY (2000).
457. See JAMES H. MITTELMAN, THE GLOBALIZATION SYNDROME:
TRANSFORMATION AND RESISTANCE (2000); Carol A.G. Jones, Capitalism,
Globalization and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal Change in
China, 3 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 195, 215 (1994).
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problem of integrating their personnel into a local setting.
Everyone has to live and work somewhere. This integration
poses threats to people's national loyalties no matter how
ambitious or worldly they are. The extent to which national
institutions do not integrate into any locality is the extent
to which they remain distant from the problems which they
are charged to deal with.
The triumph of local law at the United States Court for
China is far from an isolated and idiosyncratic occurrence.
On the contrary, it is an example, perhaps more starkly
drawn than others, of common traits of law, namely, law's
resistence and resilience in the face of efforts from far away
to usurp it.

